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vABSTRACT
The main objective of monetary policy is to protect the value of the
currency, and in so doing, achieve the objectives of maximum economic
growth, development, and the creation of employment opportunities.  As
from 1985, under the advice of the De Kock Commission, the South
African Reserve Bank (SARB), implemented the classical cash reserve
system of monetary control. Under this system, the SARB was willing to
refinance the money market shortage fully, automatically, and on certain
predetermined terms, conditions and costs.  However, since the new
political dispensation in 1994, South Africa’s financial markets have
become more globalized, liberalised, and integrated.  Thus, the classical
cash reserve system had lost its usefulness, and was no longer effective.
 As from March 1998, the SARB implemented the new repurchase
system of monetary control.
In implementing the repurchase system of monetary control, South Africa
was adopting a more eclectic approach.  This system is aimed at making
monetary policy more effective and more flexible in a financial
environment filled with complexities.  This study finds that the repurchase
system has thus far been successful in meeting its objectives. Interest
rates are more flexible and sensitive to developments in the domestic
and external environment, the signalling mechanism of the SARB has
proved to be successful, accommodation and interest rates are closely
related and the interbank market has become more developed. 
Therefore, the repurchase system appears to be more efficient than the
previous system of monetary control in South Africa.
vi
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1CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT OF THE STUDY
The main objective of monetary policy in South Africa is to protect the
value of the rand, that is, to combat the problem of inflation  (Stals,
1997b: 1; Mboweni, 2000: 3).  If achieved, this could also result in
success regarding the secondary objectives of maximum economic
growth, development and the creation of employment opportunities. 
Thus, the goal of price stability is a precondition for the attainment of
optimum economic development, growth and stability.  On a more
technical note, the monetary control mechanism used by central banks
to achieve the above differ from country to country. This is the area in
which this research is intended to make a contribution, as be will be
highlighted below.
In South Africa, the De Kock Commission was appointed in 1977 to
investigate various aspects of monetary control.  In its final report (1985),
the Commission recommended a control mechanism based on the
classical cash reserve system, which was a market-oriented approach.
 This led to the implementation during the 1980s of the control
procedures which had been in place up to March 1998.  Under this
system, the South African Reserve Bank was willing to refinance the
money market shortage fully and automatically, on certain prearranged
terms, conditions and costs, which meant that the banks’ demand for
liquidity was met fully, provided that they could supply the collateral
needed.  Herein the Bank Rate was the key operational variable of the
control mechanism.  Hence, changes in the Bank Rate and associated
2refinancing rates were used to influence the general level of interest
rates, growth in bank credit and in the money supply, and through the
transmission mechanism, economic activity and inflation.
A new monetary control procedure, called the ’repurchase system’, was
introduced in South Africa in March 1998.  In the new system, access to
Reserve Bank funds is restricted to the amount put up for tender on a
daily basis.  Banks tender for funds by using repurchase agreements.
One of the reasons given by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) for
the introduction of the new system is that the financial markets have
been moving towards being more globalised, liberalised, and integrated,
with more volatile capital movements between countries in which South
Africa’s financial institutions have to operate  (Van der Merwe, 1997a: 1).
The implementation of this new system currently represents breaking
new ground, as a result of which various uncertainties regarding its
operation still exist.  There are several research questions relating to the
new repurchase system, which will form the basis for this research.  
1.2 GOALS OF THE RESEARCH
The first goal of this research is to explore the theoretical foundations of
the systems of monetary control in place in South Africa from the time
of the De Kock Commission.  The reasons for the implementation of
these systems will also be addressed.  The present system will be
compared to the previous one.
Secondly, the research will attempt to assess the relative merits of the
new policy, by considering international evidence, particularly Germany.
It is important to investigate how other countries using this system have
3fared with it, in order to ascertain South Africa’s potential success with
it.
The third goal is to investigate the impact of the new procedures on the
financial aggregates in South Africa, such as interest rates, money
supply growth and SARB accommodation. 
Finally, it needs to be investigated whether or not banks are making
more use of the interbank loans market as an alternative to SARB
accommodation under the present system.  This is an important issue
in the light of the uncertainty and risk attached to the new process of
tendering for Reserve Bank funds.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
This study will cover the time frame between 1945 and 2000, placing
emphasis particularly on the period between 1980 up to January 2000.
The theoretical foundations of the new control mechanism will be
explored by means of a literature study.  In comparing the present policy
with the previous one, secondary information, particularly Reserve Bank
publications, will be used.
The relative merits of the present system will be evaluated by
considering evidence from Germany, where the same approach has
been in place for some time.  Through this case study, the potential
success of the policy could be brought to light and inferences for South
Africa may be drawn.
4Regarding the empirical part of the research, that is, the relationships
between the Bank Rate and the Repo Rate on the one hand and money
market interest rates, the level of accommodation, and the money supply
on the other, data analysis as well as basic time series studies, will be
used.
In the case of the impact of the repurchase system on Reserve Bank
accommodation to the banking system and possible developments in the
interbank loans market, statistical comparisons will be done.
1.4 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The following study outline has been developed to facilitate the
realisation of the aims of the research: 
Chapter Two will discuss the theoretical foundations of monetary policy.
This chapter will focus on the various schools of thought, and how they
view monetary policy in terms of its effectiveness in achieving its goals.
In particular, the Classical, orthodox Keynesian, Monetarist and Post-
Keynesian schools of thought will be analysed. 
Chapter Three is devoted to the development of monetary policy in
South Africa from the period of Dr. Gerhard De Kock up until March
1998.  This chapter will look at the various phases of monetary policy
and what impact the various schools of thought had on them.  In so
doing, it will also discuss how monetary policy functioned in this period,
and the different instruments used in achieving its objectives.  Finally,
Chapter Three will investigate why the previous system of monetary
policy was abandoned in South Africa, so as to understand why it was
necessary to implement a new system of monetary control.    
5Following the discussion of the previous system of monetary control, it
will become evident for what reasons South Africa had to implement a
new system.  Therefore, Chapter Four will discuss the repurchase
system as applied in Germany, examining how it worked, and
establishing the successes and failures it has had with the system.  This
discussion will therefore serve as an introduction to Chapter Five, which
deals with the repurchase system as applied in South Africa.  This
chapter will discuss how the repurchase system functions in South
Africa. 
Building on the above, Chapter Six will analyse the impact of the
repurchase system on various financial aggregates in South Africa.  In
particular, interest rates, money supply growth and SARB
accommodation will be analysed, comparing the previous system with
the present one.  The statistical comparisons will date from January
1996 to February 2000.  Finally, Chapter Seven will analyse the impact
of the repurchase system on the interbank loans market. Chapters Six
and Seven will therefore investigate how successful the present system
has been in comparison to the previous one. 
Chapter Eight will conclude the study, and identify possible areas for
further research.
6CHAPTER TWO
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MONETARY POLICY
2.1   INTRODUCTION
The design of monetary policy does not take place in an isolated
manner. Monetary policy in South Africa seems to have been influenced
strongly by monetary policy developments in the leading Western
economies, particularly Great Britain  (Rogers, 1986: 66).  In formulating
monetary policy, a significant number of theoretical or academic inputs
are used as a basis, determining the path monetary policy is to follow.
The inputs consist of views about the manner in which the economy
operates, and these views together form a model.  The model forms the
basis upon which economic policy is designed and implemented 
(Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 1).  Each country has a unique
economic environment and will opt for a theoretical input, or combination
of these to suit its particular economic environment.  This decision is
also based on the “theoretical appeal, and ideological persuasion” of a
particular theory  (Natrass, 1995: 2).  As conditions in the country's
economic environment change, the theoretical inputs it uses too will
change. Although this study is concerned with the technical nature of
monetary policy, it is necessary to first look into the broader role of
monetary policy within a macroeconomic framework.  This chapter
explores the theoretical foundations of monetary policy in order to
contextualise the development and implementation of the repurchase
system in 1998.
72.2 DEFINITION OF MONETARY POLICY
According to Chrystal & Price (1994: 3), the reoccurrence of severe
recessions posed a policy problem, which needed to be addressed.  This
was the reason behind the invention of macroeconomics.  Accordingly,
it is concerned with the overall structure, performance, and behaviour of
the economy.  Therefore, through analysing and viewing the underlying
determinants of the economy, that is, total production, unemployment,
and balance of payments equilibrium, macroeconomists hope to gain a
better understanding of the economy  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk,
1995: 1).  These determinants also form the objectives of monetary
policy, that is, high and stable rates of employment, balance of payments
equilibrium, domestic price stability, and long-run economic growth 
(Meijer, 1996: 217).  “Monetary policy in itself consists of decisions that
are made and implemented by the monetary authorities, to attain or to
help attain the ultimate objectives of monetary policy”  (Meijer, 1996:
207).  However, monetary policy is viewed differently by opposing
schools of thought, each differing in their opinion regarding the
effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving these objectives.
2.3 THEORETICAL SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT
2.3.1 Classical Theory
The Classical school of thought based its theory on the premise that
money is neutral.  They believed that money merely acts to conceal the
underlying forces of the real economy  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 147).
Thus, to the Classical economists, money, and the use thereof, did not
disturb the patterns of economic activity, and hence, did not affect the
real economy.  Consequently, the analysis of the Classical school was
split into two sectors, the real and the monetary sector, with the two
8being independent of each other.  The role of money was specified in
terms of the “quantity theory". 
This quantity theory was formulated by Irving Fischer1 in the well-known
“equation of exchange”, which is:
MV = PT………………………………………………………………....(2.1)
In this equation;
‰ M is the quantity of money,
‰ V is the velocity of circulation,
‰ P is the price level, and
‰ T is the number of transactions  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 148).
The Classical economists saw M as the fundamental mover in the
exchange equation, which when altered, caused changes in V and PT.
They treated V and T as stable or constant, in which case changes in M
would be the main driver behind changes in P.  Therefore, in this
equation, a change in the money supply would only cause the price level
to change.
An alternative version to Fischer’s equation of exchange is the
Cambridge version2, also referred to as the "cash balances theory"
(Struthers & Speight, 1986: 149). 
                                                
1
 An American economist in his book entitled “The Purchasing Power of Money”,
published in 1911  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 148).
2
  Developed in the twentieth century by a succession of economists at Cambridge
University, notably Marshall, Pigou, Keynes, and Robertson (Struthers & Speight, 1986:
149).
9In this version, V is replaced by money demand, and reads as follows:
M=kPR……………………………….………………….………………(2.2)
In this equation;
‰ M is the money supply,
‰ k is the proportion of real resources over which people wish to hold
command in the form of money, and
‰ R is real resources  (Morgan, 1979: 16).
The cash balances theory was held as superior to the transactions
velocity version, as it was concerned with money held, as opposed to the
transactions approach, which was concerned with the flow of spending.
From equation 2.2, it is evident that it is concerned with decisions
regarding the size of k.  Furthermore, it raises the question as to the
motives for holding money, an issue Keynes explored further, as will be
discussed in 2.3.2.
Under the cash balances approach, an increase in the money supply
would result in people holding excess cash.  The excess cash balances
are spent, increasing the surplus cash holdings of other people.  Prices
are then pushed up due to the excess money supply, which again
causes increased spending and output.  The increase in M increases
PR, and k is restored to its equilibrium level.  In contrast, under the
transactions approach, the increased money supply will result in
velocities being halved  (Struthers & Speight, 1996: 153).  This has the
effect of increasing prices, and this effect will continue until V takes on
its original value.
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All of the above relates back to the Classical school’s belief in full
employment equilibrium.  This belief rests on the assumption that there
is perfect competition in the labour market, and that money wages are
flexible  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 50).  Although the
Classical economists believed in full employment equilibrium, they were
aware that a market economy could deviate from this.  However, they
further believed the economy to be rapidly self-equilibrating, allowing it
to move back to a level of full employment quickly.  Therefore, they
ignored the factors promoting full employment, and hence aggregate
demand.  In line with their belief in full employment equilibrium, they did
not believe in the concept of involuntary unemployment, and believed
the only unemployment that exists would be of a frictional and/or
voluntary nature (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 51).  The
Classical economists therefore did not see a need for policy intervention.
The Classical economists further explained the concept of full
employment by what is known as "Say’s Law".  Say’s Law states that
"supply creates its own demand", implying that aggregate supply always
equals aggregate demand  (Keynes, 1936: 26).  However, this law was
set in the context of a barter economy where money was used only as
a medium of exchange. 
In order for Say’s Law to hold in a money economy, two conditions are
required:
‰ the aggregate cost of production must equal the aggregate factor
incomes generated in production; and
‰ the aggregate value of factor income must equal aggregate
expenditure, and hence aggregate demand  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985:
107).
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The first of these conditions can be attained only in an economy that is
static.  The second condition will hold if household consumption
expenditure equals the value of firms’ investments, that is, if
consumption equals investment.  Thus, the Classical economists did
believe it possible for money to be hoarded (saved), but also believed
that the interest rate would react to this and ensure the equilibrium level
is reached where planned savings is equal to planned investment 
(Struthers & Speight, 1986: 157).  The interest rate would then form part
of the real analysis of the Classical school, because even though it may
be the price paid for the use of money, it is determined by the real forces
of productivity and savings.
However, there is a contradiction between the quantity theory and
Walras' Law, which states that with the money and goods markets taken
together, if excess supply were summed with excess demand, it would
equal zero. Say’s Law states that supply always equals demand, but
considers only commodity markets.  Therefore, in terms of Walras’ Law,
a change in the money supply will have no effect on the price level since
there can be no excess demand for, or excess supply of money.  This
implies that it is not possible to determine the price level with this
equilibrium condition.  Clearly this contradicts the quantity theory,
wherein the quantity of money determines the price level  (Struthers &
Speight, 1986: 160).
This contradiction, however, can be resolved.  The Classical economists
integrated real and monetary theory, and by so doing, included the value
of real balances as a determinant of the demand for goods and money
(Pierce & Tysome, 1985:108).  Thus, we have a “real balance effect” 
(Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 108).  The demand for money is a demand for
the real value of money, that is, for the purchasing power it holds
12 
Figure 2.1 
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM OF THE CLASSICAL 
SCHOOL 
Cd) 
w-1 
WIP 
(a) 
.s. 
.L 
, 
, 
I 
I 
I 
• r 
p 
---:.-- p 
J a 
I 
• I 
I 
I I . 
........ - .. 
L 
.< • 
Source: Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 59 
" 
Y=AF(K:,L) 
(c) 
13
(Struthers & Speight, 1996: 161).  If demand is a function of money
balances, then it also depends on the absolute price level.  An increase
in the price level reduces the purchasing power of money (real value of
money), thereby reducing the demand for goods, causing an excess
supply.  This destroys the conjecture of Say’s Law but provides for
internal consistency in the model  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 161).
Figure 2.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the relationship between
money and the real economy of the Classical school.  In this diagram,
panel (a) illustrates the Classical labour market, where demand (DL) and
supply (SL) are in equilibrium, establishing a real wage of W0/P0, and an
equilibrium level of employment, L0.  This establishes an equilibrium level
of output in panel (b) of Y0.  Panel (c) illustrates the Classical aggregate
demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) functions.  The aggregate
supply function is perfectly inelastic, showing that the price level does
not affect real output.  Finally, panel (d) shows the nominal wage and the
relationship between the real wage and the price level at this nominal
wage.  If the nominal wage is W0, then a higher price level will decrease
the real wage.
Assume an increase in the money supply.  In Figure 2.1, (panel c), this
will shift the aggregate demand curve AD0 (M0) to the right, to AD1 (M1).
 At price P0 , the increase in the money supply will create disequilibrium
in the money market, as money demand will be greater than money
supply.  This will lead to an increase in the demand for goods and
services.  There will be an excess supply of money, therefore prices will
rise to P1 in panel (c).  The increase in prices will result in the real wage
decreasing, which creates disequilibrium in the labour market.  An
excess demand for labour of XZ emerges, at the real wage W0/P1 in
panel (a). The excess demand of labour will cause nominal wages to
increase, until it reaches a value of W1 in panel (d), which restores the
14
real wage to its equilibrium value (W0/P0 = W0/P1).  The competition in
the labour market will drive up the money wage, causing an increase in
prices and money wages of equal proportion, and no change in output,
real wages, and interest rates.
Thus, money as we can see from this analysis, does not matter, only the
nominal variables are influenced, leaving the real variables unchanged
(Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 112).
The quantity theory has been criticised for being too simplistic.  Firstly,
money payments are not always fulfilled immediately, sometimes money
is paid in arrears or advance.  The quantity theory does not consider this.
Secondly, the quantity theory consists of a number of restrictive
assumptions, and through these arrives at the direct relationship
between M and P.  These restrictive assumptions are firstly, the demand
for money is a demand for real balances.  Secondly, all the terms of the
equation are independent variables with the exception of P, thirdly prices
are flexible, and finally V and T do not change.  (Struthers & Speight,
1986: 164-165).
The Classical economists placed great faith in the power of the market
to adjust itself to an equilibrium level of full employment and output,
believing it to be almost an instantaneous process.  They further did not
believe there to be any involuntary unemployment. Money was neutral
in the long-term, therefore having no real effects.  Despite the neutrality
of money, the Classical economists were aware that an expansionary
monetary policy could lead to inflation.  However, they further believed
that monetary expansion, by creating inflation, would also raise the
nominal interest rate, therefore the demand for goods will decrease and
prices will be pushed down  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 60).
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2.3.2 Orthodox Keynesian Theory
During the first four decades of the twentieth century, it became
apparent that the Classical model of full employment equilibrium was no
longer applicable, the reason being that this period was characterised by
the trade cycle, with alternating periods of booms and slumps.  One critic
of the Classical school of thought was John Maynard Keynes3.  He was
the first economist to give a satisfactory explanation and alternative
theory to the Classical model (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 169).  Keynes’
"General Theory" became very popular and soon inspired economic
policy.
Keynes argued that the Classical model was only applicable to a special
case, not to the general case.  He attacked this theory by stating that it
was "...a tautology with little economic meaning unless added
assumptions were made" (Dennis, 1981: 80).  Keynes rejected the
Classical model on a number of grounds.  Firstly, he dispelled the
quantity theory by introducing the precautionary motive for holding
money.  He believed that not the entire increase in the money supply (in
the event of an expansionary monetary policy) would be spent, instead
some of it would be voluntarily held as idle cash balances (discussed
further below).  This implies that expenditure need not increase in
proportion to the increased money supply.  Secondly, Keynes rejected
the assumption that there existed perfect competition in the labour
market.  Finally, Keynes ruled out Say’s Law and further added that if
supply were to equal demand, it would only be a coincidental occurrence
 (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 123-124).
                                                
3
 In his book entitled “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money”,
published in1936  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 169).
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There are numerous significant differences between Keynes’ theory and
the Classical theory.  Keynes placed emphasis on aggregate demand as
a determinant of income, employment, and prices, and by so doing,
neglected supply.  In this respect, for Keynes, it was demand which
determined supply.  This was a clear rejection of Say’s Law, which held
that supply creates demand. Furthermore, Keynes made the assumption
that prices, wages and interest rates did not move instantly from one
equilibrium position to another  (Barro & Grossman, 1971: 82).  Hence,
there was no price-wage flexibility as the Classical school had assumed,
instead it was a change in quantities that was the macro-economic
equilibrating mechanism.  The reasoning behind this was simply that if
costs remained constant, but prices were cut, then profits of businesses
would decrease.  Therefore, price cuts would not be viewed favourably
(Eltis & Sinclair, 1988: 16).  Assuming that prices were flexible, Keynes
still did not believe that this would ensure full employment equilibrium.
His reasons for this were, firstly, because he believed that changes in
relative prices would not affect the determinants of expenditure, because
these were a function of income.  Secondly, cutting wages would be
reducing a major source of demand and hence expenditure, and as such
was unlikely to restore equilibrium  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 171).
 
Furthermore, he showed that expenditure could be greater, less than, or
equal to output in the short-term, causing the level of employment to
increase, decrease, or remain unchanged, respectively.  Consequently,
Keynes introduced the notion of effective demand, for which there was
only one equilibrium position, and not a number of them as under
Classical rules.  As stated earlier, Keynes did not believe in full
employment equilibrium and introduced the notion of involuntary
unemployment, which did not exist in the Classical model  (Snowdon,
Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 63).  Keynes furthermore added that the
economy was not rapidly self-equilibrating.  For this reason, the
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authorities could intervene to affect the level of aggregate effective
demand to ensure that the economy reached equilibrium faster.
Therefore, for Keynes, market forces alone could not maintain full
employment, and hence, he advocated the implementation of demand
management policies to reach full employment  (Eltis & Sinclair, 1988:
3).
For Keynes, expectations played a very important role in his model.  He
introduced the liquidity preference concept, under which he analysed the
demand for money.  It was stated earlier that not all money would be
held as active balances, but a portion of it would be held idle.  Keynes
distinguished three motives for holding money:
‰ The transactions motive which occurs because people need to make
transactions in the present time, either for business or personal
reasons, therefore they require cash.  Under this motive, Keynes
further distinguished the incomes and business motives.  The
incomes motive depends on the amount of income and receipts and
expenditures.  The business motive depends on the value of current
output and the number of hands through which the output passes.
‰ The precautionary motive arises because people desire to have
security regarding the future cash value of their resources.  This
motive is to provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditures.
‰ The speculative motive refers to people holding money to avoid
capital losses in a dwindling securities market.  According to Keynes,
it “…is the object of securing profits from knowing better than the
market what the future will bring forth”  (Keynes, 1936: 170).
The speculative motive has an inverse relationship with the interest rate,
and depends on the current interest rate relative to the normal interest
rate  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 183).  The interest rate is determined
by the demand for, and supply of money, and therefore is set in the
monetary sector.  The precautionary and transactions motives together
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form the demand for active balances and interest rates do not play a
significant role with these two motives  (Struthers & Speight, 1986: 175-
178).  It is therefore through the speculative motive that the management
of money influences the economic system.  The public will usually hold
a portfolio of the different balances.
Keynes’ most basic assumption, which was also a core assumption of
the General Theory, was that money and other financial assets are close
substitutes.  The importance of this assumption will become evident at
a later stage.  This assumption implies that the elasticity of demand with
respect to interest rates is high, hence, a small rise in interest rates on
financial assets would cause investors to move out of them and into
money.  With this background, we then begin to analyse the monetary
transmission mechanism within the orthodox Keynesian school.
(1) Monetary Transmission Mechanism
In 2.3.1, it is evident that for the Classical school, the price level is
determined by the nominal quantity of money in circulation.  For Keynes,
however, prices and interest rates are determined by the interaction of
aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  This will be demonstrated
further in Figure 2.2.  The transmission mechanism shows that money
supply changes affect expenditure primarily through its impact on
interest rates of financial assets  (Vane, 1979: 12).  The transmission
mechanism in Keynesian theory is termed the "cost of capital channel",
and there are two variations to this channel, the strong and the weak
version. Before beginning the analysis of the cost of capital channel, it
is necessary first to note that this channel includes Hicks’ IS/LM model.
 At the time, this model became the established model for
macroeconomic theory, and had an enormous influence on the path of
macroeconomic policy up to the mid-1960s  (Snowdon, Vane &
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Wynarczyk, 1995: 90).  The IS curve refers to the goods market and the
situation where investment equals savings.  The IS curve traces out the
various equilibrium positions in the goods market, and therefore the
various combinations of interest rates and incomes that produce
equilibrium in this market.  Due to the fact that investment is negatively
related to interest rates, the IS curve is negatively sloped.  The LM curve
refers to equilibrium in the money market, where money demand equals
money supply.  The LM curve is positively sloped because money
demand is positively related to income and negatively related to interest
rates  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995: 92).  Keynes assumed the
money supply was exogenous, that is, the central bank is able to control
the money supply and changes thereof are the prime cause of changes
in nominal national income  (Edkins, 1989: 57).  Thus, the money supply
curve is a vertical line.
Figure 2.2 is a diagrammatic representation of Keynes’ monetary
transmission mechanism.  Panel 1 represents the IS/LM curves
discussed above.  Panel 2 illustrates the aggregate demand, and
aggregate supply relation, panel 3 shows the economy’s production
function, and panel 4 represents the labour market situation.  Panel 5
shows the relationship between money and the real wage. 
The strong version proceeds as follows.  Assume an initial portfolio
equilibrium at i0, Y/P0, and W/P0, in panel 1 to 5.  Should the monetary
authorities conduct an open market purchase of government bonds, the
money supply will increase.  Hence, the LM curve will shift out to the
right, from LM0 to LM1 in panel 1.  There will be relatively more money
than bonds, therefore causing an excess demand for bonds.  This
causes the price of bonds to be pushed up until just enough bondholders
are influenced to replace the bonds in their portfolio with new money.
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Under Keynesian theory, there is a high substitutability between bonds
and money.  Therefore, in order to re-establish equilibrium, interest rates
fall and bond prices rise.  However, the new money holders will be in
portfolio disequilibrium, and will substitute financial assets for money,
causing the prices of financial assets to rise.  This effect will continue
until such time that the fall in the interest rates on financial assets
causes the extra money to be willingly held.  People are willing to hold
the extra money because of the lower interest rate, which makes the
cost of holding money less, making a further drop in interest rates
improbable.  Finally, the rise in bond prices makes bondholders richer,
thus they wish to hold more money to maintain the balance between the
values of their holdings of money and bonds  (Struthers & Speight, 1986:
181).
This fall in the interest rate will cause an increase in the demand for
investment goods (as investment and interest rates are inversely
related). The increased demand is the horizontal distance (Y/P0 - Y/P1)
in panel 2.  At price P0 the excess demand is (b – a) in panel 2.  For this
reason, the price level increases to P1, and there is no longer an excess
demand. There is now a lower real wage of W/P1, and the level of output
and employment has increased.  This effect, together with the decline in
interest rates (causing increased investment) is an injection into the
circular flow of income, which increases through the multiplier effect. 
The rise in income exerts a feedback effect on the economy.  Money is
taken out of speculative balances and put into precautionary and
transactions balances.  The LM curve shifts back partially to LM2  in
panel 1.  This causes interest rates to rise, and investment to fall.  This
effect will continue until equilibrium is reached in a cyclical fashion. 
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Thus, the traditional Keynesian view of monetary expansion as
transmitted to the real economy proceeds as follows:
M   ↑→  i  ↓ →  I ↑→ Y↑ ………………………………..……………(2.3)
In this equation;
‰ M is the money supply,
‰ i, the interest rate,
‰ I, investment, and
‰ Y, the output  (Mishkin, 1995: 4).
Equilibrium in this transmission mechanism is restored through changes
in interest rates and income, with the demand for money rising until it
reaches equality with the increased money supply.  It is evident that the
real economic variables have been affected, hence, money does matter
in the strong version of the Keynesian analysis, and there is scope for
effective monetary policy.
The weak version of Keynes’ cost of capital channel renders monetary
policy ineffective as an economic policy tool.  There are three reasons
for this.  Firstly, there is the liquidity trap, which means that at very low
interest rates, the demand for speculative balances might become
infinitely elastic  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 129).  This is because people,
based on past experiences, believe that interest rates cannot move
down further, therefore the authorities’ attempts to decrease interest
rates will be an exercise in futility.  The additional money will be hoarded.
 “If the liquidity trap lies above that necessary to produce a volume of
investment capable of supporting a full employment level of output, then
there will be a continuing state of unemployment”  (Pierce & Tysome,
1985: 129).  However, this is likely to be a short-term phenomenon. 
Secondly, there is the interest sensitivity of aggregate expenditure.  If the
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interest rate has a negligible impact on investment and consumption,
then the IS curve will be vertical.  If the IS curve is to the left of (Y/Pf) in
Figure 2.2, then no increase in the money supply will influence real
expenditure, and interest rates will fall until all additional cash is held
idle.  Monetary policy is then ineffective.  Finally, there is the possible
discrepancy between investment and savings.  In an economic system
where investment opportunities are low and the community is frugal, a
positive interest rate will result in savings exceeding investment, thereby
resulting in deficient demand in the economy.  Monetary policy will again
have no effect  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 132). 
Therefore, under the strong version, there is scope for monetary policy,
but under the weak version, monetary policy has no effect.  However,
within the orthodox Keynesian school, money demand is viewed as
highly responsive to changes in the interest rate (relatively flat LM curve),
and investment fairly unresponsive to the interest rate (relatively steep
IS curve).  For this reason, fiscal policy is preferred to monetary policy.
Keynes, unlike the Classical school had limited faith in the power of the
markets to produce a social maximum, because of the slow adjustment
of prices.  For Keynes, changes in the money supply did affect the real
variables of the economy, and money was not neutral.  Keynes
introduced the notion of deficient demand, and accordingly advocated
demand management policies.  Keynes did believe there to be scope for
monetary policy in containing inflation, but preferred the use of fiscal
policy as he believed it to be more effective than monetary policy.
Keynesian theory, whereby fiscal policy is treated as more important
than monetary policy, has been challenged by the Monetarist school of
thought.  The Monetarists believe that in the long-term, an expansionary
fiscal policy will lead to certain components of private expenditure being
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crowded-out, but this will have a negligible impact on aggregate demand,
and therefore the level of output and employment.  We now turn to the
Monetarists’ transmission mechanism.
2.3.3 Monetarist Theory
The 1970s saw rising inflation, and the breakdown of Keynesian demand
management policies.  As a result, Monetarism became increasingly
popular  (Healey, 1992: 197).  Milton Friedman, the leading Monetarist
economist of this period, believed the depression at the time to be a
direct result of an inappropriate monetary policy.
The Monetarists emphasise the potency of money and stress the
importance of following a monetary rule in conducting monetary policy,
to avoid economic instability.  They believed that the behaviour of
employment, output, and prices, is best assessed by the growth rate of
the money supply, and the effectiveness of monetary policy is most
usefully measured in terms of the growth of the monetary base4 
(Hamburger, 1970: 32).
Monetarists, as orthodox Keynesians, treat the money supply as
exogenous  (Edkins, 1989: 7).  Due to the money supply being an
independent variable, it has a major effect on the level of economic
activity. Furthermore, money is only one asset in a generalised portfolio
of many assets, and not a substitute for other financial assets, as under
Keynesian assumptions.  Therefore, the choice is not just between
money and bonds, but between a much wider range of financial assets.
                                                
4
 Includes high-powered money, that is, total bank reserves adjusted for changes in
reserve requirements and public currency holdings.
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Friedman re-emphasised the quantity theory of money in his analysis,
and stated it as a theory of the demand for money.  He assumed that
money demand was a stable function of a limited number of variables
(permanent income/wealth, nominal income, people’s tastes and
preferences, return on financial assets, and the expected rate of
inflation) and has a low interest elasticity  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk,
1994: 139).  This belief is necessary as it allows for the condition that
changes in the money supply are a dominant cause of changes in
national income, to hold  (Pierce & Tysome, 1994: 139). 
The quantity theory under Friedman proceeds as follows:
MV = PY…………………………………………...……………………(2.4)
 
In this equation;
‰ M is the money supply,
‰ V is the velocity of circulation of the money supply,
‰ P is the price level, and
‰ Y is output  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 150).
Under Monetarist assumptions MV influences PY.  Furthermore, V and
Y are assumed independent of M. V is stable and predictable, and
money is non-neutral and does influence Y and P, but has a tendency
towards a stable long-run equilibrium  (Dennis, 1981: 118). 
Friedman, therefore, made the following proposals:  
‰ He called for a fixed growth rule in terms of some monetary
aggregate, (initially M1) and;
‰ maintained that rules should replace discretion, because he believed
discretion would be destabilising to the economy.  This is because
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the lags between changes in the money supply and income are long and
variable  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1994: 145). 
Friedman also wanted the money creating powers of the central bank to
be curtailed, and a 100 percent reserve requirement imposed on
commercial banks.  By doing this, he believed that the economic system
would be insulated from any economic instability created by the banking
system  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 8).
With this background, one can begin to analyse the monetary
transmission mechanism under the Monetarist theory.  What is provided
here is a broad overview of the main Monetarist ideas.  More in-depth
discussions are available from Brunner & Meltzer (1993), Mishkin
(1995:3-10), Dennis (1981), Meltzer (1995: 49-72), and Struthers &
Speight (1986). 
An initial equilibrium in the goods and money markets are assumed,
which is followed by an increase in the money supply.  This will decrease
the marginal rate of return on money balances, as individuals will have
excess cash holdings.  Due to the fact that Monetarists assume prices
to be flexible, the surplus money holdings cause prices to increase, so
that the extra nominal money supply is willingly held  (Meltzer, 1995: 55).
People will therefore exchange money for financial assets, the prices of
these assets will rise, and therefore the yields on them will decrease
(Brunner & Meltzer, 1993: 8).  Banks’ cash reserves will also increase
due to the surplus cash, and they too will diversify their holdings of
earning assets, depressing the yields on the assets they acquire.  Under
Monetarist assumptions, as mentioned above, there is a much wider
range of assets to choose from, there will consequently be substitution
further along the spectrum of assets.  This is called the "shunting effect"
 (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 152).  There is also a wealth effect.  As prices
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are driven up, wealth holders experience a capital gain and increase
their expenditures.  There is thus a general increase in output and
prices, signifying that the real value of the money supply is decreasing,
hence, individuals and firms have to hold increased amounts of nominal
money so as to maintain the real value of their money balances 
(Brunner & Meltzer, 1993: 8).  The adjustment in the cost of capital
channel now takes place over a much wider range of assets and a ripple
effect is set in action across all markets (Dennis, 1981: 119). 
It is evident that in the Classical model (2.3.1), all of the change in the
money supply is absorbed by a change in prices, whereas under
Keynes, the change takes place in output.  With Monetarists, the
explanation of change is provided by the "expectations-augmented
Phillips curve"5  (Pierce & Tysome, 1985: 157).  The natural rate of
unemployment is critical in this explanation, and is the equilibrium level
of unemployment, because it is associated with equilibrium in the
product and money markets and all other relevant sectors  (Pierce &
Tysome, 1985: 157).  This rate possesses no tendency to change.
Now assume that unemployment and output are at their equilibrium
levels. From the above, it is apparent that an increase in the money
supply leads to a portfolio readjustment, which causes aggregate
expenditure to increase, as well as prices.  Employers recognise the
increase in prices of their own products before they perceive the
increase as an increase in prices in general, and therefore interpret it as
an increase in the relative price level.  Thus, they produce more and are
prepared to pay a higher wage to attract more labour required for
increased output.  Workers see the increase in money wages as an
                                                
5
  Derived from a statistical investigation undertaken by AW Phillips in 1958 into the
relationship between unemployment and the rate of change of money wages in the UK
over the 1861-1957 period  (Levacic & Rebman, 1982: 338).
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increase in real wages, and thus labour supply increases in the short-
term.  The increase in the money supply results in an increase in prices,
money wages, output and employment, all of which are consistent with
the Phillips curve.  Due to the cost of obtaining information, employers
interpret the increase in prices wrongly, because they require time to
distinguish between permanent and temporary impulses, and real and
nominal impulses.  For this reason, the Monetarists believe that
monetary policy should be used to achieve and maintain price stability
and recommend that policy be conducted by means of rules, as this will
decrease the cost of information to the public.
In the short-run, the effect is evident on output and prices, but in the
long-run, output and employment are back to their natural levels and
only prices and other nominal variables are affected.  This is known as
the "natural rate hypothesis".  In the long-term, workers realise the truth,
and labour supply declines to its original level and output and
unemployment return to their natural levels.  Therefore, in Monetarist
theory, expectations play a very important role.
The Monetarist transmission mechanism can also be viewed in terms of
the IS/LM model. There are, however, three major points of difference
between the Monetarist and Keynesian explanations:
‰ The Monetarist LM curve is much steeper - reflecting a low
substitutability between money and bonds, and a low interest rate
elasticity with money demand.
‰ there is no liquidity trap, therefore a change in the money supply will
 always alter the interest rate; and
‰ the Monetarist IS curve is less steep - reflecting a large interest
elasticity of investment.  (Dennis, 1981: 119)
It is clear from the above, that the effects of falling interest rates and
rising income is much more pronounced under Monetarist theory. 
29
Hence, monetary policy is a much more powerful instrument.  The
Monetarist transmission mechanism is wider and more powerful than the
Keynesian cost of capital transmission mechanism for a number of
reasons. Firstly, aggregate demand increases, which shifts the IS curve
to the right.  Secondly, although the Monetarists were criticised for
omitting wealth effects, if these were to be included, they would also shift
the IS curve to the right.  Finally, Monetarists place considerable
importance on the effects of expectations on the transmission
mechanism, although this does not lead to an unambiguous shift of the
IS curve to the right, all the combined effects discussed above will.
However, according to Dennis  (1981: 121), the IS/LM model is not
satisfactory for outlining the channels of influence in Monetarist theory,
as it is too simple a diagram to capture all the effects.  Although it is
evident from the above that an increase in the money supply leads to a
rise in income and a fall in the interest rate, the situation is not as simple
as illustrated here.  The LM curve will shift back to the left after the price
level increases.  Furthermore, many of the mechanisms at work here
take a considerable amount of time, and the exact location of the IS
curve is not known, and whether the economy is in equilibrium or not is
also not known. Finally, if the monetary sector adjusts faster than the
real sector, the cost of capital channel will split up into an income effect
and a substitution effect, thereby reducing interest rates and increasing
income respectively  (Dennis, 1981: 121).  However, monetary forces will
always have a crucial role to play in the determination of nominal income
in terms of Monetarist thought.
Monetarists stressed the potency of money and advocated a monetary
rule in conducting monetary policy.  Like the Keynesians, they believe
that money is non-neutral, and therefore does influence output and
prices, tending towards equilibrium in the long-term.  However, like the
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Classical school they also believe prices to be flexible, a belief Keynes
disagreed with.  They also placed great emphasis on expectations, as
did Keynes.
Given their view of the money supply process, Monetarists argue that
effective monetary control requires the central bank to focus on the
quantity/availability of bank reserves, rather than the cost of reserves.
 It will be illustrated in Chapter Three and Five how this view influenced
the development of the monetary control mechanism in South Africa.
2.3.4 Post-Keynesian Theory
The Post-Keynesian school of thought arose as a reaction to American
Keynesianism or the Neo-classical synthesis.  The Neo-classical
synthesis is a combination of Keynes’ theory and the ideas of the
Classical school. This Neo-classical synthesis was labelled by the Post-
Keynesians as "Bastard Keynesianism", as they felt that the Neo-
classical synthesis completely misrepresented what Keynes was trying
to say  (Davidson, 1991: 23).  The Post-Keynesians represent a minority
view in economic thought, although their work is becoming more and
more recognised and used in the making of monetary policy.  They are
also a very divided and young school of thought, but share a number of
common themes.
(1) Common Themes
The first common theme the Post-Keynesians share is the belief in
“effective demand failures”.  This theme has its origins in the problems
associated with time and money  (Snowdon, Vane & Wynarczyk, 1995:
95). The world is uncertain, resulting in people's actions being based on
the lack of knowledge or ignorance, which leads to mistakes that cannot
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be easily or costlessly made undone.  However, they further believe that
our present is a link between a known past and a highly uncertain future,
and as such, money and financial assets play a very important role in
connecting these time frames.  This is because economic decisions are
taken in the present that requires actions that have to be completed at
a future date. 
Apart from money, expectations also play an important role, as they
have a significant effect on economic outcomes.  The Post-Keynesians
focus on heterogeneous expectations, which is in contrast to the
Monetarists’ natural rate hypothesis, which requires a fully foreseen
future with homogenous expectations.  People’s actions are based on
past experiences, and past decisions made.  For this reason, historical
time (past) should be taken seriously according to the Post-Keynesians
 (Eichner, 1980: 122).
Significance is placed on the symbiotic relationship between micro and
macroeconomics.  The Post-Keynesians adopt a dual approach, where
macro influences upon micro are given as much importance as micro
influences on macroeconomics.  For the Post-Keynesians, the
distribution of income and power is a fundamental concern, especially
in terms of inflation.  Inflation is seen as the symptom of a struggle
between economic and political institutions, and involves the
redistribution of income from the weaker to the more powerful groups.
Furthermore, they believe that a restrictive monetary policy, with a
monetary growth rule below the current level of inflation, will exacerbate
unemployment and not moderate wage demands  (Snowdon, Vane &
Wynarczyk, 1995: 372).  For this reason, they suggest the adoption of
an incomes policy as an addition to traditional demand management
policies, which will result in a stable price and output mix.  According to
Davidson  (1981: 163), “…the incomes policy will serve to obtain social
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agreement among domestic competing groups to limit their demand for
real income in a socially responsible manner for distributing the
remaining gross national product (GNP), and hence, limiting current
inflation”.
The Post-Keynesians focus on the transitory period where changes in
the money supply have powerful real effects on output and employment
in both the short and long-run  (Eichner, 1980: 125).  As the orthodox
Keynesians, they also believe money to be important for the following
reasons:
‰ existing monetary economies do not possess an automatic tendency
towards full employment of resources over time;
‰ underemployment equilibrium is a recurring phenomenon in a money
using production economy; and
‰ underemployment equilibrium is associated with the characteristics
of money and related institutions and the way in which production is
organised.  (Davidson, 1981: 164)
Money is seen as a human institution, connected to other institutions,
and the interconnectedness requires liquidity to be available from time
to time.  In a modern market-oriented production economy, production
is organised on a “forward money contracting”6 basis, which when
fulfilled requires money to be available.  One forward contract is that of
the money-wage contract. 
According to Keynes, money and liquid assets possess two essential
properties:
‰ The elasticity of production must be zero, therefore an increase in
demand for the good will not encourage suppliers to make more of
it by hiring additional labour;
                                                
6
 
 Forward contracts stipulate a future date for both delivery and payment.
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‰ The elasticity of substitution must be zero, therefore if the price of a
good increases, people will not be able to substitute it with another
commodity  (Davidson, 1981: 167-8).
The Post-Keynesians see Keynes’ theory of liquidity preference playing
a vital role in explaining the failure of the market signalling mechanism.
Assume for example that people become cautious about their money,
and there is an ensuing rush into liquidity, obstructing the transfer of
intertemporal price signals  (Davidson, 1981: 169).  This will result in a
decreased demand for goods, consequently, sales will decline and
workers will be discharged, causing increased unemployment.  The
increase in the demand for liquid assets, however, causes their prices
to increase but this does not alleviate the unemployment problem, as
liquid assets have a zero elasticity of production. Furthermore, the
elasticity of production between liquid assets and producible goods is
zero, therefore the increased demand for liquidity will not be diverted to
other substitutes.  For Post-Keynesians, the rush to liquidity causes
workers to be laid off and they cannot be re-employed.  Thus,
unemployment is seen as a fundamental problem of any money
economy where liquidity considerations are important.  For this reason,
the Post-Keynesians believe the economy could settle down at any level
of employment, and can therefore exhibit unemployment equilibrium in
the short and long-term.
The money supply is treated as endogenous, responding and
accommodating itself to changes in the level of money wages  (Eichner,
1980: 125). Furthermore, the money supply is seen as a response, and
not a cause of inflation.  The central bank has no influence over the
money supply, the only influence it has is to set the interest rate at which
it provides the lender of last resort liquidity.  The central bank can then
only affect short-term interest rates in the economy.  This is illustrated
in Figure 2.3, which shows the Post-Keynesian analysis of the money
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Figure 2.3
THE POST-KEYNESIAN MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS
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Source: Edkins, 1989: 11
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supply process. This is a deviation from the orthodox Keynesian and
Monetarists schools, where the money supply is treated as exogenous,
which the Post-Keynesians believe not to be valid in a modern credit
economy, but only in a commodity economy where money is simply used
as a medium of exchange.  If the public wishes to increase their
expenditures, it can be put into effect if the banks create the necessary
amount of credit.  Therefore, signals have to be sent to the banking
system.
Hence, the money supply in the Post-Keynesian theory is demand
driven, with the control instrument being the interest rate  (Lavoie, 1992:
171). Therefore, supply changes precede those of money income
changes and causation runs from income to money and not from money
to income as the Monetarists had presumed.  The Post-Keynesian
money supply process can be viewed as follows:
B=(1/m)M…………………………………………………………………(2.5)
In this equation,
‰ M is the money supply;
‰ B is the monetary base (see footnote 4); and
‰ m is the money multiplier  (Edkins, 1989: 10).
Herein, M is treated as a divisor m of the monetary base, B. 
In Figure 2.3, it is evident that the money supply (Ms) is regarded as
perfectly elastic in the short-run at an interest rate (r) determined by the
monetary authorities.  Although the money supply is treated as
endogenous, it has been shown above that the central bank is able to
employ monetary targeting by varying the interest rate.  Therefore, the
money supply determines the monetary base.  The endogeneity of the
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money supply also implies that equation 2.4, (MV=PY), should rather be
read from right to left.
This view has a bearing on the monetary control procedures
recommended by the De Kock Commission (1985), as will be discussed
in Chapter Four.  The Post-Keynesians furthermore recognised two
other monetary transmission channels.  These will now be discussed.
(2) Wealth Effects and Credit Rationing Effects
In terms of the wealth effect, a change in the real quantity of money can
affect aggregate demand even if it does not change interest rates 
(Havrilesky & Boorman, 1976: 48).  The stock of “outside money” is a
component of the net wealth of the economy.  “Outside money” is,
however, non-interest bearing debt of government, therefore when the
balance sheets of the private and government sector are added
together, it will be cancelled as an item of net wealth.  For this reason,
it cannot exert a wealth effect.  However, a change in “outside money”
results in an increase in the assets of the private sector and therefore
does increase wealth.  This wealth effect is extended beyond money to
other forms of wealth such as interest-bearing government debt and real
market values of equities. 
The interest burden of interest-bearing government debt must be
financed by future taxes.  If the private sector deducts future tax
liabilities, then the existence of government bonds are both assets and
liabilities to the public, and therefore, not net wealth.  If the public
considers only a percentage of interest bearing government debt as a
liability, then the open market purchase of bonds results in an increase
in net private wealth, and hence, a change in aggregate demand.
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The second channel is that of credit rationing  (Havrilesky & Boorman,
1976: 49).  Due to imperfect capital markets, institutional forces (not the
market) control the interest rate charged.  Therefore, the interest rate will
change when there is a change in the demand for funds.  The demand
for credit is limited by lenders’ willingness to lend.  Hence, there is not a
single interest rate, but a number of different interest rates. Therefore,
even if monetary controls do not change significantly, or if aggregate
demand is inelastic, monetary policy will affect total expenditure directly
by changing the degree of credit rationing, and therefore the volume of
lending.
Overall, the Post-Keynesians stress uncertainty and therefore effective
demand failures.  Like Keynes, they also stress the importance of
expectations.  They believe that a monetary growth rule as advocated by
the Monetarists, would only serve to worsen unemployment.  They
advocate traditional demand management policies, but call for the
implementation of an incomes policy as a supplement.  The Post-
Keynesians also believe that money is non-neutral, and therefore has
powerful real effects. 
Furthermore, they believe the money supply is predominantly demand
determined, therefore the central bank can influence the money supply
only indirectly via interest rate instrumentation  (Edkins, 1989: 7).  Thus,
for the Post-Keynesians, monetary policy has an important role to play
in achieving price stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and
decreased unemployment.
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2.4 CONCLUSION
For the Classical economists, the money supply and changes in the
money supply did not have an effect on the real economy.  Increases in
the money supply would cause an increase in expenditure and therefore
the only effect this would have would be to increase prices.  The
Classical economists believed that market forces would instantaneously
remove any disequilibrium. For this reason, there would be no need for
policy intervention.  Money, therefore, was regarded as neutral and not
important.
Inasmuch as the Classical economists focused on the money supply,
Keynes focused on money demand, and neglected supply factors.
According to Keynes, unlike the Classical assumptions, there is not one
full employment equilibrium, but a number of them, and the economy
takes a long time to adjust.  Therefore, Keynes advocated demand
management policies, and believed the adjustment would take place
through quantities and not prices. For Keynes, expectations played a
very important role, whereas the Classical economists did not consider
expectations to be important. Under Keynesian analysis, changes in the
money supply do affect the real variables in the economy, and therefore,
he believed there to be scope for monetary policy.  However, because
Keynes viewed money demand as highly responsive to interest rates
and investment as fairly unresponsive to interest rates, he preferred
fiscal policy to monetary policy.
Monetarists stressed the potency of money and advocated a monetary
rule in conducting monetary policy.  Like the Keynesians, they believed
money to be non-neutral, but believed it influenced output and prices,
tending towards equilibrium in the long-term.  However, like the Classical
school they also believed prices to be flexible, a belief Keynes disagreed
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with.  The Monetarists believed monetary policy to be a powerful tool,
and in conducting monetary policy favoured rules and not discretion. 
They also placed great emphasis on expectations as Keynes did.
The Post-Keynesians stress uncertainty and therefore effective demand
failures.  Like Keynes, they also stress the importance of expectations.
 They believe that a monetary growth rule as advocated by the
Monetarists, would only serve to intensify unemployment and therefore
advocate the implementation of an incomes policy.  The Post-
Keynesians also believe that money is non-neutral, and therefore has
powerful real effects.  They recognise that there is also a wealth effect
where monetary policy can affect aggregate demand even if interest
rates do not change. They further recognise the credit rationing effect
where monetary policy affects total expenditure by changing the degree
of credit rationing and thus the volume of lending even if interest rates
do not change.  The Post-Keynesians treat the money supply as
endogenous, therefore the central bank can only influence the money
supply indirectly through variations in interest rates.
The following chapter discusses how the aforementioned schools of
thought influenced the development of monetary policy in South Africa
from World War II up to the time of the De Kock Commission.   
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CHAPTER THREE
MONETARY POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA UP TO 1998
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Since World War II, South African monetary policy has undergone
numerous changes.  It would be logical to look at past official approaches
to monetary policy in South Africa, in order to contextualise the current
developments. Furthermore, it would also help one appreciate how and why
monetary policy came to assume the form it did, and why it was only
partially successful in meeting its objectives.  It is the aim of this chapter to
focus on how monetary policy in South Africa has evolved to what it is
today, and why it has been deemed necessary to implement the new
repurchase system in 1998.
3.2 THE PERIOD BEFORE THE DE KOCK COMMISSION
South African monetary policy has undergone several transformations in the
period from World War II.  The first phase occurred in the post-World War
II period.  At this stage, the worldview was that fiscal policy was the most
effective instrument in attaining economic stability, which was clearly
Keynesian in nature. Hence, the only function monetary policy performed
was to saturate the economy with liquidity to keep interest rates at very low
levels.  This allowed investment and consumption expenditure to increase
swiftly enough to provide full employment  (RSA, 1985: 144).  South Africa
followed a somewhat different view.  Money was recognised as a unique
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financial asset, and held to have a notable influence on production,
incomes, prices, and balance of payments equilibrium  (RSA, 1985: 144).
Furthermore, the production of money was viewed as a task that could only
be carried out by the SARB and commercial banks  (De Kock, 1981: 321).
Clearly, great importance was attached to money, and therefore it needed
to be controlled. 
The second phase occurred in the late 1950s to the early 1960s  (De Kock,
1981: 322).  During this phase, inflation was as yet not a major problem,
and great importance was attached to high and stable levels of
employment, the money supply, and interest rates (although interest rates
were still kept at very low levels)  (Meijer, 1996: 238).  It was only during
this, the second phase of monetary policy, that South Africa adopted the
worldview, and ascribed importance to fiscal policy.  The authorities
accordingly placed a great deal of emphasis on Keynesian demand
management policies, whilst still recognising the importance of monetary
policy  (RSA, 1985: 144).  Money was still held as important because
expenditure, income, and prices changed in response to a change in it  (De
Kock, 1981: 322).  Furthermore, it was believed that changes in the money
supply could exercise a significant influence on interest rates, which in turn
would impact on investment and consumption.  Thirdly, the authorities
expressly recognised that there was a correlation between the general
availability of credit and an increase in the money supply, and finally, it was
accepted that a change in the money supply could sometimes have a direct
bearing on total spending.  (RSA, 1985: 144)  This phase took on
characteristics of conservative Keynesianism with elements of Monetarism
 (De Kock, 1981: 322).
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Since commercial banks were able to create money, and the money supply
was deemed important, monetary policy was directed towards the
commercial banking system.  In order to gain control over credit and the
money supply, the SARB operated on commercial banks’ cash reserves
and liquid assets, through instruments such as discount policy and moral
suasion.  Apart from these instruments, the SARB also varied the Bank
Rate, which caused shifts in commercial banks’ prime and lending rates,
and was furthermore granted authority to enforce upon banks additional
cash reserve requirements  (RSA, 1985: 145).
It is evident from the above that Monetarist theory (as discussed in the
previous chapter) clearly influenced the general thinking of the time,
particularly due to the great importance attached to the money supply. 
The third phase occurred during the time of the 1961-1964 Technical
Committee7.  It became apparent that the authorities were not successful
in their attempts to keep interest rates at very low levels.  Not only was the
economy suffering from high interest rates, but also high unemployment 
(De Kock, 1981: 323).  The supposition at this time was no longer that
money was a unique financial asset, but instead it was believed to be a
series of liquid financial assets.  Furthermore, where commercial banks
were heretofore seen as the only institutions (together with the SARB) that
could create money, it was now recognised that they were not
fundamentally different from other financial institutions  (RSA, 1985: 145).
                                                
7
 This Committee was appointed in 1961 to advise the authorities on desirable amendments
to the Banking and Building Society Act, in the light of complaints received about unfair
competition between different banking institutions and building societies.  The report of the
Committee was published in 1964.  (De Kock, 1981: 323)
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The Technical Committee did not agree with this and suggested a few
modifications.  Firstly, they proposed that in addition to money, there is
’near-money’, that is, deposits or other financial assets that serve as close
substitutes for money, and which can easily and costlessly be converted
into money. Furthermore, they suggested that the SARB and commercial
banks were not the only financial institutions able to create money, but that
other deposit taking institutions in South Africa, such as merchant banks,
discount houses and general banks could also co-operate in this process
 (De Kock, 1981: 324).  Out of this approach grew what is known as the
monetary banking sector8. 
The approach was still in essence Keynesian, but contained elements of
Monetarism.  Money was thus seen as an important determinant of total
spending and interest rates, and in this sense was Monetarist, but they did
not see it as the main determinant of prices and economic activity.  The
Technical Committee further favoured a policy of demand management,
and the use of the liquid asset system to control bank credit  (RSA, 1985:
146). This policy was then Keynesian.
The 1964 to 1980 period coincided with the fourth phase of monetary policy
in South Africa, at which time Monetarism became increasingly popular 
(Rogers, 1986: 66).  During this phase, monetary policy consisted of direct
methods of control9, combined with semi-market-oriented policy
instruments10  (De Kock, 1981: 326).  No doubt, market-oriented methods of
monetary policy were not given recognition, in particular open market
                                                
8 The SARB, commercial banks, and other banking institutions with monetary significance.
9
   Bank credit ceilings, exchange controls, and import deposits.
10  Variable liquid asset and cash reserve ratios.
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operations, and other forms of intervention in the financial markets by the
SARB.  Interest rates still played a minor role at this time.
The arguments put forward for not using market-oriented methods of
monetary policy were threefold.  According to the De Kock Commission,
South Africa’s financial markets were still under-developed, and therefore
not equipped for such methods.  Secondly, interest rates in South Africa at
the time were highly sensitive to the political environment, and for this
reason, the De Kock Commission preferred to avoid large increases in
interest rates.  The authorities also needed to make certain forms of socially
desirable credit more attractive, and therefore had to increase the amount
of such credit, for example, building society mortgage loans.  This made
interest rate rises more undesirable.  Finally, in financing its deficit before
borrowing, government would resort to bank credit.  This action had the
effect of increasing the money supply directly, and increasing banks’ liquid
assets, and hence their ability to create credit for the private sector.  (RSA,
1985: 147)  Still, the SARB deemed it necessary in this period to curb bank
credit extended to the private sector, and achieved this by means of direct
instruments such as credit ceilings, and substantial increases in the
minimum liquid asset requirements.
The direct methods of control used by the SARB at this time were not
effective in achieving the objectives of monetary policy.  Avoiding direct
controls is advantageous as it means more efficient financial markets,
making the real costs of investment lower and the real rewards for savers
higher, as loanable funds are allocated more efficiently  (Kantor, 1986: 98).
Furthermore, direct controls tend to be clumsy and take effect only with
substantial time lags.  Hence, the De Kock Commission of Enquiry was
appointed in 1977.  They published a preliminary report in 1978, and a final
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report in 1985  (RSA, 1985: 148).  Before discussing the recommendations
put forward by the De Kock Commission, it is necessary to first identify the
deficiencies of the above system of monetary policy.
3.3 DEFICIENCIES OF MONETARY POLICY BEFORE THE DE KOCK
COMMISSION
According to De Kock (1981: 327), monetary policies applied since 1946
suffered certain deficiencies, and these help to explain why the authorities
were not always successful in attaining the ultimate policy objectives.  The
underlying reasons for the deficiencies in monetary policy follow.
As discussed above, South Africa relied on direct controls and not on
market-oriented policies.  In 3.2, the disadvantages of using direct controls
were briefly mentioned.  Market-oriented financial markets improve
economic growth, and allow the application of monetary policy to become
more effective  (RSA, 1985: 162).  Numerous contributing factors helped
explain why South Africa did not give market-oriented policies their due
recognition.
Firstly, although the financial markets were developing rapidly, the
authorities did not appreciate this or recognise its ramifications for monetary
policy.  Secondly, it was not believed that these markets were capable of
producing optimal economic results.  Thirdly, there was the fear that if left
alone, these markets would suffer negative consequences such as high
interest rates (RSA, 1985: 162).  All of these factors contributed to South
Africa’s dependence on direct controls.
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It is clear from the above reasons why the monetary authorities placed
heavy reliance upon direct methods of control and on semi-market-oriented
methods. These methods, however, did not allow the monetary authorities
to influence changes in monetary aggregates, interest rates, exchange
rates, and credit, and as such, failed to achieve their goals.  Therefore, the
use of direct methods of control led to disintermediation11, thereby reducing
the efficiency of monetary policy. 
Secondly, monetary policy was viewed as the equivalent of the monetary
authorities’ attempts to control credit extended by the banking sector to the
private sector  (RSA, 1985: 163).  As such, importance was attached to
instruments such as higher cash reserve requirements, liquid asset
requirements, and credit ceilings, which control bank credit extended to the
private sector.  Therefore, it took emphasis off other instruments such as
public debt management, discount policy, the exchange rate and exchange
control policy, which impact on money, credit, interest rates, exchange
rates, and hence aggregate demand  (De Kock, 1981: 328).  This view was
regarded as narrow, as monetary policy should rather include all measures
that influence the various monetary aggregates, interest rates, and the flow
of funds in general. 
Thirdly, the relationship between the monetary aggregates and interest
rates was not clearly defined  (RSA, 1985: 164).  None of the monetary
aggregates such as M112, M213 or M314 were used as targets  (RSA, 1985:
                                                
11 The replacement of credit normally/previously extended through the intermediation of a
bank or other financial institution by money broking and non-intermediated credit extended
directly by primary lenders to ultimate borrowers  (RSA, 1985: 163).
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164).  Neither was any use made of interest rate targeting, but instead
interest rates were kept at unrealistic levels.  In using these as monetary
policy targets, it allows for the goal of economic stability to be attained.  The
result of this was conflicting objectives between money supply and interest
rate policy, which allowed for disintermediation and thus weakened
monetary policy.  An example given by De Kock (1981: 330) is where it
would be official policy to reduce monetary expansion, yet the authorities
would employ deposit rate controls so that deposit rates were kept below
market levels, thereby encouraging monetary expansion.
  
Fourthly, instruments used in the monetary policy strategy, in particular that
of exchange rate and exchange control, had not been properly co-ordinated,
thereby reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy as a whole  (RSA,
1985: 164).  Finally, the liquid asset system of bank credit control was not
adequately implemented, and also suffered fundamental weaknesses (RSA,
1985: 166). The De Kock Commission identified these weaknesses as
follows:
‰ There were no similarities between the interest rates on statutory liquid
assets and non-liquid assets.  The interest rate differential on these
tended to widen if bank liquidity was in short supply.  This made
inflationary financing attractive to borrowers,
                                                                                                                                   
12 M1 = notes and coins in circulation outside the monetary banking sector, cheque and
other transmission deposits of the domestic private sector with the monetary banking sector,
and other demand deposits of the domestic private sector with the monetary banking sector
 (ABSA, 1998: 164).
13 
 M2 = M1 plus short and medium term deposits of the domestic private sector with the
monetary banking sector  (ABSA, 1998: 16).
14
 M3 = M2 plus long-term deposits of the domestic private sector with the monetary
banking sector  (ABSA, 1998: 16)
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‰ It became more difficult to implement effective monetary policy because
this system led to deficiencies in the short-term financial markets,
distortions in interest rates, and a misallocation of resources, and finally
‰ It provided an incentive for disintermediation (as explained above), which
led to a widening of the gap between banks’ lending and borrowing
rates, resulting in financial markets becoming less competitive.  (RSA,
1985: 170-171).
In order to control the credit creating ability of banks, their required liquid
asset ratios were varied, or the authorities would operate on their liquidity
base  (RSA, 1985: 166).  However, the authorities failed to achieve this
objective.
As will be evident later, in the fifth phase of monetary policy, from the late
1970s, there was a movement away from these direct methods of control
towards a full reliance on indirect instruments.  This implementation of
indirect methods of control, was however, at first limited to the industrialised
countries, and adopted by emerging and other developing economies from
the late 1980s  (Van der Merwe, 1997b: 5).  The discussion will now focus
on the recommendations of monetary policy as made by the De Kock
Commission.
3.4. THE DE KOCK COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS
The De Kock Commission, after evaluating the deficiencies of the previous
system, recommended a market-oriented approach to monetary policy, as
they believed such an approach would serve South Africa better  (RSA,
1985: A9). 
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The Commission’s reasons for suggesting a market-related approach were
the following:
‰ Firstly, financial markets function efficiently only if they are reasonably
free, competitive, dynamic, and liberal, and make an important
contribution to the general economic growth and welfare of the country.
‰ Secondly, growth in the monetary aggregates is stabilised and
moderated with market-oriented policies, thereby allowing more effective
control over disintermediation; and leading to interest rates and
exchange rates that are more realistic and market related.  If these could
be achieved, the monetary authorities’ influence over aggregate money
demand would be improved  (RSA, 1985: A9).  Therefore, the De Kock
Commission believed such an approach would overcome the
weaknesses of monetary policy as experienced in the past.
They recommended that in addition to the objectives of balance of
payments equilibrium and economic growth, the principal long-term goal of
monetary policy should be the preservation of a relatively stable domestic
price level.  Although this would form the primary objective, relative prices
would still be given sufficient freedom to change  (RSA, 1985: A10).  The
De Kock Commission saw no compromise between these goals of
monetary policy in the long-term.
The De Kock Commission furthermore recommended that the SARB adopt
monetary targets as its specific intermediate objective of monetary policy
(RSA, 1985: A10).  This recommendation was based on the belief that
inflation is a monetary phenomenon, and therefore, if the rate of growth in
the money supply could be curbed effectively, inflation would be controlled
(ABSA Bank, 1998: 4).  This recommendation appears to have been
influenced by the Monetarist school of thought (see Chapter Two) that
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favoured a monetary growth rule.  The De Kock Commission preferred
monetary targeting to interest rate targeting, as it believed the
disadvantages of the latter would far surpass the advantages.
In targeting the money supply, the De Kock Commission believed that this
target should be applied flexibly.  Therefore, interest rates and exchange
rates would not be completely free to find their own levels at all times, but
would be given a certain degree of freedom to reflect the varying degrees
of tightness in the market.  This meant they would at times have to rise to
very high levels, and not be kept at artificially low levels as had been done
in the past.  Thus, whatever circumstances the SARB may encounter, it
would have to use its discretion in deciding what combination of monetary
aggregates, interest rates, and spot and forward exchange rates to aim at.
 The De Kock Commission further recommended that the money supply
objectives be expressed in terms of rates of increase which the SARB find
reasonable.  These would be set once a year  (RSA, 1985: A11).  The fact
that the De Kock Commission recommended discretion and not rules made
it different from what the Monetarist advocated, as they preferred a fixed
growth rule. 
In order to control bank credit creation, the De Kock Commission
recommended the use of the “classical cash reserve system”  (RSA, 1985:
A14).  In fulfilling the minimum cash reserve requirement, banks would, if
necessary, have to supplement their cash reserves, by approaching the
discount window of the SARB.  Therefore, banks would be forced to obtain
financing from the SARB, and pay at the rate set by the SARB.  The rate
charged for accommodation would be the prime instrument of control 
(Meijer, 1996: 242).  Therefore, discount policy would be applied to
influence the cost of credit and the demand for credit.  This includes the
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cost to the banking system, and to the banks’ clients  (De Wet, Jonkergouw
& Koekemoer, 1995: 578).  Rogers (1985: 241) points out that this
proposed control mechanism closely resembles the Post-Keynesian
exposition of the money supply process and their recommended monetary
control mechanism.  This is explained further in 3.5.
The market-oriented instruments of monetary policy recommended by the
De Kock Commission, would, through the purchase and sale of appropriate
financial securities impact on prices and quantities in these markets 
(SARB, 1997d: 32).  The De Kock Commission recommended the use of
the following instruments:
‰ Public debt management;
‰ Open market operations;
‰ Discount and general accommodation policy; and
‰ Intervention in the spot and forward exchange markets.  (RSA, 1985:
A13)
The above instruments would be supplemented with semi-market-oriented
techniques. 
3.5 MONETARY POLICY UNDER DR. GERHARD DE KOCK
The De Kock era started during the early 1980s and signified the fifth phase
of monetary policy in South Africa.  This period displayed a clear transition
to a more market-oriented monetary policy.  The main steps signalling this
transition, were as follows:
‰ In March 1980, deposit rate controls were abolished,
‰ In September 1980, bank credit ceilings were abolished;
‰ In September 1980, South Africa’s balance of payments situation
deteriorated, and consequently, the financial markets were allowed to
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tighten, and interest rates were allowed to increase.  Phasing out the
liquid asset instrument between 1982 and 1984 further reinforced the
role of flexible interest rates.
‰ In December 1983, rediscount rates were determined separately,
instead of being set at a rigid margin over market interest rates.  The
accommodation rates were varied more frequently in accordance with
changes in market conditions, and the SARB’s own policy stance. 
(RSA, 1985: 148).
Several of the De Kock Commission’s recommendations were implemented.
 In order to achieve the ultimate objectives and ultimately the containment
of inflationary pressures, the SARB in March 1986 set specific targets for
growth in one or more of the money supply targets  (Gidlow, 1995: 22). 
Annual targets for the growth in the M3 money supply were then set, and
the guideline growth range was set as an upper and lower limit of 10
percent and 6 percent respectively.  These limits did not remain constant,
but were gradually reduced.  By targeting the money supply, the SARB was
following a Monetarist approach.  The Bank, however, made it clear, that
these targets would not signify a strict and tight monetary growth rule, but
should rather be seen as an acceptable rate of monetary expansion  (RSA,
1985: A10).
It was proposed that monetary targeting has various advantages:
‰ Firstly, it makes the public alert to the fact that that there is a relationship
between the money supply and prices;
‰ The business community, consumers, and the labour movement are
able to deduce what actions the monetary authorities will take in the
future,
‰ Government’s propensity to spend public funds is restrained, hence they
53
will not be as enthusiastic to resort to bank credit, thereby also limiting
the likelihood of exceeding the money supply targets,  and finally
‰ If the monetary authorities announce in advance their intended stance
on monetary policy, then the appropriate adjustments in wages and
salaries of employees and spending plans of business can take place.
 (ABSA, 1998: 4)
The German Bundesbank was the first central bank to announce money
supply targets in 1975, with other central banks following suit thereafter.
These policies have been successful in bringing down the average rate of
inflation in industrialised countries until the 1980s.  Furthermore, other
economic indicators were also used in conjunction with the money supply,
such as changes in bank credit extension, overall liquidity in the banking
system, level of and changes in the yield curve and interest rates, and
actual and expected movements in the rate of inflation  (Van der Merwe,
1997b: 2).
The operational variable in the SARB’s monetary policy at this time was
interest rates.  The SARB provides the private sector with additional bank
credit, and by so doing, money is created.  The amount of bank credit
extended to the private sector is dependent on the amount of liquidity
available within the banking system, and the demand for credit emerging
from the private sector.  Total demand is driven by the level of interest rates.
 Therefore, the SARB had to observe and constrain growth in total bank
credit extended, and therefore influence the level of interest rates through
its operations in the financial markets (Stals, 1999e: 2).  Clearly, there was
a distinct recognition of the importance of interest rates as a control
mechanism under Dr. Gerhard De Kock.  This view was in line with the
Post-Keynesian theory of the money supply process, as discussed in 2.4.
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 Furthermore, the authorities recognised that there was a relationship
between monetary aggregates and interest rates, and were aware that the
two could not be determined independently. 
The monetary authorities favoured discretionary monetary policy as
recommended by the De Kock Commission.  Despite the increased
emphasis on market-oriented economic policies, the SARB did not adopt a
purely free market approach, and therefore did intervene in determining
interest rates and monetary aggregates.  This was done through the above
instruments such as open market operations, public debt management, and
rediscount policy, as suggested by the De Kock Commission  (Gidlow,
1995: 15).  Semi-market-oriented techniques of varying the banks’ cash
reserve requirements were used to supplement the above instruments.
The Bank Rate15, and changes thereof became the key element in the
SARB’s refinancing policy, because the Bank Rate directly affected money
market interest rates, which affected the volume of bank credit, money
demand, money supply, and the cash reserve requirements of banks  (De
Wet, 1986: 10).  It is evident from the above that causation ran from money
demand and credit, to the monetary base  (Rogers, 1985: 246). 
The refinancing rates of the SARB were made effective by forcing the
smaller banks to borrow from the SARB at these rates, through the
management of the shortage of liquidity in the money market.  The SARB
has the ability to provide and destroy banks’ reserves, and is the only
institution able to do so.  Therefore, through influencing the lending rates of
                                                
15 The Bank Rate was the basic rate for refinancing, and also the rate on which other
refinancing rates were largely based  (Nel, 1994: 25).
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banks, the SARB is able to influence short-term interest rates  (Guma,
1999: 16).  Prior to April 1993, accommodation was provided in two ways,
firstly “...through the rediscounting of treasury bills, Reserve Bank bills, Land
Bank bills and liquid bankers acceptances with an outstanding maturity of
91 days, at different rates set by the SARB.  Secondly, through the
extension of overnight loans against the security of specified paper of a
specified maximum maturity at specified rates”  (Schoombee, 1996: 85). 
Rediscounting was always the cheaper option, and therefore the most
preferred.  As from April 1993, cash reserve shortages were accommodated
by extending overnight loans to the commercial banks at the Bank Rate (in
the case where treasury bills, Reserve Bank bills, Land Bank bills, and
government stock with a maximum outstanding maturity of 91 days were
pledged), or the Bank Rate plus a margin (in the case of the
aforementioned paper with outstanding maturity of between 91 days and 3
years), depending on the securities offered as collateral  (Schoombee,
1996: 85).  The Bank Rate placed a ceiling on short-term interest rates. 
The Monetarists favoured control of the money base, and therefore reject
the interest rate approach.  Thus, both the SARB and Monetarists favoured
monetary targets, but differed regarding the manner in which it was to be
achieved.  The SARB’s monetary policy was compatible with Post-
Keynesian monetary theory, and incompatible with the quantity theory of
money (Rogers, 1985: 241).  However, although they employed a Post-
Keynesian analysis of the money supply, they put forth a policy of monetary
targeting as Monetarist.  Thus, they followed the lead of other central banks
around the world  (Rogers, 1985: 241). 
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Thus, the operational variable in the SARB’s monetary policy during the
1980s has been the general level of interest rates, and the SARB’s prime
policy instrument in influencing the operational variable remained its
refinancing policy.  The SARB opted for the so called " classical cash
reserve system", whereby they refinanced the money market shortage fully,
unconditionally and on certain prearranged conditions, terms and costs, as
recommended by the De Kock Commission.  The SARB could affect the
demand for liquidity only through variations in interest rates  (Van der
Merwe, 1997b: 3).  The classical cash reserve system closely corresponds
to the Post-Keynesian analysis of the money supply process as discussed
in Chapter Two.  The Post-Keynesians treat the money supply as
synonymous with money demand.  Furthermore, the SARB achieved its
monetary targets by manipulating interest rates and not the cash reserves.
 This is therefore incompatible with the Classical and Monetarist schools’
quantity theory.
3.6 THE CONTROL MECHANISM IN MORE DETAIL
As stated above, the Bank Rate was used as the prime instrument of the
SARB enabling it to control the ability of banks to create credit by
influencing the cash base of the banks (their balances with the SARB) 
(SARB Training Institute, 1997b: 39).  This was because the Bank Rate had
a quick and comparable effect on other market interest rates  (SARB
Training Institute, 1997b: 39).  According to Nel (1994: 15), the objective of
the Bank Rate was to make it gain a greater degree of influence over
market interest rates.  This was supplemented by varying the cash reserve
ratios of the banks.  From 3.5, it is clear that in attaining its ultimate
objective of price stability, the SARB targeted the money supply.  It used the
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Figure 3.1
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK MONETARY POLICY
FRAMEWORK IN THE DE KOCK ERA
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE
Price Stability
↑
INTERMEDIATE TARGETS
Money Supply Aggregate (M3)
↑
OPERATIONAL VARIABLE
Bank Rate or Some Other Specific Short-Term Interest Rate
↑
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
- Discount Policy
- Open Market Operations
- Public Debt Management
- Official Foreign Borrowing
- Central Bank intervention in Spot and Forward Foreign Exchange
 Markets
- Cash Reserve Requirements
Source:  SARB Training Institute, 1997a: 132
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Bank Rate as its key operational variable in achieving the money supply
targets, through its influence on the money market shortage.
Figure 3.1 below is a diagrammatic representation of the SARB monetary
policy framework during the De Kock era.  It shows that the SARB employed
various policy instruments in order to have an effect on the Bank Rate and
other short-term interest rates, which in turn had an impact on the growth
in the money supply.  Through targeting the growth in the money supply, the
ultimate objective of price stability was aimed for.  This section will now
discuss in more detail the various instruments the SARB used in making
monetary policy more effective.
3.6.1. The Cash Reserve System
Until 1981, the monetary authorities controlled banks’ credit creating ability
by influencing their holdings of liquid assets and/or varying the ratios of their
required liquid assets  (RSA, 1985: 181).  However, in 3.3, the weaknesses
of this system were identified.  Based on this, the De Kock Commission
recommended that the SARB should influence banks’ cash bases instead,
and if necessary, vary the required cash reserve ratios.  Hence, the
classical cash reserve system was introduced in South Africa in the 1980s.
A restrictive monetary policy would, for example, result in the SARB
increasing the cost of its accommodation rates, therefore impacting on
interest rates generally, and on the demand for credit.  In this way, the
SARB could influence the total liabilities of the banks to the public, and
therefore their cash reserves (De Kock, 1983: 3).  This system was then
essentially Post-Keynesian in nature.  This meant that interest rates would,
at times, have to rise sharply and to relatively high levels. 
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Policy instruments such as open market operations were used to
supplement the above policy.  These instruments influenced the banks’
cash reserve holdings and in so doing, created indebtedness, which in turn
made the Bank Rate more effective.  In this system, it was the cost of cash
reserves that deterred expansion in the money supply in an inappropriate
manner.  Furthermore, the central bank could extend its accommodation to
the banking system via a limited group of privileged institutions, such as
discount houses.  These institutions served as a funnel through which only
the net shortage of cash reserves in the banking system was channelled to
the central bank  (RSA, 1985: 184). 
The banking sector would obtain full, immediate and unconditional access
to cash reserves through the discount window, but at a rate set by the
SARB.  This was precisely due to the fact that the growth in the money
supply was demand determined with the central bank manipulating interest
rates and not the cash reserves  (SARB Training Institute, 1997b: 55). 
Cash reserves borrowed through the discount window are known as
borrowed cash reserves.  The policy instruments used to give effect to the
above mechanism will now be discussed in more detail.
3.6.2 Policy  Instruments
(1) Public Debt Management
Public debt management was one of the main instruments used in the
conduct of monetary policy.  It consists of  "decisions and actions by the
relevant public entities to attain premeditated effects with regard to the size,
the composition by type of debt instruments or variety of borrowing, the
maturity of structure and the ownership distribution of the public debt,
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notably the debt of the central government "  (RSA, 1985: 187).  The De
Kock Commission recommended that there be a close relationship between
this instrument and open market operations, where both the SARB and the
Treasury have input regarding the use of these two instruments  (RSA,
1985: 193).  This recommendation was implemented, to support the
SARB’s refinancing policy, thereby making the Bank Rate effective  (Meijer,
1996: 263).
Under this system, the deposit liabilities of the banks would expand if
government spending were financed through the extension of additional
credit to the government sector.  Such actions would increase the money
supply, and expand the deposit liabilities of the banks, thereby requiring
them to hold additional reserves with the SARB.  These additional reserves
were obtained by monetising part of their liquid assets, thereby putting
upward pressure on interest rates (Gidlow, 1995: 59).  Under the cash
reserve system an increase in net bank credit extended to government still
increased the money supply directly, but did not increase the banking
system’s ability or desire to extend more credit, or expand the money supply
further.  It is through the level and structure of interest rates, including its
influence on the SARB’s discount policy, that it exerts its influence on
monetary conditions  (RSA, 1985: 190). 
The fact that banks made good their shortfall of cash by withdrawing funds
from discount houses, forced the discount houses to make use of SARB
accommodation.  As a result thereof, the costs of accommodation, and
hence interest rates, became important variables.  In South Africa, however,
public-debt management was not used extensively as an instrument of
monetary policy, but close consultations between the Treasury and the
SARB did indeed take place.
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(2) Open Market Operations
As discussed in 3.4, the De Kock Commission recommended that the SARB
expand its use of open market operations as a means of influencing the
money supply and interest rates.  It was also used to smooth out seasonal
fluctuations in money market conditions instead of relying solely on
rediscounting and overnight loans.  Furthermore, they recommended that
different prices and quantities be used, without the exclusion of one or the
other, so as to develop open market techniques best suited to South African
conditions. 
Open market operations refer to “….the purchase or sale of securities
(government stock, Land Bank bills, bankers acceptances, and foreign
exchange), by the central bank in a secondary market in support of its
monetary policy aims  (SARB Training Institute, 1997a: 125).  It was
introduced in September 1973, but the SARB started placing emphasis on
it as an instrument only in March 1980.  It was introduced at this late stage
because there was no active market in government securities at the time,
and the SARB held an inadequate portfolio of government securities 
(SARB Training Institute, 1997a: 69).  Subsequently, the scale of open
market operations grew considerably  (Gidlow, 1995: 53).  Initially, open
market operations were to be conducted in government stock, treasury bills,
Land Bank Bills, and banker’s acceptances.  However, there was a limited
availability of such liquid paper, and the SARB was frequently compelled to
use securities of other public sector bodies  (Meijer, 1997: 29).
An open market sale or purchase of assets will have an immediate effect on
the supply of money circulating in the economy, and the cash reserves of
banks, immediately decreasing or increasing these respectively  (SARB
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Training Institute, 1997b: 63).  If the central bank conducts an open market
sale of assets, the cash reserves of banks decrease.  This increases their
need for accommodation, and therefore, the money market shortage 
(Guma, 1999: 18).  Cash reserves obtained under open market operations
are known as non-borrowed cash reserves.  According to Schoombee
(1996: 62), short-term interest rates should be influenced mainly by
changes in the supply of non-borrowed cash reserves, at market
determined prices, in order to influence the operational variable.  This point
will be referred to in Chapter Five.
According to Gidlow  (1985: 79), “…open market operations have the
advantage that they are less visible, more flexible, and facilitate a more
efficient functioning of the markets in which rates are more sensitive to
changes in monetary conditions”.  It is, however, inefficient in terms of its
flexibility and manoeuvrability for purposes of very short-term management
of the market.  This is because settlement of these transactions could only
take place two weeks after they had been concluded  (Meijer, 1997: 29).
 However, this issue will be discussed later in section 3.7.
(3)  Bank Rate and Discount Policy
Discount policy formed an integral part of the classical cash reserve system,
together with public debt management and open market operations. 
Discount policy refers to “….the SARB’s policy in regard of its extension of
financial assistance or refinancing to discount houses and banks, at their
insistence, in the form of rediscounting of treasury bills and other acceptable
financial instruments, in the form of collateral lending against the security
of such instruments”  (Gidlow, 1995: 67).  It therefore provides banks with
the necessary credit to meet their cash reserves for either their minimum
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cash reserve requirements or overnight loans  (Meijer, 1996: 252).  The
need for credit could arise as a result of open market sale of assets (open
market operations), or increased government spending financed by
domestic banks  (public debt management). The interest rate at which
refinancing is provided, determines the effective cost of cash reserves at the
discount window.
Due to the fact that accommodation was granted immediately,
unconditionally, automatically, and to the full extent of the shortfall in the
banks’ aggregate cash balances, changes in the cost of accommodation
 was the only way in which the terms and conditions of accommodation
could be changed.  Because the Bank Rate was the lowest refinancing rate
available, it became the basic rate for rediscounting.  It was set and varied
at the Reserve Bank’s own discretion.
Short-term interest rates were usually below the Bank Rate, and the gap
between short-term interest rates and the Bank Rate indicated a change in
the underlying demand for bank credit, the liquidity position of banks, and
expectations of the market regarding the future change in the Bank Rate
 (SARB Training Institute, 1997b: 117).  If the central bank’s rates were
higher than the market rates, banks would bid for paper, thereby losing cash
reserves and therefore would experience a cash reserve deficiency.  This
deficiency was then made good at the central bank’s discount window,
driving up the prices of this paper and driving down the corresponding
market yields and interest rates.  This process continued until these yields
and interest rates reached approximate equality with the central bank’s
rediscount rates.  The reverse of this process holds true  (Meijer, 1996:
253). The SARB was therefore able to exert a dominant influence over
money market and other short-term interest rates.
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The SARB therefore followed the De Kock Commission’s recommendation
that the Bank Rate be used as the rediscount rate, and that the SARB
would use its discretion in setting this rate.  Changes in the Bank Rate
policy in the 1980s were designed to place the authorities in a position
whereby they could lead, and not follow market interest rates.  At times
however, decreases in the Bank Rate followed decreases in market interest
rates that took place in anticipation of an expected change in the Bank
Rate, but this will be discussed further in Chapter Six.
3.7 EVENTS LEADING TO THE DEMISE OF THIS SYSTEM
As indicated above, monetary policy decisions under the De Kock
Governorship were linked to changes in the M3 money supply.  At this time,
there existed a stable relationship between the money supply and total
domestic expenditure on the one hand, and the money supply and inflation.
The importance attached to the money supply was a result of the monetary
authorities' assumption that there was a link between the rate of increase
in the money supply and inflation  (Stals, 1997b: 2).  As discussed above,
in this system, the Bank Rate and other refinancing rates were set and
varied at the discretion of the SARB.  These rates were used to influence
the general level of interest rates in the economy, as well as other economic
aggregates mentioned previously.
This approach applied since 1986, served South Africa well as its financial
markets were isolated from international markets, and capital flows were
determined by exchange controls.  However, with the new dispensation
since 1994, major political and social reforms took place, and South Africa
was reintegrated into the global economy.  Three major structural changes
have occurred throughout the world, which forced South Africa to rethink its
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monetary policy.  These were globalisation, the liberalisation of the financial
markets worldwide, and international co-operation and integration (Van der
Merwe, 1997a: 1).  This called for a drastic restructuring of South Africa’s
financial sector, as it made the objective of price stability all the more
difficult to attain.  The credibility of the M3 money supply as an intermediate
guideline of policy became questioned, as it was rendered a less reliable
indicator of inflation, as well as a less reliable anchor for monetary policy.
The environment in which monetary policy was conducted changed
considerably as a result of the financial liberalisation and globalisation.  This
was because the national financial markets increasingly became
interdependent.  This interdependency has various implications.  Firstly,
domestic interest rates may now have to adjust less in order to achieve the
objectives of monetary policy  (Van der Merwe, 1997a: 2).  Furthermore,
shocks are more easily transmitted from one market to another, and the
growth of the financial markets has increased the capital flow between
countries, as well as the volatility of movement of these funds between
countries (Van der Merwe, 1997a: 2).  Large international capital
movements easily disrupt trends in all the major financial aggregates.  As
a result, the financial instruments must be able to react quickly and
sensitively to changes in the underlying conditions in the financial markets
to restore equilibrium  (Stals, 1998b: 2).  Furthermore, interest rates and
exchange rates must be flexible and not be constrained by rigid money
rules.  As is evident, international convergence, co-operation and integration
have serious implications for the role and conduct of monetary and other
economic policy measures that the authorities institute.
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In South Africa, there has been an increase in non-resident participation in
the domestic financial markets, resulting in a large turnover.  Moreover, this
has led to greater volatility in long-term interest rates, as investors are quick
to alter their positions as changes occur in the domestic environment (Van
der Merwe, 1997a: 3).  The large degree of volatility in capital movements
is not only influenced by domestic developments, but also by events in other
countries, such as the Mexican and Brazilian crisis in 1994 and 1998
respectively.
Although the inflation rate in South Africa had been brought down to more
acceptable levels, the core inflation rate at 7,2 percent in January 1998, was
still twice as high as the average rate of inflation in the economies of South
Africa’s major trading partners (Stals, 1998a: 4).
The rate of increase in bank credit extension to the private sector slowed
down significantly, but the net claims of monetary institutions on the
government increased sharply, thus causing the growth in total credit
extension to increase.  The growth rate in the money supply also remained
high, appreciably higher than the upper limit of the SARB’s guideline range
of between 6 percent and 10 percent.  Growth in the M3 money supply
consistently increased at high rates, fluctuating at around 15 percent while
the income velocity declined sharply.  All the above trends were reflected
in interest rates, which remained at relatively high inflation-adjusted levels.
 The exchange rate of the rand although relatively steady in 1997, was still
affected by international developments  (Stals, 1998a: 4-7).  Furthermore,
the amount of liquidity available in the banking sector declined from R10, 6
billion in March 1997 to R5, 3 billion in October, showing that the banks no
longer needed assistance of large amounts from the SARB for most of the
time  (Stals,1997e: 2).   
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Apart from the negative events just described, there were intrinsic
weaknesses in the conduct and development of monetary policy itself.  The
disadvantages to the system discussed above are many.  Firstly, it made
money market interest rates insensitive to changes in liquidity.  The low net
direct effective cost of refinancing has also contributed to the insensitivity
of money market interest rates.  The easy access banks had to SARB
accommodation, at a fixed Bank Rate, contributed to the rigidity of the
money market.  Secondly, the SARB was unable to provide clear signals to
the market about its monetary policy stance, and in turn could not receive
clear signals from the market regarding the banks’ perceptions of the
developments taking place in the markets.  Finally, development of the
interbank market was discouraged, as well as trading in treasury bills and
short dated government bonds  (SARB, 1998f: 1).  It was recognised there
was a need for greater flexibility in the market for short-term funds.
Market interest rates have become increasingly volatile, therefore monetary
control procedures have to be able to respond quickly to such changes.
According to Schoombee (1996: 92), the use of automatic access to the
central bank’s discount window to influence short-term interest rates has
come under increasing criticism.  Central banks over the world have
reduced their use of the discount window, and instead began to use open
market operations and other such instruments.  The focus has moved from
controlling banks’ cost of cash reserves, to the quantity of reserves.  As is
evident throughout this chapter, South Africa has concentrated a large
amount of reliance on its discount window, and therefore on the cost of
cash reserves. 
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Furthermore, the classical cash reserve system was not useful in managing
the money market on a day-to-day basis, it was only applicable when large
and sustained changes in domestic liquidity occurred, the reason being that
it takes time to apply and is unwieldy.  Also, frequent increases in the
reserve requirements could disrupt the efficient management of banks’
portfolios, and could lead to disintermediation, thereby weakening monetary
control.  The open-market operations also did not have an immediate effect
on interest rates, because the SARB relied mainly on long-term government
bonds  (Van der Merwe, 1997b: 4). 
Due to these weaknesses, the SARB adopted the repurchase system in
March 1998.  This system is similar to the one in use by Germany as will be
discussed in Chapter Four.
3.8 CONCLUSION
Monetary policy as laid down in South Africa since the time of the De Kock
Commission, has proceeded along Keynesian lines, with Monetarist
influences.  This policy, which incorporated the targeting of the M3 money
supply, served the country well.  This was the case as long as the financial
markets in South Africa were relatively isolated from the rest of the world,
and exchange controls were firmly in place.  At this time, there existed a
stable relationship between changes in money supply and total domestic
expenditure, and therefore between money supply and inflation  (Stals,
1998b: 1).  The SARB used the instruments it had at its disposal, namely
the cash reserve requirements, discount window, and open market
operations, to ensure its money supply guidelines would be achieved. 
However, with the integration of South Africa into international markets, and
the relaxation of exchange controls, the picture had changed.  The
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monetary policy applied was no longer effective, and was riddled with
difficulties.  For this reason, the suitability of continuing with this policy was
questioned, both within and outside the SARB.  Central banks around the
world discovered that the successful application of money supply guidelines
or targeting posed several difficulties.  With this then came the advent of a
new monetary policy, which will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FOUR
MONETARY CONTROL PROCEDURES IN
GERMANY: A CASE STUDY
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the various phases of monetary policy
in South Africa since the World War II period up to March 1998.  It was
illustrated in particular that the previous monetary policy system became
ineffective after 1994.  Hence, South Africa adopted the repurchase
system in March 1998, a system which has been in place in Germany
since 1985.  For this reason it would be logical and useful to use
Germany as a case study to see how this system was applied and what
successes and failures Germany has had thus far. This chapter will
serve as an introduction to the following chapter, which discusses the
repurchase system as applied in South Africa.  The targets of monetary
policy in Germany, as well as an overview of their repurchase system are
discussed in the sections below.  A short overview of the German
interbank market is provided in Chapter Seven.
It is important to note that since the beginning of 1999, the European
Central Bank has been responsible for monetary policy in the European
Monetary Union, which includes Germany.  For this reason, the
monetary control procedures discussed in this chapter are no longer in
operation in Germany.
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4.2 THE INTERMEDIATE TARGETS OF MONETARY POLICY
Due to the complex nature of the transmission mechanism, and the time
lags associated with it, in order to achieve its objectives, the Bundesbank
has to gear its monetary policy to an intermediate target, over which its
operational variable has some control.  In order to be effective, the
intermediate target variable has to give a relatively early indication of the
impact of monetary policy.  The intermediate target and operational
variable therefore have to satisfy certain requirements. Firstly, it must be
possible for the central bank to draw reliable conclusions from the
operational variable regarding the outcomes of monetary impulses. 
Secondly, the intermediate target must have a stable relationship with
the final target variable and, therefore, the achievement of the
intermediate target must ensure the attainment of the final goal.  Thirdly,
the central bank must be able to control the operational variable with
sufficient accuracy with the aid of instruments.  (Clarida & Gertler, 1996:
10)
In deciding on an intermediate target for monetary policy, it was argued
in Germany that real interest rates are unlikely to provide a realistic base
for the price level, as a particular interest rate pattern may be consistent
with both price stability and high inflation  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995:
68-69). Consequently, it is not suitable as an intermediate target, or as
a leading indicator of monetary policy.
Secondly, monetary impulses are passed on in the transmission
mechanism mainly through credit aggregates, that is, the volume of bank
lending to enterprises and individuals.  However, the problem with using
it as an intermediate target is that a close and stable relationship
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between credit aggregates, and hence, price movements cannot be
unequivocally assumed theoretically, and has not yet been empirically
validated for Germany.  It would therefore not be wise to use credit
aggregates as a leading indicator  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 69).
Monetary aggregates, however, are far less prone to the above
uncertainties. It has been empirically proven that there does exist a
relationship between movements in the money stock and the overall
price level  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 70).  Over the long-term,
money is created mainly through lending by the banking system to the
private sector and the net appropriation of external assets by the
banking system  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 71).  Furthermore, the
Bundesbank can control the expansion of the money stock through the
terms at which it supplies central bank money (see footnote 16). 
Through its management of liquidity in the money market, the central
bank can influence the banks’ willingness to lend, and therefore overall
growth in the money supply.
 
In deciding to use monetary aggregates as an intermediate target of
monetary policy, the question as to which monetary aggregate to use is
vital. The M1 and M2 monetary aggregates are extremely volatile in
Germany.  Regarding the M1, it seemed to overstate the effects of
interest rate policy pursued by the central bank  (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1995: 73). Furthermore, the M1 only measures the actual cash in hand,
and therefore does not give a realistic picture of the money supply in the
economy, making it appear to be tighter or easier than what it actually is
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 73).  The M2 again distorts the trend of
monetary growth in the opposite direction.  The M2 expands strongly in
periods when short-term interest rates increase very rapidly, and
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furthermore understates the prohibitive effects of monetary policy and
can even run counter to the direction of monetary policy  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 73).
The Deutsche Bundesbank therefore favours the broader definition of
the money stock, M3.  The growth of the M3 has shown a stable positive
relationship with the growth of aggregate production, and a negative
relationship with interest rate movements  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995:
74).  In the long-term, a clear connection between the growth of the M3
money supply and price movements has been evident, and economic
studies show that through controlling M3, the Bundesbank can influence
the price level in the desired direction.  This facilitates the medium-term
direction of monetary policy when the annual monetary target is
determined, evaluating the macro-implications of current monetary
trends and gauging the appropriate monetary policy actions  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 75). However, it is possible that the underlying
relationships could become distorted in the short-term, but in the long-
term, there is no convincing evidence that the relationship between
monetary growth and price movements have become unstable in
Germany or that the strategy of monetary targeting should be
abandoned.  As was seen in Chapter Three, South Africa also preferred
and used the M3 money supply as an intermediate target from 1986.  It
will be indicated in Chapter Five, however, that South Africa later
discontinued this practice.
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4.2.1. The Bundesbank Monetary Targets
Each year the Bundesbank establishes a goal for inflation, and based on
this goal, sets a target for its monetary aggregate, which is consistent
with its inflation goal  (Bernanke & Mihov, 1996: 2).
It was indicated in Chapter Three that the Bundesbank was the first
central bank to set monetary targets in 1975, and at this time used the
“central bank money stock”16 as its target  (Eizenga, 1987: 6).  In 1988,
it was replaced by the M3 money stock.  The reason for this change was
that the central bank money stock was prone to serious disturbances,
and often went above the target range  (Schmid & Jerrmann, 1991: 74).
Events in the real economy also caused the Bundesbank to deviate from
these guidelines, however, there was always an official explanation
provided  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 103).
This system has the advantage that it is flexible, because the monetary
targets are only guidelines and not legal mandates.  Between 1975 and
1978, the Bundesbank announced a point target of 8 percent each year,
which was always more or less exceeded.  From 1979, it chose to
publish an intermediate target range that was checked and revised in the
middle of each year, and in 1991, a monetary target for a reunified
Germany was announced for the first time.  (Schachter & Stokman,
1995: 476)
                                                
16
 
 The central bank money stock comprises of currency in circulation and minimum
reserves, which the banks are required to hold against their domestic liabilities.
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Since using the M3 monetary aggregate, the Bundesbank has more
often than not met its targets, although in some years it has overshot the
target. Therefore, despite facing a number of constraints due to its
integration into the world’s financial markets, Germany’s success rate
with monetary targeting has been favourable.  Germany's floating
exchange rates provide some room for manoeuvre, but the growing
interdependence of financial markets and increased international
monetary policy co-operation have created new dependencies, as has
been the case in South Africa.  In implementing monetary targeting,
Germany has managed to slow down long-term rises in interest rates;
regain price stability; decrease the growth rate of the cost of living; and
moved business activity on to the path of sustained growth  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 87). 
4.3 OVERVIEW OF THE GERMAN MODEL
According to the Deutsche Bundesbank Act17, the Bundesbank is
responsible for monetary policy in the Federal Republic of Germany, and
commits itself to stabilise the value of the German currency, the
Deutsche Mark.  This ensures domestic price stability, and the stability
of purchasing power in terms of foreign currencies  (Schachter &
Stokman, 1995: 476). By keeping purchasing power stable, the
Bundesbank believes it can create the monetary conditions allowing for
the maintenance of a long-term, high level of employment with steady
economic growth  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 66).
                                                
17  
 Article 3 of the Deutsche Bundesbank Act of 1957  (Schachter & Stokman, 1995:
476).
76
The Bundesbank furthermore defines its role as “...to safeguard the
currency by regulating the amount of money in circulation and the
amount of credit supplied to the economy”  (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1995: 66).
Like South Africa, the Bundesbank uses instruments that influence
interest rates and the availability of funds in the money market, in order
to achieve its monetary objectives.  This is aimed indirectly at the
amount of credit supplied to banks and at the demand for money and
credit.  Previously, the Bundesbank used instruments such as rediscount
policy, lombard policy (to be defined below), variations in rediscount
quotas and minimum reserve requirements.  Through these instruments
it was able to influence short-term interest rates and money market
conditions because it has the power to:
‰ change the minimum reserve obligations of the banks;
‰ conduct open market operations;
‰ influence holdings of public balances, in particular their allocation
between the central bank and commercial banks, and also to
influence the manner in which public cash deficits are financed;
‰ to lay down conditions for access to rediscount credit from the central
bank;
‰ fix advances on securities; and
‰ to engage in intervention in the foreign exchange market.  (European
Communities Monetary Committee, 1972: 92).
The discount rate and the lombard rate represented the most important
interest rates in Germany.  There are no upper and lower limits for these
rates, but generally the discount rate is the cheapest rate and the
lombard rate the most expensive rate.  The instruments of discount and
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lombard policy are discussed in further detail below in 4.4.2.  Besides
acting on interest rates, the Bundesbank endeavours to influence money
demand, by influencing bank liquidity.  Through influencing bank liquidity,
demand and supply relations on the money market are altered, therefore
causing movements in interest rates.
4.4 MONETARY CONTROL PROCEDURES IN MORE DETAIL
Despite the great amount of importance attached to the monetary
aggregates, daily management of monetary policy is concerned with
setting the short-term interest rates.  The Bundesbank, in its
publications, states that in the short-term, moderating market interest
rate fluctuations take preference over meeting monetary aggregate
targets (Clarida & Gertler, 1996: 11).  The Bundesbank translates its
goal of monetary policy into near-term interest rate objectives, and
supplies the banks with reserves to meet these objectives  (Clarida &
Gertler, 1996: 11).  Until the mid-1980s the Bundesbank manipulated
short-term interest rates and bank reserves via discount window lending
to banks, making available two types of credit, discount credit and
lombard credit.  Therefore, the focus was on the cost of reserves.
In the last few years, the Bundesbank increasingly used more market
oriented policies  (Jahnke & Reimers, 1995: 75).  These instruments,
together with the restructuring of the minimum reserves, enabled the
Bundesbank to adjust the size of the demand for central bank money,
by varying the reserve ratios. Secondly, it has reduced the quantitative
significance of rediscount credit, and is therefore no longer used as an
instrument for managing liquidity.  Finally, the repurchase system has
become the key determinant of banks’ overall refinancing.  This section
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will now focus on the Bundesbank’s instruments of monetary policy,
indicating how and why it moved to a securities repurchase system in
1985.
4.4.1 Minimum Reserve Policy
The minimum reserve policy was introduced in 1948  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1989: 56).  Under this policy, banks keep a certain
percentage of their deposits covered by balances at the central bank.
 The minimum reserve policy was introduced to provide the central bank
with a flexible and effective instrument of liquidity policy.  The minimum
reserve requirement serves the same purpose as the cash reserve
requirement in South Africa, for this reason it would be useful to look at
it.
In implementing the minimum reserve policy, the Bundesbank intended
it to perform a dual task  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 125).  Firstly, it
was meant to create a demand for central bank money by banks when
the volume of credit and money expands in the economy.  When this
happens, banks are forced to obtain financing from the Bundesbank,
and therefore see it as a lender of last resort.  The central bank can also
modify the reserve ratios, therefore altering the amount of central bank
balances permanently supplied to banks.  This keeps the creation of
money by banks under control.  Since a change in the reserve
requirements will either absorb or release central bank money for banks,
the minimum reserve policy can also compensate for developments
which entail the creation or destruction of central bank money, such as
foreign exchange flows  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 63).  Monetary
expansion can only take place if the Bundesbank accommodates this
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need, and makes its own contribution to banks’ creation of money.  The
Bundesbank determines how much and at what interest rate it provides
additional central bank balances (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 63).
Secondly, the minimum reserve policy acts as liquidity buffer absorbing
unforeseen fluctuations in liquidity needs, generally with no intervention
by the Bundesbank.  This results in stable interest rates  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 126).
The minimum reserves carry no interest, thus this policy initially
dampens bank profitability, creating a burden for banks which they pass
on to their customers.  The minimum reserve ratios have to be fulfilled
only on average over a month, therefore banks can use their central
bank balances for payment purposes, and if necessary, withdraw them
temporarily.  If banks fall short of their minimum reserve ratios, the
amount is subject to a special rate of three percentage points above the
current lombard rate.  If the amount exceeds the minimum reserve ratio,
banks acquire investments at the central bank which earn interest. 
Under the previous system in South Africa, the cash reserves were held
in two accounts, with the one earning interest and the other non-interest
earning.  Furthermore, the cash reserve requirements had to be fulfilled
on a daily basis.  This was changed with the introduction of the
repurchase system in 1998, but further discussion on South Africa’s
cash reserve requirement policy will follow in Chapter Five.
There has been an increasing interdependence between international
financial markets.  Consequently, this has resulted in increased money
holdings outside Germany, impairing the ability of domestic monetary
aggregates to provide accurate information to the authorities. 
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Consequently, the minimum reserves have created competitive
distortions, which are harmful to Germany.  Furthermore, a change in the
minimum reserve ratios can send unwarranted signals to the markets,
and these are not desirable. Thus, the Bundesbank restructured the
minimum reserve ratios to lower them substantially. 
For these reasons, the incentive to bypass the minimum reserve ratios
has increased.  This instrument is much less significant today, and is
held solely for regulatory purposes, forcing the banks to refinance at
conditions set by the Deutsche Bundesbank  (Eizenga, 1987: 8).  For
example, when banks increase their lending operations, this
automatically decreases the liquidity within the banking system as a
whole.  Therefore, banks will refinance this shortage from the
Bundesbank.  In this manner, the efficiency of rediscount and open
market policy is enhanced  (Eizenga, 1987: 8).  The minimum reserves
were last used in 1987 to absorb heavy inflows of foreign exchange.
4.4.2 Refinancing Facility
Refinancing refers to “…lending by the Bundesbank to credit institutions
through the purchase of bills of exchange (rediscounting) and the
granting of loans against the collateral of securities (lombard loans)” 
(Jahnke & Reimers, 1995: 98).  The aim is to influence the quantity of
money and credit circulating in the economy.  The instrument of control
in this facility are interest rates, but the Bundesbank can use quantitative
and qualitative restrictions as well. 
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Individual banks have no general right to refinancing facilities at the
Bundesbank.  Every institution holding the minimum level of reserves,
however, is offered access to the refinancing facility, depending on the
general monetary situation and the particular circumstances of the
institution seeking credit  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 46).  The
various refinancing options available to banks are now discussed below.
(1) Rediscount Policy
Under rediscount policy, commercial banks can obtain liquidity from the
central bank by selling it bills of exchange, which have to be paid back
in no more than three months, and no less than seven days.  Banks are
able to use this facility at a preferential interest rate  (Clarida & Gertler,
1996: 12).  Changes in the discount rate usually entailed a shift in the
pattern of interest rates in the Federal Republic of Germany.  The trend
was for interest rates to change much more in short-term business than
in long-term business, that is, more vigorously on the money market 
(European Community Monetary Committee, 1972: 96). 
The discount rate is the lowest boundary for money market interest
rates, therefore there are quotas attached to rediscount credit. 
Furthermore, if money market interest rates were lower than the discount
rate, banks would finance purchases of new bills by money market
credit, thus increasing demand for money market credit and therefore
increasing interest rates.  This would have the effect of closing the gap
with the discount rate.  Before the introduction of the Repo Rate, this
rate was similar to the Bank Rate as used in South Africa.
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What is of importance in this facility is that the amount of rediscount
credit is limited through the establishment of rediscount quotas.  By
increasing the discount window borrowing quotas of banks, it is possible
for the central bank to tighten policy.  This is therefore a quantitative
control procedure.  In the past, quotas were increased or decreased
according to the requirements of monetary policy, alternatively, banks
were only allowed to use a certain percentage of their quotas  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1989: 47).  Fixed quotas were applied for one year at a
time.  If the rediscount quotas were raised, the immediate result was an
increase in unutilised rediscount facilities.  These unused facilities were
used in times when liquidity was scarce, especially if refinancing credit
was more expensive  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 48).  If the quotas
were raised to compensate for losses in liquidity, or to provide central
bank balances, then this signified a technical adjustment to liquidity and
was not indicative of an expansionary monetary policy  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1989: 48).  However, this was often misunderstood by the
public, with the result that a change in rediscount quotas frequently had
signal effects that were not warranted. 
The Bundesbank Act did not lay down minimum or maximum levels for
the discount rate, thus the Bundesbank could act in a discretionary
manner in setting this rate.  The Bundesbank introduced a uniform
method of calculation in 1974, to enable a standard quota to be
calculated for each bank according to objective criteria.
Rediscount quotas do not affect liquidity immediately, if rediscount
quotas are increased, then only the unused portion for rediscounting is
increased.  The rate at which it is used depends on whether banks wish
to repay more expensive types of central bank borrowing, and the extent
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to which they are able to obtain additional bills.  A cut in quotas can only
take place as bills which have already been discounted fall due
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 103).  Changes in these quotas had an
impact on the average cost of borrowing from the Bundesbank.
For a long time, changes in rediscount quotas were not aimed at
changing the banks’ refinancing at the Bundesbank through bills, but
instead the focus was on banks’ unused refinancing facilities and liquid
bank assets which could be sold to the central bank at any time, and
therefore provided automatic access to central bank money.  These
unused refinancing facilities increased the time lag with which restrictive
monetary policy measures took effect.  The quantitative significance of
rediscount credit has diminished substantially, and it is no longer used
as an instrument for managing liquidity.
(2) Lombard Policy
Lombard loans cannot be granted for longer than three months, and are
extended only to bridge the temporary liquidity needs of banks
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 101).  The lombard rate can be changed
daily, and can be revoked.  Lombard loans have always been fixed
above the discount rate, reflecting their purpose, which is only for
emergency funding.  In this sense, lombard loans are used for second-
tier accommodation.  If money market interest rates were higher than the
lombard rate, it would be profitable for banks to borrow from the
Bundesbank and lend in the money market.  This would increase supply
and decrease demand in the money market, resulting in declining money
market interest rates.  The Bundesbank can affect the quantity of loans
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borrowed through this facility by changing the interest rate charged to
banks on these loans, namely the lombard rate.
For a long time, the gap between the lombard rate and the discount rate
was never more than one percentage point, but occasionally in times of
restrictive policy, it has been as wide as 3 percentage points  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1989: 51).  Under the traditional methods, sometimes
banks met all their needs for the reserve requirements through lombard
loans.  According to the Deutsche Bundesbank (1989: 52), this had two
disadvantages:
‰ Banks came to regard the lombard loans facility as a permanent
source of central bank money, and the day-to-day rate remained
closely linked to the lombard rate.  Changes in the lombard rate did
not allow for flexibility.
‰ Short-term and minimum changes in money market conditions
offered a greater chance of not being seen straight away as a basic
change in monetary policy stance, and therefore, of being
misunderstood.
The lombard window lost its role as a last resort refinancing facility,
creating havoc with the Bundesbank’s monetary policy instruments, and
weakening the central bank’s controlling position  (Dudler, 1986: 66). 
Banks borrowed heavily through the lombard window, therefore the call
money rate was virtually pegged at the level of the Bundesbank’s
lombard rate.  This was a problem also faced by South Africa in its
previous accommodation system, which will be discussed in Chapter Six.
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Setting the discount rate and the lombard rate was the cornerstone of
interest rate policy.  The discount rate represents a floor for the rates,
and the lombard rate represents a ceiling. The lombard rate is of more
significance to the interest rate trend, as it is an upper limit for the day-
to-day money market rate.  If the liquidity position is well balanced, that
is, when there is sufficient liquidity in the market, no bank will pay higher
rates than it has to for lombard credit.  However, even though the
lombard rate is a ceiling for short-term interest rates, it might happen that
the day-to-day rates exceed it, if liquidity is very scarce.  Banks’ lending
and deposit rates largely followed the lombard and discount rates.
Besides influencing the credit costs of commercial banks, by setting
official interest rates, changes in the discount rate and the lombard rate
were also viewed as indicators for the direction of Bundesbank monetary
policy.  An increase in interest rates was interpreted as contractionary
monetary policy, and a decrease in interest rates as an expansionary
monetary policy. 
These instruments placed the Bundesbank in a good position to exercise
control over the money supply.  In practise, however, the Bundesbank
found it increasingly difficult to rely exclusively on these familiar policy
instruments. According to Dudler (1986: 57), there were a number of
reasons for this:
‰ They required formal decisions by the central bank’s council;
‰ They were accompanied by pronounced signal effects not always
desired; and
‰ banks need considerable time to adjust their deposit and lending
rates and their reserve positions to conventional policy measures.
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Furthermore, the lombard facility was regarded as a permanent source
of central bank money, therefore, any easing or tightening of liquidity
was reflected in the differences of levels in lombard borrowing.  Due to
the strong links between the German money and capital markets, and
those abroad, there was a growing need to be able to respond quickly
to changing conditions in financial markets  (Deutsche Bundesbank,
1995: 112).  The traditional instruments were unable to do this, and the
effects of these instruments took place only with substantial time lags.
The Bundesbank wanted more discretion in influencing the monetary
situation in the money market, and to limit the use of lombard loans so
that they would be used only temporarily to meet peak needs in the
money market, in line with its intended purpose.  The discount policy and
lombard policy became inflexible, and could only be changed on a
discrete basis. Thus, the Bundesbank lacked the ability of targeting
interest rates.
Flexibility in managing the money market could be enhanced by the
more active use of short-term, reversible open market operations, such
as securities repurchase agreements.  In such a system, the initiative
would remain in the hands of the Bundesbank.  Over the last 15 years,
the Bundesbank began dealing in repurchase agreements, and made
increasing use of the United States style auction of open market
operations.  These two changes have greatly increased the
Bundesbank’s ability to fine tune movements in market interest rates.
They are more desirable as instruments of monetary control, especially
since the 1980s, with the economy exposed to larger and more frequent
interest rate and exchange rate shocks from abroad.  Thus, it was only
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from 1985 that the management of the money market was done in a
more flexible manner.
This change to a more flexible system occurred as a result of the
growing inter-linking of Germany as a financial centre with financial
international markets.  Since then, the Bundesbank has only modified
the weighting and adjustment of individual instruments to cope with the
underlying changing conditions that have taken place.  The next section
will discuss securities repurchase agreements. 
4.4.3 Open-Market Policy under Securities Repurchase
Agreements
Open-market policy refers “…to the purchases and sales of securities by
the central bank for its own account in the open market”  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1989: 65).  The central bank buys and sells at market
prices, therefore it cannot choose arbitrary prices.  When the central
bank participates in the market, this has an effect on the market
situation, and the interest expectations of open market players are
altered so that the Bundesbank is forced into the position of being an
interest rate leader.
The Bundesbank since the late 1970s had developed open market
operations under securities repurchase agreements.  They provide
banks with temporary central bank funds.  Initially, open market
operations were traded in bills of exchange, but this has since changed
to debt securities, as credit institutions have virtually no major stocks of
bills in their portfolios  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 111).  The interest
rate relevant to the securities repurchase agreements, is the Repo Rate.
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Under this system, the Bundesbank purchases securities eligible as
collateral for the lombard loans from banks, subject to a minimum
reserve requirement, on condition that the bank simultaneously
purchases the securities forward (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 110).
 Securities repurchase agreements are offered to banks in the form of
fixed-rate tenders (stating in their bids only the amount required) or
variable rate tenders (stating in their bids both the amount required and
the interest rate they are willing to pay).  In the fixed rate tender, the
Bundesbank sets the Repo Rate itself, and institutions state in their bids
the amount required (not less than DM1 million).  Of the total bids
received, the Bundesbank allots the amount on offer, should this not be
sufficient to cover all the banks, the Bundesbank will then reduce the
bids accordingly.  In the variable rate tender, allotments are made either
at uniform interest rates (Dutch style auction), or at individual bidding
rates tendered by banks  (United States style auction).  Bids at rates
above the average allotment rate are provided in full, and bids below this
rate are reduced accordingly.  Until 1988, the Bundesbank used only the
Dutch style auctions for variable rate tenders, and set a minimum
interest rate as a guideline.  Afterwards, the United States style auction
method of variable rate tenders was instituted, with no minimum bidding
rate given and allotments made at credit institutions individual bidding
rates, starting with the highest rate  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 112).
Historically, the fixed rate tender has prevailed in periods when interest
rates are on a downward trend, and the variable rate tender in periods
of rising interest rates (Schmid & Asche, 1997: 83).  The Bundesbank
has generally stuck to the fixed rate tenders for a long time at
unchanged interest rates.  When the Bundesbank introduced the
repurchase system, it raised the lombard rate, while offering increased
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amounts of securities repurchase agreements at rates significantly below
the new lombard rate  (Dudler, 1986: 67).  Initially, banks anticipated an
increase in the money market rates and continued to borrow heavily
through the lombard window  (Dudler, 1986: 68).  After this was
overcome, the new techniques operated smoothly, facilitated by
favourable domestic economic developments, fairly steady and
moderate expansion of key monetary aggregates, and an improved
external environment  (Dudler, 1986: 71).  Therefore, the repurchase
system passed the initial test successfully, making it easier for the
Bundesbank to cope efficiently with external disturbances and growing
influences of volatile market expectations on short-term interest rates
and exchange rate developments. 
When the securities repurchase agreements were introduced in
February 1985, the Bundesbank offered three repurchase agreements
per month, which was changed in August 1998 to four per month.  In
December 1993, this changed to one per week, and then changed again
to four short-dated and two long-dated transactions between July 1989
and October 1992.  In November 1988, the repurchase agreements
were supplemented with quick tenders, enabling the Bundesbank to
influence the money market flexibly on a day-to-day basis  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 113).  Quick tenders are settled on the same day
with securities repurchase agreements allotted the day after the tender.
 This differs to the customary repurchase transaction, where the
repurchase agreement is allotted one day after the tender. 
The Bundesbank began to use this instrument so that it could eliminate
the excessive use of lombard borrowing.  However, this could only be
accomplished if repurchase agreements were offered at a rate below the
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lombard rate.  If they were above or at the level of lombard loans, banks
would still meet part of their funding needs via lombard loans, which they
could use in a more flexible manner  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 69).
 For this reason, the Repo Rate lies below the lombard rate.  There is
therefore now an interest rate corridor, with the ceiling fixed by the
lombard rate, and the floor by the discount rate.
The advantages of the use of the securities repurchase agreements in
Germany are:
‰ they are reversible at short notice;
‰ the initiative is in the hands of the Bundesbank;
‰ their terms can be varied in accordance with the current liquidity
situation;
‰ they do not directly affect prices in the debt securities market; and
‰ they only serve to regulate the money market  (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1995: 112).
Securities repurchase agreements primarily determine the movements
of the day-to-day money market rates within an interest rate corridor
(mentioned above), where the floor is set by the discount rate and the
ceiling by the lombard rate.  Furthermore, the Repo Rate has
psychological signal effects and the central bank uses these to influence
interest expectations in the market.  Furthermore, securities repurchase
agreements mature and are renewed at short intervals, and the terms
can be adjusted immediately to the changed market conditions, therefore
they are perfect for this day-to-day money market management. 
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4.5 SUCCESSES OF THIS SYSTEM
The securities repurchase system was introduced because the
traditional instruments suffered certain weaknesses (discussed in 4.4.2).
 These instruments were ineffective because they took effect with
substantial time lags, and they created undesirable signal effects. 
Furthermore, the lombard facility lost it role as an emergency lending
facility.  The Bundesbank needed instruments that would be flexible and
quick to respond to dynamic market conditions.  Hence, the securities
repurchase agreements were introduced.
Since its implementation, there has been a large volume of securities
repurchase agreements conducted by the Bundesbank.  This means that
the Bundesbank has been successful in its aim to become more flexible
in its interest rate and liquidity policies  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989:
70).  For example, in 1986, there were massive inflows of foreign
exchange into the country.  The Bundesbank reacted to this by
decreasing the volume of securities repurchase agreements.  In 1987,
the amount of foreign exchange inflows increased even further, the
Bundesbank therefore had to continue decreasing the volume of
repurchase agreements, but could not do this indefinitely as it would
hamper the smooth continuation of flexible money market management.
Therefore, the Bundesbank increased the minimum reserve ratios and
decreased the discount quotas  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 118). 
This proved to be successful.
Under securities repurchase agreements, the volatility in the day-to-day
money market rate has decreased  (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1995: 118).
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At the same time, the demand for central bank money has remained
responsive enough so that liquidity shocks can be absorbed by interest
rate changes in a subtle manner.
The increased use of securities repurchase agreements since the mid-
1980s has effectively restored the lombard loan facility to its traditional
function of an emergency facility and a ceiling for the day-to-day money
market rate.  Since then, the level and pattern of interest rates has been
largely determined by liquidity and the rate structure of such transactions
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1989: 75).  However, it is possible that the role
of the lombard facility may be strengthened temporarily for monetary
policy reasons, to selectively tighten liquidity in the money market.  It
may also happen that banks take up exceptionally large amounts of
lombard loans for speculative reasons, thus impeding liquidity
management by the Bundesbank.  The Bundesbank can break free from
this "liquidity trap" by calling for an increase in the lombard rate so that
the lombard loan facility reserves its function of an emergency funding
facility for the banks.
Furthermore, should the Bundesbank find it difficult to influence interest
rates, it may take recourse to the liquidity channel in order to do this, but
will only be successful if:
‰ It  is able to foresee market-determined liquidity shocks with sufficient
reliability; and
‰ the banks’ behaviour is not determined by pronounced expectations
of interest rate changes  (Schmid & Asche, 1997: 87).
In the second requirement above, the Bundesbank opts for the fixed rate
tender to give the market guidance.  If the variable rate tender is used,
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it might happen that interest rates push it against the limits of the interest
rate corridor.  If interest rates increase, then the Repo Rate will closely
follow the lombard rate, and the Bundesbank will be in danger of falling
into a "liquidity trap"  (continuously increasing interest rates).  Should this
happen, the lombard rate will take over the function of the Repo Rate,
making the Repo Rate ineffective.  If interest rates decrease, the Repo
Rate approaches the level of the discount rate, and the discount trap
opens (continuously decreasing interest rates).  However, despite these
risks, the money market management through securities repurchase
transactions has proven its worth.  The Repo Rate has assumed interest
rate leadership in the day-to-day money market in both the short and
medium-term.  Markets respond directly to the announcement of a
change in the Repo Rate.
4.6 CONCLUSION
Prior to the period with the introduction of the securities repurchase
transactions system, the discount policy, lombard policy, and minimum
reserve policy formed the key policy instruments in Germany. However,
Germany found it increasingly difficult to rely on these, and needed a
more flexible alternative, as these instruments proved to be
cumbersome. The lombard facility, which was intended for emergency
funding, was used for daily refinancing.  Furthermore, the country was
suffering from more frequent interest rate and exchange rate shocks
from abroad.  This was the reason for the introduction of the securities
repurchase system, which provided a more flexible alternative. From this
time, the minimum reserves were held solely for regulatory purposes,
and the discount policy was no longer used as an instrument for
managing liquidity.  With the extension of the open market operations,
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in the form of securities repurchase agreements, this has become the
key determinant of banks overall refinancing.  This change has
increased the Bundesbank’s ability to fine tune movements in the market
for interest rates, and recourse to the lombard facility has taken on its
original purpose. This system has proved to be very successful in
Germany.
The adoption of the repurchase system in South Africa as from 1998 is
the topic of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE NEW REPURCHASE SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous system of Reserve Bank accommodation was discussed
in Chapter Three.  This system, which had been in place from 1985
onwards, was a market-oriented approach targeting the growth in the M3
money supply.  The SARB accommodated the banks fully, automatically,
and on certain predetermined terms, conditions and costs.  Central
banks all over the world, however, abandoned money supply targeting
as an intermediate objective of monetary policy, with the exception of
Germany as discussed in Chapter Four.  South Africa was somewhat
slower in following suit, due to the country’s economic isolation from the
rest of the world  (Stals, 1997d: 2).
With the new political dispensation coming into effect in 1994, the
country’s long economic isolation ended, and South Africa's economic
system became open to international developments.  Distortions
developed in the relationship between changes in the money supply and
inflation.  The volume of financial transactions increased to a large
extent, therefore increasing the money supply, but this did not contribute
to the demand for real goods and services.  As a result, although the
income velocity of circulation of the money supply declined sharply, the
total transactions velocity of circulation did not decrease.  It would be
expected that the increase in the money supply would lead to rising
inflation.  However, this was not the case, in fact inflation had been on
a downward path  (Stals, 1999b: 2). 
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This was but one of the many associated problems of the previous
system.  On 9 March 1998, South Africa moved to a more eclectic
approach to monetary policy, and started to manage the money market
through securities repurchase agreements.  Until recently, this approach
was still based on the guidelines for the M3 money supply.  This chapter
will discuss the repurchase system as applied in South Africa.
5.2 THE REPURCHASE SYSTEM
The system of money supply targeting in South Africa was abandoned
as a result of developments which took place world-wide, these being
the financial liberalisation, globalisation and integration of the country
into the world financial markets.  These developments weakened the
ability of the money supply to achieve the primary goal of protecting the
value of the rand. 
With the above developments, came a relaxation of many of the
exchange controls, which had been in place for so long.  With exchange
controls relaxed, foreign capital movements across international borders
became increasingly volatile, as did exchange rates  (Barnard, 1998: 1).
For this reason, short-term interest rates, which were previously
insensitive to changes in the domestic financial environment, need to act
as a shield against domestic and external fluctuations, and therefore be
more sensitive to such developments.
In the new system, repurchase agreements between the SARB and
banks have become the new mechanism whereby the SARB provides
liquidity to the market  (SARB, 1998f: 1).  The new procedures are
intended to make monetary policy and the instruments of monetary
policy more effective and flexible in a complex financial environment.
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As before, the SARB continues to intervene in the financial markets and
use its discretion when deciding what combinations of money supply
growth, interest rates, and exchange rates should be aimed at in a given
set of circumstances, in order to support the objective of low inflation 
(Stals, 1999a: 7).  However, the relationship between the various
financial aggregates is becoming increasingly complex, for this reason
the SARB decided to de-emphasise money supply and bank credit
extension as indicators for its monetary policy decisions  (Stals, 1998a:
10).  By taking the emphasis off the money supply, the SARB has
included other financial indicators, which it would monitor in conjunction
with the money supply.  These include other price indices, the level of
interest rates and the slope of the yield curve.  Inflation can also be
affected by developments in other economic aggregates such as the
balance of payments position; gross gold and other foreign exchange
reserves, and changes in these aggregates may affect the financial
aggregates and can also influence the stance of monetary policy  (Stals,
1998a: 11).
It is still the aim of monetary policy to influence the overall lending policy
of banks, and also the demand for credit and money in the economy
indirectly through changes in bank liquidity and interest rates in the
money market  (Barnard, 1998: 3).  Instead of using refinancing fully,
automatically, and on certain prearranged terms, conditions and costs,
the SARB now actively manages money market liquidity through
conducting open market operations in securities repurchase
agreements. In the previous system of accommodation, refinancing was
regarded as a permanent source of liquidity, therefore accommodation
had very little effect on interest rates.  At the time the repurchase system
was implemented, it was hoped that regular repurchase transactions
would become the main apparatus to regulate money market liquidity.
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Figure 5.1
SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK CURRENT
MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE
Price Stability
↑
INTERMEDIATE TARGETS
Money Supply Aggregate (M3) and Certain Other Variables
↑
OPERATIONAL VARIABLE
Repo Rate and Marginal Lending Rate
↑
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
- Accommodation (Repo) Policy
- Open Market Operations
- Central Bank Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Markets
- Other Repurchase Transactions
- Cash reserve Requirements
- Tax and Loan Accounts
Source:  SARB Training Institute, 1999: 43
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Whether or not this has been achieved will be discussed further in
Chapter Six.  The objective of this is to make domestic liquidity
management the most important operational tool of monetary policy and
to reduce the SARB’s role in the foreign exchange market.  The
repurchase agreement is better known as a ‘repo’, which is an acronym
for sale and repurchase agreements.
In addition to implementing the repurchase system, three other changes
were made to the accommodation system to enable monetary policy to
operate more efficiently.  The changes made were the discontinuance
of the daily net cash reserves, the introduction of signalling to the market
and the implementation of the marginal lending facility.  These will be
discussed below.  Figure 5.1 is a diagrammatic representation of
monetary policy under the new repurchase system.  In comparing Figure
5.1 with Figure 3.1, it is evident that the Bank Rate has now been
replaced by the Repo Rate, and the number of intermediate targets has
increased.
5.2.1 The Repurchase Lending Facility
The repurchase lending facility is a facility whereby the SARB provides
accommodation to banks when they are short of cash.  Banks no longer
discount eligible paper with the SARB but enter into repurchase
transactions with it on an overnight basis.  Repurchase transactions take
place against the same collateral as used to be accepted at the previous
discount window, that is, 105 percent of the market value of treasury
bills, SARB bills, Land Bank bills and government bonds with an
unexpired maturity to redemption of less than two years  (Guma, 1999:
24). 
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“The repurchase agreements involve the outright buy and sell
transactions with the full transfer of ownership of the underlying assets”
(SARB, 1998g: 3).  The counter parties allowed to tender for the
repurchase agreements are restricted to banks, because the objective
of the repurchase system is to regulate liquidity in the banking system.
 In order to obtain funds, the holder of a security will sell it to a counter
party. The seller agrees to purchase the security back at a prearranged
future date and interest rate  (Barnard, 1998: 4).  Table 5.1 is a
diagrammatic representation of this process.  In the first round of the
repurchase transaction, AA sells securities to AB, and enters into a
legally binding agreement, whereby AA agrees to purchase the
equivalent securities from AB for an agreed price, at a specified date in
the future.  AB has an open title to the securities, but also has a
responsibility to deliver the equivalent securities to AA at the end of the
repurchase period.  The interest rate charged is the Repo Rate, and
constitutes the difference between the sale price (the price at which AA
sells the security to AB), and the repurchase price (the price at which AA
buys back the security) (Barnard, 1998: 5).  The maturity period of the
repurchase agreement was initially set at one week, but should
conditions require it this could be altered.  In June 1998, this was
changed to one day  (Meijer, 1997: 9).
The SARB announces daily how much accommodation it is willing to
provide, the banks tender for the amount of accommodation they
require, and state in their bids the interest rate they are willing to pay for
this facility.  Banks must have a sufficient amount of underlying eligible
securities in order to tender. The amount the SARB puts up for
accommodation is then apportioned to the banks, providing first for the
banks with the highest bid rates.  Therefore bids are allotted from the
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Table 5.1
MONETARY AND SECURITY FLOWS OF A
REPURCHASE TRANSACTION
LEG 1
Party AA   Sells R100 million worth government securities →Party AB
Party AA ← Party AB pays for government securities
Party AA now has R100 million worth of cash against which it has delivered
R100 million worth of securities to which Party AB has full title.
LEG 2
Party AA   Pays R100 million worth of cash plus Repo Rate  →Party AB
Party AA ← Party AB sells R100 million worth of government securities.
Source:  Barnard, 1998: 5
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highest to lowest rate tendered.  Banks therefore co-determine the Repo
Rate with the SARB, whereas previously, the SARB determined the
Bank Rate  (Guma, 1999: 24).  At times, the amount the SARB puts up
for accommodating the money market shortage may not be sufficient to
accommodate all the banks.  In this case, the banks may finance the
remaining shortage from their settlement account balances, borrow from
the interbank loans market, or borrow under the marginal lending facility
at a penalty rate, but this will be discussed further below.  Clearly, the
repurchase agreement is used under deficit money market conditions.
There is a second type of repurchase agreement, the reverse
repurchase agreement, which is used to drain liquidity from the market.
 This is used under surplus money market conditions, which are created
when banks hold large amounts of excess cash reserves.  The SARB
drains the surplus by selling securities in the market.  A system of
second repurchase transactions was introduced in South Africa, which
would take place on certain days, and include reverse repurchase
agreements in government stocks.  This will therefore increase the
money market shortage and force banks to borrow from the SARB under
normal repurchase agreements at a higher interest rate than the rate
earned on government stock bought from the SARB under the reverse
repurchase agreements.  This has the effect of boosting the income flow
of the SARB (SARB Training Institute, 1999: 54).
The repurchase agreement is conducted at a variable rate and therefore
the SARB uses the United States style auction which is the same as that
used in Germany  (see Chapter Four).  Under this method, banks tender
at an “interest rate they are prepared to pay on cash balances provided
to them, and tender against the temporary and to-be-reversed sale of
approved securities to the SARB”  (Barnard, 1998: 5).  Each successful
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tenderer is awarded his/her tender, at the specific successful interest
rate tendered.  Banks therefore know the price of the funds they borrow,
but the amounts of funds to be received could be different from the
tendered amount.  The SARB then makes public the weighted average
of all successful tendered interest rates.  The SARB can reject certain
individual tenders and accept others. This is known as partial allotments.
The securities used by private banks as collateral have been mentioned
under 5.2.1.  Each of these has different risk or return profiles.  In order
to protect themselves against such risks, the banks provide the SARB
with securities at an adjusted market value.  This adjusted market value
is called a ‘haircut valuation’, and is the purchase price plus repurchase
interest multiplied by the appropriate ratio  (SARB, 1998g: 8).  This
means that the market value of the securities must equal the total
repurchase price multiplied by the appropriate ratio (risk weighting).
The tenders are conducted on a daily basis, therefore the Repo Rate is
expected to fluctuate daily, and it is hoped that these fluctuations will
lead to a more flexible structure of interest rates than that prevailing
under the previous system  (Barnard, 1998: 15).  Furthermore, it is
believed that the flexibility of interest rates will result in clearer signals
being sent to the monetary authorities regarding monetary conditions.
 With this in place, the SARB should be able to contain any weaknesses
in the rand, and at the same time be able to relax exchange controls
further (Barnard, 1998: 16).  Banks will furthermore be given more scope
to manage their liquidity positions more efficiently. 
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Monetary policy is therefore expected to be more market orientated than
before.  It is also anticipated that key bank lending rates will change in
line with the Repo Rate.  Changes in the Repo Rate should also affect
deposit and lending rates of commercial banks.  It is expected to have
a direct impact on liquidity in the money market, therefore also having
significant indirect effects via interest rates on other macroeconomic
variables.   These questions will be explored in Chapter Six.
There are various procedures that have to be followed in conducting
repurchase transactions, which are discussed below.
(1) Practical Procedures for the New Repurchase System
Appendixes I to IV (b) present the daily timetable, as well as the screen
announcement and repurchase agreement entered into between the
SARB and private banks.  From Appendix I, it is shown that the SARB
publishes a preliminary amount, which it will put up for tender at 12:00
every day.  In this, the SARB makes known what it estimates the money
market shortage to be for that day.  The estimates are calculated by
means of liquidity forecasts.  Liquidity forecasts are essential because
they form the basis for planning and decision-making, and are
particularly significant in the new accommodation operational
procedures. However, it is an extremely difficult task estimating the daily
money market shortage, because there are factors influencing money
market liquidity over which the SARB has no direct control.  These are:
‰ Changes in note and coin circulation outside the SARB.
‰ Autonomous balance of payments transactions affecting the net
foreign assets of the SARB;
‰ Changes in government deposits held at the SARB; and
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‰ Surpluses/deficits due to transactions in the forward market and
exchange rate.  (Barnard, 1998: 11)
The SARB therefore needs to have historical and projected time series
data of changes in these factors.  Forecasting the deposits of the
government at the SARB is the most difficult.  Close co-operation and
co-ordination between the Department of Finance and the SARB is
therefore essential for success of the new operational procedures. The
SARB furthermore requires fine-tuning measures, in order to predict
banks’ liquidity needs as accurately as possible.  Such measures include
quick tenders; sale/purchase of short-term treasury bills; adjustment in
the portfolio of the Corporation for Public Deposits and transfer of
government funds between the tax and loan account of government at
private banks and the exchequer account with the SARB.
The bids for the repurchase agreements are allotted sequentially, from
highest to lowest until the full amount on offer is allotted.  The SARB
decides on the minimum accepted bid rate when all tenders have been
received.  Bids for funds from banks are irrevocable.  The minimum
amount that banks are allowed to bid for is R10 million and thereafter in
multiples of R1 million  (SARB, 1998g: 8).  Within fifteen minutes of each
tender, the SARB announces the result of each round, stating the
amount of funds to be provided and the average Repo Rate.  The funds
are not released to the banks if their financial instruments register
account is not in order.  Delivery of securities takes place either
physically to the SARB settlement division (bills), or transferred to the
SARB safe custody account in the central depository within one hour, via
the South African
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Table 5.2
MECHANICS OF THE REPURCHASE SYSTEM
 Bid
rate
(%)
Tendered
amount
(R mill)
Amount
received
(R mill)
Repo
interest
(R)
Collateral
Value (R)
Deficit
(R)
Bank A 20,00 350 350 142 000 344 760 569 5 381 431
Bank B 19,96 200 200
Bank C 19,92 400 400
Bank D 19,88 300 50
Total 19,95 1250 1000
Total amount tendered = R1.25 billion
Reserve Bank financed = R1 billion
Analysis of Bank AA’s Repo bid rate, amount tendered, nominal interest
payable, market value of securities offered, and margin deficit:
Purchase Price (repo allotment) 350 000 000
Interest (at repo tender rate) 142 000
Total Repurchase Price 350 142 000
Market value of bonds sold to the Bank AA    201 336 488 
Market value of Treasury Bills sold to the bank AB     143 424 081
Total Market Value 334 760 569
LESS Repurchase Price (sell back price) 350 142 000
Equal Margin Deficit 5 381 431
The margin deficit has to be made good to the Reserve Bank.
(Barnard, 1998: 6-7)
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multiple options settlement system (SAMOS)  (discussed further in
Chapter Seven). 
When the repurchase agreements mature, participants buy securities
from the SARB equivalent to those sold to it in the first leg of the
repurchase transaction.  On, or after the payment, the securities are
returned to the banks.  Appendixes III to IV (b) are examples of the
repurchase agreements and the margin transfer to and from the SARB.
Table 5.2 illustrates the mechanics of the repurchase system involving
banks tendering different bid rates for a specified amount of central bank
funds.  In this table, Bank A tenders for an amount of R350 million at an
interest rate of 20,00 percent, while Bank B tenders for R200 million at
19,96 percent, and Bank D tenders for R300 million at an interest rate
of 19,88 percent.  Bank A and B, who tendered at the highest bid rate
are allotted their amounts in full, whereas Bank D only receives R50
million, which is less than what was tendered for.  Bank D will therefore
have to find alternative financing for the extra R250 million, either
through using its settlement account balances or the marginal lending
facility.  In analysing the position of Bank A, a 20 percent interest rate on
its tendered amount of R350 million will amount to R142 000, effectively
bringing the total repurchase price of the financing to R350 142 000. 
This is the amount Bank A has to pay to repurchase the securities from
the SARB.  Bank A, however, sells securities to the SARB to the value
of R334 760 569, which when subtracted from the repurchase price
equals a margin deficit of R5 381 431.  Bank A has to provide the SARB
with this difference. 
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5.2.2 The Cash Reserve Requirement
Previously, the cash reserve requirement was used to create a demand
for central bank money, whenever the volume of money and credit
expanded because it forced banks to obtain the necessary liquidity from
the central bank.  It also gave the SARB the ability to adjust the required
reserve ratios if conditions in the money market required this  (Van der
Merwe, 1997b: 12). Under the repurchase system, it is now used to
decrease extreme volatility in interest rates on a day-to-day basis.  In the
past, the cash reserves had to be maintained at legally specified
minimum levels, on a daily basis, equivalent to 2 percent of all liabilities,
and 1 percent of short-term liabilities.  Previously the cash reserves were
split into two accounts, with the one account earning interest (short-term
liabilities account) and the other non-interest earning.  With the
implementation of the repurchase system, this requirement was changed
to 2,5 percent of banks’ total liabilities.  Furthermore, these cash
reserves have to be maintained over an average basis of one month, as
is the case in Germany with its minimum reserve policy (see Chapter
Four)  (Meijer, 1997: 7).  See also Hugo (1998: 2).
The cash reserve ratios have become less popular as a monetary
control instrument because of certain specific drawbacks.  To make it
more effective as an instrument of monetary control, the SARB no longer
pays interest on any part of the required cash reserves  (Meijer, 1997:
8). Banks previously were not allowed to be in overdraft at the end of the
daily settlement period, and if they were, they would be charged a
penalty rate equal to the Bank Rate plus a margin.  Under the
repurchase system, however, banks are able to use their cash reserves
early in the month, and rebuild them later in the month (to be discussed
109
in 5.2.3).  The SARB determines at what ratios the cash reserve
requirements have to be maintained at, and does this based on its
evaluation of economic circumstances, and as an alternative monetary
policy instrument.  These ratios cannot be changed frequently because
even a small change could induce relatively large shifts in banks’ assets.
 For the instrument to be effective, it must be applied equitably to all
banks and all deposits.  However, the SARB reserves the right to change
the cash reserve requirement and induce supplementary requirements
should the situation call for this. 
The reserve requirements have to be kept at a minimum, as this is
necessary for effective monetary control, and do not include interbank
deposits as this could inhibit the development of the interbank market
 (Hugo, 1998: 3). Cash reserves are held at the SARB and are also used
to make and receive payments  (Van der Merwe, 1997b: 16-18).
The SARB furthermore drains liquidity by issuing debentures.  Banks can
make up this lost interest incurred on them as a result of the termination
of reserve requirements on short-term liabilities on which interest was
previously paid, by investing in these debentures  (Guma, 1999: 23).
5.2.3 The Marginal Lending Facility
It has already been established that the SARB can influence the total
liquidity shortage through repurchase agreements, but as stated above
in 5.2.2, on occasion the tenders are not accepted in full.  When banks
are short of cash, it is replenished by borrowing under the marginal
lending facility, at a penalty rate equivalent to the old Bank Rate, which
is now called the Marginal Lending Rate.  Therefore, it is used to bridge
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the temporary liquidity shortfalls not provided for under the repurchase
tenders.  The SARB’s objective is to make the cost of funds more
responsive to supply and demand conditions, so that it can send signals
to banks reflecting its view on money market conditions. No limits are set
on the use of this facility provided the banks present the required
collateral.  The Marginal Lending Rate forms an upper ceiling/limit to the
overnight market rate for funds (SARB, 1998f: 1).  Therefore, there is a
divergence between the Repo Rate and the higher Marginal Lending
Rate.  Should the difference between the two narrow, it could be
indicative of a future rise in the Marginal Lending Rate, and vice versa.
This facility is intended to be used on an infrequent basis, that is,
overnight or for a few days, so that the outstanding balance on this
lending facility is kept to a minimum.  For this reason, it was initially set
at 3 percentage points above the Repo Rate to discourage its use,
however, with the crisis in 1998, it was set at a much higher rate to the
Repo Rate and varied with it  (Stals, 1998c: 1).  There is no floor facility
offered by the SARB, implying a more active interbank market.  This
means that interest rates in this market are more responsive to changes
in banking conditions and will therefore give a better signal to the central
bank of the general monetary conditions  (SARB Training Institute, 1999:
53).
The marginal lending facility forms part of the SAMOS system, whereby
all banks are allowed to open settlement and loan accounts at the
SARB, in order to participate in the interbank settlement process.  It may
be that at times the SARB will fix the Marginal Lending Rate at a
premium to the Repo Rate, in order to discourage banks from making
extensive use of this facility. The Marginal Lending Rate performs the
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same function as the lombard rate in Germany.  The SARB maintains
the right to limit or suspend a bank’s access to this facility, amend
conditions of this facility, or suspend the facility for an indefinite period
of time  (Van der Merwe, 1997b: 17).
5.2.4 Signalling to the Market
The Governor of the SARB announced that banks should not see the
size of the daily liquidity requirement as an important indicator of SARB
policy on short-term interest rates.  Instead the amount of liquidity the
SARB offers at the daily tender relative to the overall liquidity need in the
market, will be used to signal the SARB’s intentions to the market 
(Stals, 1999d: 1). 
The SARB in its sole discretion determines the amount of refinancing
which it is willing to provide, and this can be greater than, less than, or
equal to the money market shortage.  A full provision of liquidity
suggests a neutral stance on the part of the SARB, where it supports the
current direction and extent of interest rate movements in the market.
 An under-provision indicates that the SARB is of the opinion that
interest rates should rise, and an over-provision signals that the SARB
wants the Repo Rate to decrease  (Stals, 1999e: 2).  In exceptional
circumstances, the SARB reserves the right to conduct auctions with a
predetermined fixed interest rate.  This would occur where the SARB
wants to obtain an immediate and substantial change in money market
interest rates (Guma, 1999: 25).
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5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REPURCHASE SYSTEM
The SARB phased in the new system by fixing the Repo Rate for a week
from 9 March 1998, at 15 percent, and the Marginal Lending Rate was
set at the level of the previous Bank Rate, at 16 percent, effectively
decreasing the cost of borrowing from the SARB by one percentage
point.  In April 1998 the Repo Rate became receptive to money market
developments and moved down to 14,79 percent on 11 May 1998.
Subsequently, strains developed in the foreign exchange market where
the rand was put under pressure  (Barnard, 1998: 14).  The SARB
reacted by providing less than the estimated liquidity requirement.  This
resulted in interest rates increasing, and the Repo Rate increased to
16,09 percent on 25 May 1998, producing a Marginal Lending Rate
increase to 3 percentage points above the daily average Repo Rate.  On
26 May 1998, the SARB introduced the fixed Repo Rate at 18 percent,
and the Marginal Lending Rate increased to 10 percentage points above
the Repo Rate  (SARB, 1998e: 39).  This was to be maintained only until
conditions in the money market had calmed down.  On 2 June 1998, the
spread between the Repo Rate and the Marginal Lending Rate was 15
percentage points. 
When it became apparent that the rand would remain vulnerable for a
longer period, the SARB abandoned the fixed rate tender in favour of the
variable rate auction system on 19 June 1998, and widened the spread
to 20 percentage points.  In July 1998, the Repo Rate gradually crept
higher.  In August and September of 1998, the Repo Rate was fairly
constant, and in October when conditions in the money market had
improved, the Repo Rate declined to around 20 percent.  These general
interest rate conditions will be discussed in more detail in 6.2.1.
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Under the repurchase system, banks are able to manage their liquidity
positions more efficiently.  Furthermore, repurchase transactions are
advantageous because they can be implemented quickly, and do not
have significant price effects, and are easily adapted to changing
conditions.  When banks tender, the amount of the tender will normally
equal the projected liquidity need, that is, what they presume their
liquidity need to be.  As stated above, where the total liquidity needs of
the market are not met on a specific day, the remaining shortage can be
financed from the banks’ settlement account balances, which are held
with the SARB.  Alternatively, banks can make use of the marginal
lending facility or the interbank loans market (to be discussed further in
Chapter Seven).
The SARB believes that daily changes in the Repo Rate should not lead
to volatility in the Prime Overdraft Rate and the mortgage lending rates
of the banks.  Banks will have to find a new base for these rates, which
could possibly be linked to a “moving average of the Repo Rate”  (Stals,
1998a: 13).  Banks’ lending rates should follow their average effective
cost of total funds.  Clearly, with the implementation of the repurchase
system, the SARB is focussing more attention on controlling the amount
of cash reserves rather than the cost of cash reserves.
5.4 CONCLUSION
With the globalisation, liberalisation, and co-operation of international
financial markets, the SARB found its previous monetary policy
instruments to be ineffective in the changing financial environment. They
were not flexible enough, and generated broad and lagged effects.  As
such, the SARB implemented the repurchase transactions system, as
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was done in Germany. This was done to regulate liquidity in the money
market.  In the new system, the SARB wants to guide interest rates
rather than control them. Furthermore, in order to prevent turbulence in
the domestic financial markets, the signalling capacity of the SARB has
become more important. The new procedures make various forms of
signalling possible, which are hoped to lead to greater transparency of
monetary policy than the previous procedures.
The impact of the repurchase system on money market interest rates,
money supply growth and accommodation procedures will be discussed
in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
IMPACT OF THE REPURCHASE SYSTEM ON MONEY
MARKET INTEREST RATES, MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH
AND ACCOMMODATION PROCEDURES
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to explore the relationship between the
new repurchase system and certain financial aggregates in South Africa,
and how it has changed from the previous system of accommodation.
Statistical information has been obtained from the SARB.  All data are
of a monthly nature, dating back to January 1996, with the exception of
the over/under-provision information, which is of a daily nature.  This
study covers the period up to February 2000.
Particular objectives are to establish whether there is a different
relationship between the Repo Rate and money market interest rates
than there was between the previous Bank Rate and money market
interest rates. Furthermore, the difference in the relationship between the
M3 money supply and the Bank Rate, and between the M3 and the Repo
Rate will be examined.  The relationship between the level of
accommodation and the Bank Rate on the one hand, and the Repo Rate
on the other, will be investigated to establish if there are any differences.
 Finally, it will be investigated if the SARB’s system of under- and over-
accommodating of liquidity has had any impact on interest rates, and
whether this had made signalling to the market more effective.  This is
done in order to establish whether the new system has achieved its
objectives.
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6.2 MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES
6.2.1 Analysis of Money Market Interest Rates under the Previous
System of Accommodation versus the New Repurchase System
of Accommodation
Figure 6.1 plots the relationship between the Bank Rate and other
money market interest rates, and Figure 6.2 plots the relationship
between the new Repo Rate and other money market interest rates in
South Africa.  It is evident from Figure 6.1, that there was a positive
association between the Bank Rate and money market interest rates,
despite minor short-term fluctuations.  The Bank Rate, however, was set
at the discretion of the SARB, and as such changed infrequently.  Money
market interest rates remained posted to the Bank Rate, and so suffered
the same weakness.  The fact that the Bank Rate was determined by the
SARB, and not allowed to fluctuate in accordance with market
conditions, made it rigid and inflexible.
Furthermore, money market interest rates and the Prime Overdraft Rate
reacted to changes in the Bank Rate with a substantial time lag.  In
February 1996, there were disturbances in the foreign exchange market,
and the external value of the rand dropped  (SARB, 1996: 35).  It is
apparent in Figure 6.1 that the SARB followed a restrictive monetary
policy in order to buffer this.  However, referring to Figure 6.1, short-term
interest rates first reacted in April, after the Bank Rate was increased.
 According to Guma (1999: 21), it was only after long and sustained
increases in the money market shortage, that some reaction in short-
term interest rates could be detected.  This was clearly inefficient.
117
Figure 6.1
BANK RATE VS OTHER MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES
1996/01 – 1998/03
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
Figure 6.2
REPO RATE VS OTHER MONEY MARKET INTEREST RATES
1998/03 – 2000/01
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
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Money market interest rates reflected market expectations as to what the
SARB was likely to do, and did not reflect shifts in the market’s own
perception of policy needs in prevailing money and credit situations
(Meijer, 1997: 40).  As such, there were instances when money market
interest rates seemed to have influenced the Bank Rate.  In October
1997, the Bank Rate was decreased in reaction to the decline in money
market interest rates.  As such, instead of being an interest rate leader,
the Bank Rate would be an interest rate follower. This was primarily due
to expectations in the market regarding the future course of the Bank
Rate. Expectations about the Bank Rate tended to dominate the
determination of the structure of short-term interest rates.  If participants
expected the Bank Rate to increase, they would increase their short-term
interest rates, regardless of money market liquidity conditions.  In
December 1996, for example, the BA Rate declined for 15 months
consecutively due to widespread belief that the Bank Rate was going to
decrease  (SARB, 1998e: 40).  In fact, Figure 6.1 indicates that money
market interest rates in general started to decline before the Bank Rate
decreased in October 1997.  As Van der Merwe  (1997b: 4) puts it,
expectations about a change in the Bank Rate became a much more
important factor than the available liquidity in the money market in
explaining changes in interest rates.
Market interest rates sometimes behaved perversely, for example, a rise
in the money market shortage would create an increase in the demand
for treasury bills for presentation at the discount window.  Increased
demand for treasury bills would increase their price, thereby decreasing
their yield.  Therefore, instead of seeing interest rates increase to reflect
the money market shortage, the authorities would observe a decrease
in the tender rate for treasury bills (Guma, 1999: 22).  As is visible in
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Figure 6.1, this was the case in October 1996, when the Treasury Bills
Rate moved in the opposite direction of the other money market interest
rates.  The Treasury Bills Rate decreased to 14,94 percent, when the
others were increasing in response to the tight conditions in the market.
 According to the SARB  (1997d: 41), this was primarily due to “…the
special status enjoyed by the short-term Treasury Bills Rate, a limited
availability of liquid assets in the market, and a relatively strong demand
by banks for high quality paper used as collateral against borrowing at
the discount window”.
It is apparent from Figure 6.2, that the Prime Overdraft Rate, as well as
other short-term market interest rates are closely associated with the
new Repo Rate.  Initially, due to the uncertainties regarding the new
system, the Repo Rate fluctuated widely, but soon became steadier.  In
Figure 6.2, it is evident that the other money market interest rates
followed the trend of the Repo Rate perfectly, increasing when the Repo
Rate increased and vice versa. The positive relationship between the
Repo Rate and the other money market interest rates that is expected
to exist is clearly evident.
It would appear that the Repo Rate has thus far changed in line with
conditions on the domestic and external front.  In April 1998 the rand
came under pressure and the SARB under-provided the estimated daily
liquidity requirement, nudging the Repo Rate higher  (SARB, 1998e: 39).
This occurred after the Russian government unilaterally declared a
moratorium on the repayment of the rouble-denominated debt, and non-
residents began to withdraw large sums of portfolio investment made in
South African government bonds  (Stals, 1999c: 3).  The Repo Rate
increased to as much as 21,86 percent in September 1998 and
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remained there until it was clear that the crisis was over.  It is also
evident that the Repo Rate, as the other money market interest rates,
changed relatively quickly and easily.  The Repo Rate increased from
14,79 percent in May 1998, to 21,86 percent in September 1998  (SARB,
1998d: 25).  Thus, at the time of the crisis, the Repo Rate showed its
flexibility in the extent of the upward adjustment made in this short period
of time. 
The curve of the Repo Rate in Figure 6.2 appears to be much smoother
if compared to that of the Bank Rate in Figure 6.1.  In theory, the Repo
Rate is not fully determined and set by the SARB, but allowed to
fluctuate with the market.  Being market determined makes it possible
for the Repo Rate to change at smaller intervals than the previous Bank
Rate, being sensitive to such fluctuations.
There does not appear to be a substantial time lag between changes in
the Repo Rate and money market interest rates as there was with the
Bank Rate and money market interest rates.  Figure 6.2 shows that the
market interest rates reacted to changes in the Repo Rate almost
immediately.  For example, in May 1998, when strains developed in the
foreign exchange market, the Repo Rate adjusted upwards sharply and
quickly, and the other rates followed suit immediately. According to Stals
 (1999a: 2), the repurchase system was introduced for the “…specific
purpose of accommodating periodic volatile situations in the financial
markets”.
The volatile behaviour of the money market interest rates as explained
above in the analysis of the Bank Rate and money market interest rates,
has not been observed under the new system.  One can conclude from
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Figure 6.2 that money market interest rates have largely followed the
trend of the Repo Rate, increasing when the Repo Rate increases and
vice versa.  In this respect, it is clear that the Repo Rate has been an
interest rate leader, and not a follower as the Bank Rate had been. 
Furthermore, under the new system, it would appear that conditions in
money market liquidity and the signals sent out by the SARB certainly do
affect changes in the Repo Rate, and hence, the money market interest
rates.  The signalling mechanism of the SARB, as explained in Chapter
Five, appears to be relatively efficient.  During the crisis in May 1998, the
SARB under-provided the daily liquidity requirement, and only provided
60 percent of banks’ estimated liquidity needs  (SARB, 1998e: 46).  The
Repo Rate reacted by increasing substantially, as did the other money
market interest rates.  This issue, however, will be explored later in 6.5.
Finally, from Figure 6.2, it is apparent that as from May 1998, the
Marginal Lending Rate increased dramatically.  This was necessary to
achieve the goal of this facility as a last resort lending facility.  Whether
this has been achieved will be discussed in 6.4.  However, referring back
to Figure 6.2, it is evident that the Marginal Lending Rate has always
remained well above the Repo Rate, and has followed the trend of the
Repo Rate.
As mentioned in Chapter Five, the SARB believes that daily changes in
the Repo Rate should not lead to volatility in the Prime Overdraft Rate.
 In Figure 6.1, it is evident that the gap between the Bank Rate and the
Prime Overdraft Rate was always approximately three or four
percentage points.  In Figure 6.2, it would appear that there is still a
three or four percentage point difference between the Repo Rate and
the Prime Overdraft Rate.  According to SARB (1999a: 25), during the
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crisis in 1998, and the resultant volatility in the Repo Rate, the banks
were guided in the setting of their Prime Overdraft Rates by the
prevailing margin between the Prime Overdraft Rate and the Repo Rate
of the SARB.  Following the decrease in the Repo Rate in October 1998,
if this margin widened to more than four percentage points during this
period, the banks would respond by lowering their Prime Overdraft Rates
by approximately one percentage point at a time.  Thus, one could
conclude that the Prime Overdraft Rate is linked to a moving average of
the Repo Rate, because it will change only after the Repo Rate has
changed by approximately four basis points. 
From the above discussion, one can conclude the following differences
between the two systems of monetary control.  Firstly, the Bank Rate
stayed at the same level for long periods of time whereas the Repo Rate
changes much more frequently.  Secondly, there was a positive
association between the Bank Rate and money market interest rates, but
this association is also present under the repurchase system.  Thirdly,
the curve of the Repo Rate is much smoother than that of the Bank
Rate, and the benefit of this is increased money market stability. 
Fourthly, the movements in interest rates under the previous system
reflected market expectations as to what the SARB was likely to do, and
as such did not send out accurate signals to the market or the SARB.
 Under the repurchase system, however, movements in interest rates
seem to be grounded in actual market conditions.  Furthermore, under
the previous system, there were time lags between changes in the Bank
Rate and money market interest rates, and at times, the Bank Rate
would be an interest rate follower and not a leader.  These lags have not
been evident under the repurchase system, and the Repo Rate appears
to be in the lead at all times.  Finally, the volatile behaviour of interest
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rates as experienced in the previous system has not been observed in
the new system.  It would appear that the Repo Rate is more flexible,
sensitive, and quick to respond to external fluctuations, and therefore
has been more efficient than the Bank Rate system.
6.3 MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH
6.3.1 The Bank Rate and Money Supply Growth versus the Repo Rate
and Money Supply Growth
Figure 6.3 shows the relationship between the Bank Rate and the money
supply growth rate, and Figure 6.4 shows the relationship between the
Repo Rate and the money supply growth rate.  It is clear from Figure 6.3
that the M3 money supply growth rates consistently breached the upper
limits of the guideline range of between 6 and 10 percent, between 1996
and 1998.  Figure 6.3 reveals that this has occurred despite a fairly high
and rising Bank Rate in 1997, which stood at 17 percent.  It is apparent
that the M3 money supply growth met the guideline ranges very rarely.
Referring again to Figure 6.3, it is evident that in the overall period of
May 1996 to February 1998, the Bank Rate did not appear to have a
material effect on the growth rate in the M3 money supply.  There may
have been instances when the increase in the Bank Rate succeeded in
bringing down the M3 money supply growth, however, most of the time
it appeared to have been ineffective.  For example, restrictive monetary
policy did succeed in decreasing the rate of growth in the money supply
in the first few months of 1996  (Stals, 1996: 1).  In the first half of 1996,
the M3 growth decreased after the SARB increased its Bank Rate. 
However, according to the SARB Training Institute  (1999: 31), the
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Figure 6.3
BANK RATE VS MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH
1996/01 – 1998/03
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
Figure 6.4
REPO RATE VS MONEY SUPPLY GROWTH
1998/03 – 2000/02
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
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increase in the Bank Rate appeared to be a result of the weakness of
the rand at the time, rather than a response to the movements in the M3
money supply growth rate.  The Bank Rate was ineffective in curbing the
growth in the M3 money supply in the previous system of
accommodation.
The trend in the Bank Rate further seems isolated from the trend in the
M3 money supply growth rate in Figure 6.3.  There appears to be no
correlation present between the two.  The negative relationship that is
expected to exist is not evident, serving as a further indication that the
Bank Rate did not appear to be successful in its objective of influencing
the growth in the M3 money supply.  Furthermore, the money supply has
been highly volatile, yet the Bank Rate has changed infrequently, and as
such could not have a noticeable effect on the growth in the M3 money
supply.
For the above reasons, the implementation of the new repurchase
system coincided with a more eclectic approach.  As discussed in
Chapter Five, the SARB de-emphasised the importance of the M3
money supply growth, and set target guideline ranges for a period of
three years at a time, and not twelve months at a time  (Stals, 1998a:
10).  Furthermore, the SARB now uses a set of indicators, and not just
the M3 money supply as an indicator, making it much less significant in
the new system. 
Referring to the new system in Figure 6.4, for most of 1999, the target
guideline ranges have been reached.  This cannot be attributed solely
to the new repurchase system, but also to the improved global economic
and financial conditions, and the significant decrease in the growth in
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total domestic credit extended to the private and banking sector, which
forms a large part of the M3 money supply (SARB, 1999c: 34).  The M3
money supply growth rate does seem to be under control, staying below
the target guideline ranges for much longer periods of time than under
the Bank Rate system.
Further, there appears to be a positive relationship between the M3
money supply growth and the Repo Rate, as is evident in Figure 6.4. 
According to Van den Heever (2000), the M3 money supply in South
Africa consists mostly of interest-bearing deposits, with just a small
fraction of coins and notes that does not earn interest.  As such, if
interest rates rise, it encourages people to hold more of their wealth in
M3 deposits, and therefore, one might expect a bit of a perverse short-
run relationship.  It would only be in the long-run that higher interest
rates would dampen income and expenditure, which would reduce the
transactions demand for money, as discussed in Chapter Two, and then
the conventionally expected negative relationship will emerge.  Hence,
one would expect a positive relationship in the short-run. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the Repo Rate and the M3 money
supply in Figure 6.4 seems much closer than that between the Bank
Rate and M3 in Figure 6.3.  The volatility as experienced in the Bank
Rate system is also not evident under the repurchase system.
Thus, in the previous system of accommodation, the money supply
growth constantly exceeded the upper guideline range set by the SARB.
This occurred despite high and rising interest rates in the period of 1996
to 1997.  There were instances when the guideline ranges were met, but
it occurred rarely and for very short periods of time.  Under the
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repurchase system, the money supply has stayed within the guideline
ranges for most of the time.  Furthermore, the negative relationship that
is expected to exist between the Bank Rate and money supply growth
in the short-term is not evident in Figure 6.3, neither is it evident in
Figure 6.4.  This is probably due to the content of the money supply and
time lags.  Also, money supply growth has been highly volatile, yet the
Bank Rate has changed infrequently.  The trend between the money
supply growth and the Repo Rate has been much smoother, and the
trend less volatile.
6.4 ACCOMMODATION
6.4.1 Comparison between the Bank Rate and the Repo Rate regarding
Accommodation
As indicated in Chapter Five, under the previous system,
accommodation referred to the provision of overnight loans at the Bank
Rate against the collateral of treasury bills, Reserve Bank bills, Land
Bank bills and central government bonds with an unexpired maturity of
91 days or less.  Under the new repurchase system, accommodation
refers to the tendering for funds through repurchase agreements, where
bids are covered by a sufficient amount of eligible underlying assets
which can only consist of treasury bills, Land Bank bills, Reserve Bank
debentures and central government bonds, irrespective of maturity 
(SARB, 1998f: 2).  First-tier accommodation refers to accommodation
provided to banks at the Bank Rate under the previous system, and now
the Repo Rate.  Second-tier accommodation refers to accommodation
provided to banks at the Bank Rate plus a margin under the previous
system, and now at the Marginal Lending Rate under the new system.
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Figure 6.5
BANK RATE VS ACCOMMODATION
1996/01 – 1998/03
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
Figure 6.6
REPO RATE VS ACCOMMODATION
1998/03 – 2000/01
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
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Figure 6.5 plots the relationship between the Bank Rate and the level of
first and second-tier accommodation.  Figure 6.6 is the relationship
between the Repo Rate, the level of accommodation provided under the
Marginal Lending Facility and the level of accommodation provided at
the Repo Rate.  Figure 6.5 indicates that in the previous system of
accommodation, the Bank Rate seemed to be insensitive to liquidity
changes.  As discussed previously in 6.2, expectations about changes
in the Bank Rate appeared to be a much more important factor in the
movements of interest rates, than money market liquidity.  The size of
the money market shortage seemed to have no significant influence on
money market interest rates because of the neutral expectations
environment where these rates remained posted to the Bank Rate,
which itself was not influenced by the money market shortage.  Thus, the
SARB found it difficult to signal its views on interest rates to market
participants through variations in the liquidity shortage.  It was only after
prolonged and sustained increases in the money market shortage and
when second-tier accommodation was provided that a reaction was
detected.  In Figure 6.5, for example, in the last four months of 1996,
when second-tier accommodation was utilised, only then did the Bank
Rate increase.
According to Van der Merwe  (1997b: 4), market interest rates did not
respond well to liquidity conditions, and as such, did not accurately
reflect money market conditions.  Market interest rates were usually only
affected by the size of the shortage when second-tier accommodation
was provided, and generally were much more responsive to actual or
expected Bank Rate changes. Thus, the SARB experienced difficulties
when attempting to signal its views on interest rates to market
participants through variations in the liquidity shortage.
130
Furthermore, the SARB relied primarily on long-term government bonds
in its open market operations, with settlement periods of 8 - 14 days 
(Van der Merwe, 1997b: 3).  This helped to explain why open market
operations did not have an immediate effect on interest rates. South
African banks also had easy access to financing from abroad, so upward
pressures on interest rates when domestic liquidity was tight were not as
pronounced as would have been otherwise.  All of this was exacerbated
by the fact that the banks had easy access to SARB accommodation at
a fixed Bank Rate.  Money market interest rates seemed to react to the
size of the money market shortage with a substantial time lag.
One would expect to find a negative correlation between the Bank Rate
and accommodation, but this is not evident in Figure 6.5.  At  times, it
would appear to be the complete opposite.  There is no clear negative
relationship in the short-term between the Bank Rate and
accommodation, the two appear to be isolated from each other. 
Finally, regarding the use of second-tier accommodation, it is quite
evident from Figure 6.5, that banks made frequent use of this facility
under the previous system.  As such, it sometimes defeated the purpose
of monetary control as discussed in Chapter Five.  A possible
explanation, not evident in these figures, is that the difference between
the Bank Rate and the rate used to provide second-tier accommodation
was not large enough to discourage its use.  The rate on second-tier
accommodation was generally between 1,5 and 0,75 percentage points
above the Bank Rate  (SARB, 1998f: 1).  Furthermore, second-tier
accommodation was used frequently because accommodation was so
easily available from the SARB.
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In Figure 6.6, it appears that under the repurchase system, the Repo
Rate has been far more responsive to liquidity conditions than the
previous system had been.  The negative correlation that is expected to
exist between the Repo Rate and accommodation is more apparent in
Figure 6.6.  For example, when the level of accommodation increased
in the first half of 1998, the Repo Rate increased sharply, and the level
of accommodation began to decline again.  At this time, there was
financial turbulence in the South East Asian markets, which had spillover
effects in South Africa.  As a result, conditions were tight, and only in the
last three months of 1998, did liquidity conditions ease and the Repo
Rate begin to decline. 
Between February and August 1999, there was a negative correlation
between the Repo Rate and the level of accommodation.  The Repo
Rate continued to decline, while the level of accommodation required
increased.  This was, however, due to the actions of the SARB, which
caused the daily liquidity requirement of banks to increase steadily,
through its liquidity-draining operations. This was intended to increase
private banks’ dependency on central bank funding and therefore their
participation in respect of the daily auction of repurchase agreements
 (SARB, 1999e: 43).  The SARB drained liquidity by means of entering
into foreign currency swap transactions with the private banks; issuance
of SARB debentures; and conducting reverse repurchase operations in
government securities  (SARB, 1999d: 35). 
In Figure 6.6, between September and December 1999, the Repo Rate
continued to decline whilst accommodation also decreased.  This
behaviour was somewhat unexpected, as it was contrary to the negative
relationship that is expected to exist between the two.  However, this
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relationship occurred as a result of concerns by the SARB about the
seizing up of liquidity in the money market because of millennium-related
problems.  These problems caused the SARB to change its strategy and
to deliberately assist in the easing of the liquidity positions of banks in
the fourth quarter (SARB, 1999c: 43).  Since the SARB deliberately
eased liquidity conditions, there was no reason for the Repo Rate to
increase in response to this.
The time lag associated with the previous system of accommodation
does not appear to be evident in the new system.  This is because of the
flexibility and sensitivity of the Repo Rate as discussed in 6.2. 
Furthermore, banks no longer have the easy access to SARB
accommodation they had before, and the settlement period of the
repurchase transactions is presently much shorter.  When the
repurchase system was first introduced, the repurchase transactions had
a maturity of seven days, however with the crisis in May 1998, it was
reduced to one day  (SARB Training Institute, 1998: 51).
Regarding the marginal lending facility, referring to Figure 6.6, it would
appear that the SARB has had considerable success in achieving its
goal of making this facility one of a last resort lending facility.  When the
repurchase system was first implemented in March 1998, it is apparent
in Figure 6.6, that banks still made use of the marginal lending facility to
a large extent.  However, when the SARB increased the Marginal
Lending Rate in May 1998, banks cut down their use of this facility and
it is subsequently barely ever used.  The amount loaned under this
facility decreased from R7, 3 billion on 22 May 1998 at a rate of 18,8
percent, to R1, 5 billion in June 1998, at a rate of 44 percent  (SARB,
1998e: 45).
133
Under the repurchase system as portrayed in Figure 6.6, there appears
to be an efficient functioning money market, where interest rates are co-
determined by the SARB and the private banks, and not solely by the
SARB as previously. Thus, money market interest rates appear to be far
more responsive to liquidity conditions than previously.  The negative
relationship between the Repo Rate is more evident under the new
system than it was under the Bank Rate system, and the time lags
associated with the previous system are not apparent under the
repurchase system.  Finally, the SARB has achieved its goal of making
the marginal lending facility a last resort facility, as much less use has
been made of accommodation at the Marginal Lending Rate.   Under the
previous system, greater use was made of second-tier accommodation
than under the repurchase system.
6.5 UNDER/OVERPROVISION OF LIQUIDITY AND THE REPO
RATE
Under the previous system, accommodation was provided automatically
and to the full extent of the money market shortage.  Therefore, signals
were sent out through variations in the Bank Rate.  However, from the
analysis in 6.4.1, it is apparent that the SARB found it difficult to signal
its views on interest rates to market participants, and hence, the
signalling mechanism was ineffective. Under the new procedures, banks
bid for funds through daily auctions, and they are not always
accommodated to the full extent of the money market shortage.  It is
through changes in the level of liquidity provided that signals are sent
out.  The SARB has made it clear that an under-provision signals that it
would like to see interest rates rise.  An over-provision would in turn
mean that the SARB would like to see interest rates decrease, and a full
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provision implies a neutral monetary policy stance.  It is therefore
important to look at whether this signalling mechanism has been
efficient.
Referring now to Figure 6.7, in the first four months of 1998, monetary
policy was broadly neutral and the Repo Rate remained relatively stable.
 In May and June 1998, the Asian contagion affected South Africa and
it is apparent from Figure 6.7 that the SARB under-provided the money
market shortage significantly. During this time the Repo Rate increased
dramatically.  It was only between 26 May 1998 and 14 June 1998, when
the SARB fixed the Repo Rate at 18 percent, that the under/over-
provision did not affect the Repo Rate (SARB, 1998e: 38).  However,
when the fixed rate auction was abandoned, the SARB under-provided
the money market shortage and the Repo Rate increased dramatically.
Figure 6.7
UNDER/OVERPROVISION OF LIQUIDITY VS REPO RATE
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(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
At the beginning of July, the daily liquidity requirement was over-provided
and the Repo Rate decreased.  However, between July and September
1998 the SARB under-provided the daily liquidity requirement and the
Repo Rate increased steadily.  It was only from mid-October when the
daily under-provision was met in full that the Repo Rate entered a period
of general decline, and then remained fixed at 12 percent between
November and December 1999.
At the end of June 1999, the SARB over-provided the money market
shortage, signalling its preparedness to accept a faster decline in the
Repo Rate  (SARB, 1999d: 30).  The change in the Repo Rate is evident
in Figure 6.7 where the slope of the curve is steeper.  In July 1999, the
SARB under-provided the money market shortage by R10 million,
signalling a slowdown in the Repo Rate  (SARB, 1999d: 30).  In Figure
6.7, this is once again evident by the flatter Repo Rate curve in this
period.  There is a clear negative relationship between the Repo Rate
and the amount of liquidity provided in Figure 6.7.
When the SARB under/over-provides the money market shortage, clear
signals are sent out and the Repo Rate behaves accordingly.  Previously
the SARB accommodated the money market shortage fully and
automatically, and so had to send signals via changes in the Bank Rate.
However, as discussed in 6.4.1, this signalling mechanism was
ineffective.  The money market shortage seems to have a much more
significant influence on the Repo Rate than what it had under the Bank
Rate system.  The repurchase system has worked very well in this
respect, sending out clear signals, and allowing the appropriate
adjustments in the Repo Rate to take place.  One can therefore
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conclude that the SARB appears to have been successful in terms of its
signalling mechanism.
6.6 CONCLUSION
Under the Bank Rate system of accommodation, there was a positive
association between the Bank Rate and money market interest rates.
 However, the Bank Rate changed infrequently, and so did money
market interest rates, despite a few minor fluctuations.  Thus, money
market interest rates and the Bank rate were rigid and inflexible. 
Furthermore, money market interest rates reacted to changes in the
Bank Rate with a substantial time lag, and this was inefficient.  Money
market interest rates also reflected the market’s expectations as to what
would happen to the Bank Rate in future, and did not reflect the true
market conditions.  Sometimes, money market interest rates were
volatile, with interest rates decreasing at times when liquidity was tight,
instead of increasing, as they should.  Thus, under the previous system
of accommodation, money market interest rates were inflexible and
insensitive to domestic and external fluctuations.  They were unable to
send accurate and reliable signals to the SARB. 
Under the repurchase system, however, there is clearly a positive
relationship between money market interest rates and the Repo Rate.
Money market interest rates and the Repo Rate have changed in line
with conditions on the domestic and external fronts, and have reacted in
a quick and sharp manner. The Repo Rate is grounded in actual money
market conditions, and not determined by market expectations of the
likely actions of the SARB.  The time lag associated with the previous
system is not evident under the repurchase system, and the volatile
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behaviour of interest rates has not been evident.  The Repo Rate and
money market interest rates appear to be much more flexible and
sensitive to market conditions, than the previous Bank Rate system.
Regarding the M3 money supply growth, it regularly breached the upper
limits of the SARB’s guideline range, despite the Bank Rate being at a
high level.  Changes in the Bank Rate did not appear to have a material
effect in curbing the growth of M3 under the previous system.  However,
under the new system, the SARB has de-emphasised the significance
of the M3 money supply growth rate.  Under the new procedures, the
growth in the M3 has stayed within the target guideline ranges for most
of the time, but this has not been attributable solely to the repurchase
system, but to improved global financial conditions.  However, the growth
in the M3 does appear to have been put under more effective control in
the new system, and it has therefore been more successful than the
previous system in this regard.
Finally, in the previous system of accommodation, the Bank Rate and
money market interest rates seemed to be insensitive to changes in
money market liquidity.  This was a result of the neutral expectations
environment prevalent in South Africa.  Due to this, the SARB found it
difficult to signal its views, and only when second-tier accommodation
was used, did the Bank Rate increase.  All of this was exacerbated by
the fact that banks had easy access to SARB accommodation.
Furthermore, there was no clear negative relationship between the Bank
Rate and accommodation.  Under the repurchase system, the Repo
Rate seems to be far more responsive to liquidity conditions, and the
negative relationship between the Repo Rate and level of
accommodation is evident.  The SARB has also appeared to be
137
successful in terms of signalling to the market in its under/over-providing
actions.  Finally, the marginal lending facility has been restored to a
facility of last resort.  Much less use is now made of second-tier
accommodation under the marginal lending facility.  The repurchase
system appears to have been much more successful than the Bank Rate
system.  It is more sensitive, quick to respond, and generally works more
efficiently.
The impact of the new system on the development of the interbank loans
market is the topic of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN
RESERVE BANK ACCOMMODATION PROCEDURES
AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERBANK LOANS
MARKET
7.1 INTRODUCTION
One of the objectives of this study is to examine whether the interbank
loans market has become more developed since the introduction of the
repurchase system of accommodation.  The interbank market seems not
to have developed under the previous Bank Rate system.  This was
apparently due to the easy access banks had to SARB accommodation,
which discouraged active trading in treasury bills and short dated
government bonds  (Van der Merwe, 1997b: 2).  However, with the
introduction of the new system, it was hoped that the interbank market
would become more developed and active.
7.2 BACKGROUND TO THE INTERBANK LOANS MARKET
Under the previous system of accommodation, banks had to hold
statutory minimum cash reserves based on the size of their liabilities.
The minimum cash reserve requirement was 2 percent of total liabilities
less capital and reserves, and amounts owing by banks and mutual
banks.  There was a further 1 percent of banks’ short-term liabilities after
adjusting for deposits pledged as security for loans, amounts owing by
banks, and 50 percent of remittances in transit  (Van der Merwe, 1998:
7). 
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These minimum cash reserves were held in reserve accounts, besides
which banks also maintained current or free balance accounts with the
SARB.  These were used to deposit free reserves, which were used as
a first line of liquidity or for settling interbank claims arising out of the
daily cheque clearing (Falkena, Faure, & Kok, 1984: 37).  The
automated cheque clearing bureau (ACB) calculated the settlement of
claims banks had with each other.
Interbank settlement under this system did not take cognisance of
increasing exposures and risks, which, because of the exponential
increase in the volume and values of transactions, grew very large. 
Neither the banks, nor the SARB, knew what the settlement exposure of
any particular bank would be, since it was determined to a large extent
by the payment transactions of the customers of banks, with
computation being an “after-the-event affair”  (SARB, 1998h: 1).  Banks
therefore had no way of determining what their settlement obligations
would be.  The ACB settlement procedure required manual intervention
and did not provide banks with any intra-day information.  Finally, the
system was ultimately dependent on the SARB for settlement, and
failure to meet settlement obligations at the time of settlement would
cause serious disruptions in the financial system  (SARB, 1998h: 1).
In March 1998, with the introduction of the repurchase system, the ACB
cheque clearing system was replaced by the new National Payments
System (NPS), facilitated by the introduction of the South African
Multiple Options Settlement System (SAMOS).  Under the SAMOS
system, all registered banks are eligible to open settlement and loan
accounts with the SARB, so that they are able to directly participate in
the interbank settlement process.  The SAMOS system works on a
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prefunding principle, where payments can be made only if the paying
bank has sufficient funds in its settlement account (SARB, 1997c: 2).
This removes the problem of settlement failure. Furthermore, with the
introduction of the repurchase system, the minimum cash reserve
requirements of banks was changed to 2,5 percent of their total
liabilities. It was indicated in Chapter Five that the SARB uses an
average basis, where the cash reserves have to be maintained over the
period of one month, and not on a daily period as previously  (Hugo,
1998: 2).  Banks therefore have more flexibility in managing their liquidity
on an on-line, real-time basis.  Daily and intra-day calculations of
compliance to the cash reserve requirements are made possible  (Van
der Merwe, 1997b: 16). 
Changes in the interbank settlement system during 1998 improved the
clearing process in the market and allowed banks to use the available
reserves more economically  (Van der Walt, Wesso, & Morudu, 1999: 8).
 Actions by the SARB to accommodate temporary reserves effectively
stabilised the interbank settlement market.
7.3 FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERBANK MARKET
The interbank market is an informal market where banks lend funds to
each other, where the amounts are generally large and the maturities
are of a short (overnight) nature.  The funds in the interbank market take
the form of NCD’s, non-negotiable deposits and other loans and
advances  (Van der Walt, Wesso, & Morudu, 1999: 8).  As stated above,
one of the reasons for the introduction of the new system of
accommodation was to further develop South Africa’s financial markets,
by giving a boost to the interbank market in overnight and other very
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short-term funds, and to the markets in short-term market instruments
 (Meijer, 1999: 6). In South Africa, funds in the international interbank
market form a very small portion of the total funds in the interbank
market  (Van der Walt, Wesso, & Morudu, 1999: 8).
At the end of the daily cheque clearing, banks have to transmit
settlement instructions to the SAMOS system, but are generally left with
a temporary excess or shortfall on their clearing accounts with the
SARB.  However, in order to submit settlement instructions, they need
to have funds available in their settlement accounts.  Banks therefore
need a channel for making good the shortages of some from the
surpluses of others.  Such a channel in the United States is known as
the ’federal funds market”, or in South Africa, the “call fund”.  This
mechanism is supplemented by interbank lending  (RSA, 1985: 24).
Should banks be short of funds, they currently have a number of funding
options:
‰ borrowing from the SARB under the repurchase system;
‰ utilising their required cash reserve funds or liquid asset holdings to
obtain funds from the SARB;
‰ utilising call funds;
‰ borrowing under the marginal lending facility, and finally;
‰ borrowing from the interbank loans market.  
Approximately 80 percent of banking business are presently conducted
by the big four18commercial banks in South Africa.  When faced with
deficits at the daily cheque clearing, these banks try to avoid undertaking
                                                
18
ABSA BANK, NEDCOR, FIRST NATIONAL BANK, and STANDARD BANK.
143
significant repurchase agreements with the SARB, and instead, opt to
borrow from the interbank market at the Interbank Rate. The Interbank
Rate generally lies below the rate for SARB funds.  Banks would also
borrow under this facility should they lack the suitable collateral to obtain
the use of funds under the repurchase system  (Van der Merwe, 1998:
8).
The previous Bank Rate, and now the Repo Rate, is set above the
Interbank Rate, because should a bank experience a debit position, it
would not have any reason to pay more than the SARB’s rate for
additional cash balances. If the Interbank Rate were above the Bank
Rate or Repo Rate, banks would first borrow from the SARB.  This would
then inhibit the development of the interbank market.  Similarly, if a bank
experiences a credit position, it would not be willing to accept a lower
rate than the SARB’s rate on its clearing surplus, or anticipated clearing
surplus  (Meijer, 1997: 15).  Previously, the SARB rarely paid interest on
banks’ cash balances or any portion thereof, and if the SARB did pay
interest, it would be at a rate which was not market-related or
competitive  (Meijer, 1997: 15).  Under the new procedures, the SARB
does not pay any interest on these balances at all. Therefore, just as
banks would opt to borrow from the interbank market before approaching
the SARB, so banks will avoid maintaining a surplus cash balance with
the SARB.  These surplus cash balances can therefore be passed on to
banks which are indebted by means of interbank loans. This is one of a
number of co-operative relationships banks have with each other in
order to facilitate the smooth functioning of money and credit markets
 (Lipsey, Steiner, Purvis & Courant, 1990: 652).
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The level of interest rates in the interbank market is dependent on the
previous day’s general level of interest rates and the estimated size of
the current and future cash shortage faced by the market  (Van der
Merwe, 1998: 7).  The monetary authorities in South Africa do not regard
the new interest rate established in the interbank market on any
particular day as an indicator of future trends in interest rates.  It does,
however, have an influence on expectations and consequently on other
money market interest rates  (Van der Merwe, 1998: 8).  The interest
rates in the interbank market tend to move closely in line with the rates
prevailing in the domestic money market  (Bank of International
Settlements, 1983: 8).
7.4 THE INTERBANK MARKET IN GERMANY
It is useful to look at the German case, in order to establish how the
interbank market has developed there, and to make a comparison
between South Africa and Germany.  This section forms part of the
German case study in Chapter Four, but is presented here for
convenience.  The interbank market in Germany, as in South Africa, is
largely driven by reserve management considerations.  The period over
which the required level of reserves is computed, begins on the 16th day
of each month, and ends on the 15th day of the following month  (London
School of Economics, 1994: 87).  This implies that banks will either wish
to lend excess reserves, or borrow reserves to cover a deficiency.  Most
interbank deals are conducted directly between banks themselves,
rather than through brokers, and the daily turnover mainly comprises of
unsecured one-day loans, although maturities stretch out to one year.
The rates in the interbank market exhibit very little intra-day movement,
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remaining close to the official interest rates on regular repurchase
agreements (London School of Economics, 1994: 83).
The Overnight Rate, which is the interest rate charged on interbank
loans, will be equal to, or lower than the official rate at which lombard
credit (as discussed in Chapter Four) is available to banks, and equal to,
or higher than the official rate at which the Bundesbank sells treasury
bills.  Although the Overnight Rate can lie anywhere in this corridor, it
generally lies close to the rate on securities repurchase agreements 
(London School of Economics, 1994: 92).  Changes in these two rates
are regarded as significant indicators of a change in the stance of
monetary policy, since they are designed to permit either a higher or
lower overall level of short-term interbank rates.
The Overnight Rate is relatively stable during the maintenance period,
because of the high level of reserves banks hold in order to meet their
cash reserve requirements.  It is only as the end of the reserve
maintenance period approaches that the Overnight Rate becomes more
variable, because banks are less able to work off any deviations from
their average reserve balances.
Banks are charged a penalty rate of 3 percentage points above the
lombard rate for failing to meet their reserve requirements, therefore they
will use lombard credit if they cannot obtain funds on the interbank
market.  This works much the same way in South Africa, where banks
are charged the Marginal Lending Rate, which is also a penalty rate if
they fail to meet their cash reserve requirements.  Furthermore, the
Bundesbank may not be prepared to sell treasury bills on the final day
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of meeting the cash reserve requirement, therefore the Overnight Rate
may fall to zero if banks in aggregate find they have excess reserves.
7.5 ADVANTAGES OF HAVING A MORE DEVELOPED
INTERBANK MARKET
According to Van der Walt, Wesso & Morudu (1999: 7), an active
interbank market eases the liquidity management of banks and improves
the efficiency of the money market as a whole.  In many countries,
attempting to improve financial efficiency has led to greater volatility in
interest rates.  With a well functioning interbank market and other money
markets, this risk can be reduced.  Furthermore, the averaging principle,
as discussed in Chapter Five, in the application of the cash reserve
requirement, should ensure more stability in short-term interest rates
while making use of repurchase agreements  (Barnard, 1998: 12).
A more active interbank market also implies that rates in this market are
more responsive to changes in banking conditions, as some banks are
reluctant to borrow for a week under the repurchase system when their
need for such cash could quickly disappear  (Barnard, 1998: 18).  This
will therefore give a better signal of conditions on the monetary policy
front to the central bank.  Thus, it implies more responsive and sensitive
interest rates in the interbank market, as well as better signalling from
the market to the SARB. 
A close correlation should exist between the Repo Rate and call interest
rates in the money market under normal financial conditions  (Barnard,
1998: 18). This implies that the Interbank Rate will move in harmony with
the Repo Rate, increasing when the Repo Rate increases and vice
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versa.  A more active interbank market also implies that less use will be
made of the marginal lending facility, which is one of the objectives of
the new repurchase system. A more active interbank market implies that
banks will approach each other for funds before borrowing under the
repurchase facility or marginal lending facility, since such a route would
be the more costly one.  With a more active interbank market, in terms
of banks’ management of their cash, their accounts with the SARB must
be in order, and therefore better managed  (Hugo, 1998: 7).
An active interbank market makes it easier for banks to adjust the
volume of their assets and liabilities, as some banks may find they can
attract more deposits than they can use, while others may be unable to
take advantage of lending opportunities because of a shortage of funds.
 Thus, non-bank depositors and end-users can more efficiently be
brought together if banks transfer funds between themselves  (Bank of
International Settlements, 1983: 10).
Banks are likewise better able to manage interest rate risks arising from
their customer business under an active interbank market.  If a bank
funds a six-month customer loan with a three-month customer deposit,
it faces an interest rate risk.  This can be avoided by placing the deposit
in the interbank market and funding the loan with six-month funds
borrowed from the market.  Therefore, banks can hedge mismatches
resulting from differences in interest rate periods  (Bank of International
Settlements, 1983: 10).
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Finally, the interbank market can be a source of profit by correctly
anticipating interest rate movements and placing them for a few months
when the yield curve is positive and when interest rates subsequently fall
 (Bank of International Settlements, 1983: 11).
7.5.1 Risks associated with the Interbank Market
Although the interbank market has many advantages associated with its
use, there are also risks involved, which need mentioning.  One of the
major risks banks face is that of creditworthiness.  Any bank is eligible
to borrow from the interbank market provided it can convince other
banks that it is creditworthy (Bank of International Settlements, 1983:
32).  Major banks have lines19 which are unadvised (where the borrowing
bank is not told how large its line is), and uncommitted (where the lender
is not obliged to provide any funds).  A variety of factors are used to
influence a bank’s assessment, such as the reputation of the bank,
quality of management, degree of personal contact and day-to-day
information provided by dealing in the market  (Bank of International
Settlements, 1983: 34).  The majority of banks have a wide spread of
loans in their portfolio and as such, bank lending to them is in the same
sense sharing this portfolio.  By diversifying their portfolio’s, banks can
decrease the risk involved.  Not all banks, however, have well diversified
portfolios or are well managed, and banks’ monitoring procedures may
not always make an adequate distinction between the riskiness of
lending to different banks in the market  (Bank of International
Settlements, 1983: 35).
                                                
19  A line specifies the maximum amount a bank is willing to have outstanding to the
borrower at any time and the maximum maturity (Bank of International Settlements, 1983:
33).
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Therefore, the interbank market can be a profitable source of business,
if banks guard against risks created by other lending banks if they
diversify their portfolios.
7.6 DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERBANK MARKET
Competition for funds in the interbank market has been impeded to
some extent by the ever-present indebtedness of the big four banks in
aggregate to the SARB.  This, according to Meijer (1997: 15), was
unnatural and unhealthy and had a crippling effect on interbank
competition.  However, the rates quoted for deposits by the banks are
not always equal, indicating that a degree of competition for deposits
does exist in this area.  If the big four banks rely extensively on
assistance from the SARB by bidding up rates for deposits in the market,
they might find their deposit rates become somewhat uncompetitive vis-
à-vis other banks outside the big four (SARB Training Institute, 1999:
57).
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the easy former access of banks to
SARB accommodation also had a negative impact on the development
of the interbank market, because banks were accommodated
automatically and to the full extent.  As a result, they had no need to
borrow from the interbank market, as funds were so readily available
from the SARB.  Banks also on occasion held large sums of excess cash
reserves even though they did not earn interest, or if they did earn
interest on their cash reserves, it was not a market-related interest rate
(Meijer, 1999: 12).  Finally, previously banks’ minimum reserves included
interbank deposits, inhibiting the development of the interbank market.
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Banks’ minimum cash reserves are now kept at a minimum and do not
include interbank deposits as this could inhibit the development of the
market  (Hugo, 1998: 3).  Banks no longer have the easy access to
SARB accommodation and this should provide further strengthening to
the interbank market.  Finally, the SARB discourages banks from holding
excess cash reserves as they are told that these balances should, and
may be essentially held only for making good a cash balance shortfall
 (Meijer, 1999: 13).  No interest is paid on any part of the required cash
reserves, further discouraging banks from holding excess cash balances,
and instead lending the excess cash to other banks and earning interest
on these balances.
Some other central banks have also opted for a deposit facility where
surplus funds of banks can be deposited at these central banks at a
predetermined interest rate which serves as a floor for other short-term
interest rates  (Meijer, 1999: 12).  As mentioned previously, Germany
operates with an interest rate corridor, and therefore has a floor facility.
This corridor system of accommodation seems to be an arrangement
suited for countries with well developed and established markets for
interbank funds  (Meijer, 1999: 12).  South Africa does not belong to this
category.  Should this stand-by facility therefore be introduced in South
Africa for interest-bearing deposits, it may retard the development of the
interbank market.  Thus, no floor facility implies a more active interbank
market in South Africa.
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7.7 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERBANK MARKET
This section explores the efficiency and level of development of the
interbank market presently as compared to the previous system.
Figure 7.1 represents the relationship between the Bank Rate, the
Interbank Rate and the level of interbank lending.  Figure 7.2 shows the
relationship between the Repo Rate, the Interbank Rate and the level of
interbank lending.  As is evident from Figure 7.1, there were relatively
small volumes of trading in interbank loans in the period 1996 - 1997.
 It was only at the end of 1997, and beginning of 1998, that larger
volumes of interbank loans were witnessed.  As such, one could
conclude that in the 1996 - 1997 period, the interbank market was not
much developed and used.  This could probably be attributed to the
permanent indebtedness of the big four banks to the SARB, and the
easy access these banks had to SARB accommodation.
Furthermore, one would expect there to be some negative correlation
between the level of interbank lending and the Interbank Rate, but there
does not appear to be any correlation.  In fact, in the 1996 period, there
were instances when one could see a positive correlation between the
two.
As was mentioned earlier, the Bank Rate was set above the Interbank
Rate. However, from Figure 7.1, one can see that the Interbank Rate at
times rose above the Bank Rate.  Naturally, this kind of behaviour had
a negative impact on the interbank market, since no bank will pay higher
rates in the interbank market for funds than it has to at the SARB.  For
example, in May, July, and October 1996, the Interbank Rate went
Figure 7.1
INTERBANK RATE, BANK RATE & LEVEL OF INTERBANK LENDING
1996/01 – 1998/03
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
Figure 7.2
REPO RATE, INTERBANK RATE & LEVEL OF INTERBANK LENDING
1998/03 – 2000/02
(SOURCE:  Compiled using SARB data)
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above the level of the Bank Rate.  In these periods, it is evident that the
level of interbank lending decreased in response to these developments.
Towards the end of 1997, and beginning of 1998, the Interbank Rate
remained below the Bank Rate and was on a decline, and in this period
the amount of interbank lending increased significantly. Finally, there
appears to be no cyclical trend between the Interbank Rate and the
Bank Rate prior to December 1996.  The Bank Rate changed
infrequently, yet in Figure 7.1, one can see that there was a great deal
of volatility in the Interbank Rate.
Considering Figure 7.2 and the new repurchase system, as from March
1998, it would appear that the level of interbank lending has increased
since the previous system.  Between June and August 1998, more use
was made of this facility than in any period between 1996 and 1997. 
The reason for the more active interbank market could possibly be
because banks no longer have the easy access to SARB
accommodation.  In Figure 7.2, one can also see that there is a more
stable relationship between the level of interbank lending and the
Interbank Rate.  There appears to be a close correlation between the
two, with the exception of a few brief periods.  There appears to be much
less volatility in the level of interbank lending.
Finally, the Interbank Rate in Figure 7.2 appears to be sensitive to
developments in the Repo Rate.  One can see that the two have moved
in harmony with each other, and therefore the Interbank Rate has
become a more market-related rate.  The Interbank Rate has stayed
very close to the Repo Rate, as is the case in Germany.  Under the
previous system, there were times when the Interbank Rate moved
above the level of the Bank Rate, but this has not occurred under the
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new system. The Interbank Rate has always remained below the level
of the Repo Rate, and followed the same cyclical trend.  This would, in
principle encourage banks to make more use of the interbank market.
7.8 CONCLUSION
The previous system of accommodation was not successful in
enhancing the development of the interbank loans market.  This was
mainly due to the fact that the SARB accommodated the money market
shortage fully and automatically, and at a fixed Bank Rate.  As such, the
Interbank Rate was not sensitive to liquidity conditions, and at times rose
above the level of the Bank Rate.  This inhibited the development of the
interbank loans market, as banks would not borrow from the interbank
market at a higher rate than what they could get at the SARB. 
Furthermore, the banks’ minimum reserves included interbank deposits,
inhibiting the development of the interbank market.   Under the previous
system, there were smaller volumes of interbank loans, and there did not
appear to be any correlation between the Interbank Rate and the level
of interbank lending.  There was also no cyclical trend apparent between
the Interbank Rate and the Bank Rate. 
However, it appears that under the repurchase system of
accommodation there has been increased lending in the interbank
market than previously.  The Interbank Rate appears to be sensitive to
the Repo Rate, and therefore, to liquidity conditions.   The Interbank
Rate has also remained below the level of the Repo Rate, which is
another factor which helps explain why the Repo Rate has been more
successful in achieving the objective of developing the interbank market.
There appears to be a close correlation between the Interbank Rate and
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interbank lending, and the Interbank Rate appears to be following the
same trend as the Repo Rate.  The next chapter summarises the
findings and conclusions of this study. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
8.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
For the Classical economists, money supply and changes in the
money supply did not have an effect on the real economy.  Increases
in the money supply would cause increases in expenditure and
therefore the only effect this would have would be to increase prices.
The Classical economists believed that market forces would
instantaneously remove any disequilibrium. For this reason, there
would be no need for policy intervention.  Money, therefore, was
regarded as neutral and, not important.
Whereas the Classical economists focused on the money supply,
Keynes focused on money demand, and neglected supply factors.
According to Keynes, unlike under Classical assumptions, there is not
one full employment equilibrium, but a number of them, and the
economy takes a long time to adjust.  Therefore, Keynes advocated
demand management policies, and believed the adjustment would
take place through quantity and not prices. For Keynes, expectations
played a very important role, whereas the Classical economists did
not consider expectations to be important.  Under Keynesian analysis,
changes in the money supply do affect the real variables in the
economy, and therefore, he believed there to be scope for monetary
policy.  However, because Keynes viewed money demand as highly
responsive to interest rates and investment as fairly unresponsive to
interest rates, he preferred fiscal policy to monetary policy.
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Monetarists stressed the potency of money and advocated following a
monetary rule in conducting monetary policy.  Like the Keynesians,
they believed money to be non-neutral, but believed it influenced
output and prices, tending towards equilibrium in the long-term.
However, like the Classical school they also believed prices to be
flexible, a belief Keynes disagreed with. The Monetarists believed
monetary policy to be a powerful tool, and in conducting monetary
policy favoured rules and not discretion.  They also placed great
emphasis on expectations as Keynes did.
The Post-Keynesians stress uncertainty, and therefore, effective
demand failures.  Like Keynes, they also stress the importance of
expectations.  They believe that a monetary growth rule as advocated
by the Monetarists, would only serve to intensify unemployment, and
therefore, advocate the implementation of an incomes policy.  The
Post-Keynesians also believe that money is non-neutral, and therefore
has powerful real effects.  They recognise that there is also a wealth
effect where monetary policy can affect aggregate demand even if
interest rates do not change.  They further recognise the credit
rationing effect where monetary policy affects total expenditure by
changing the degree of credit rationing and thus the volume of lending
even if interest rates do not change.
Monetary policy as laid down in South Africa since the time of the De
Kock Commission, has proceeded along Post-Keynesian lines, with
Monetarist influences. This policy, which incorporated the targeting of
the M3 money supply, served the country well.  This was the case as
long as the financial markets in South Africa were relatively isolated
from the rest of the world, and exchange controls were firmly in place.
At this time, there existed a stable relationship between changes in
the money supply, and total domestic expenditure, and therefore
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between the money supply and inflation  (Stals, 1998b: 1).  The SARB
used the instruments it had at its disposal, namely, cash reserve
requirements, the discount window, interest rates charged by the
SARB on its loans and open market operations, to ensure its money
supply guidelines would be achieved.  However, with the integration of
South Africa into international markets, and the relaxation of exchange
controls, the picture changed.  The monetary policy applied was no
longer effective, and was riddled with difficulties.  For this reason, the
suitability of continuing with this policy was questioned, both within
and outside the SARB.  Central banks around the world discovered
that the successful application of money supply guidelines or targeting
posed several difficulties.
Under the Bank Rate system of accommodation, there was a positive
association between the Bank Rate and money market interest rates.
However, the Bank Rate changed infrequently, and so did money
market interest rates, despite a few minor fluctuations.  Thus, money
market interest rates and the Bank Rate were rigid and inflexible.
Furthermore, money market interest rates reacted to changes in the
Bank Rate with a substantial time lag, and this was inefficient.  Money
market interest rates also reflected the market’s expectations as to
what would happen to the Bank Rate in future, and did not reflect the
true market conditions.  Sometimes, money market interest rates
would behave perversely, with interest rates decreasing at times when
liquidity was tight, instead of increasing, as they should.  Thus, under
the previous system of accommodation, money market interest rates
were inflexible and insensitive to domestic and external fluctuations.
They were unable to send accurate and reliable signals to the SARB.
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Regarding M3 money supply growth, it regularly breached the upper
limits of the SARB’s guideline range, despite the Bank Rate being at a
high level.  Changes in the Bank Rate did not appear to have a
material effect in curbing the growth of M3 under the previous system.
Finally, in the previous system of accommodation, the Bank Rate and
money market interest rates seemed to be insensitive to changes in
money market liquidity.  This was a result of the neutral expectations
environment prevalent in South Africa.  Due to this, the SARB found it
difficult to signal its views, and only when second-tier accommodation
was used, did the Bank Rate increase.  All of this was exacerbated by
the fact that banks had easy access to SARB accommodation.
Furthermore, there was no clear negative relationship between the
Bank Rate and accommodation.
The previous system of accommodation was not successful in
enhancing the development of the interbank loans market.  This was
mainly due to the fact that the SARB accommodated the money
market shortage fully and automatically, and at a fixed Bank Rate.  As
such, the Interbank Rate was not sensitive to liquidity conditions, and
at times rose above the level of the Bank Rate.  This inhibited the
development of the interbank loans market, as banks would not
borrow from the interbank market at a higher rate than what they
could get at the SARB.  Furthermore, banks’ minimum reserves
included interbank deposits, inhibiting the development of the
interbank market.  Under the previous system, there were smaller
volumes of interbank loans, and there did not appear to be any
correlation between the Interbank Rate and the level of interbank
lending.  There was also no cyclical trend apparent between the
Interbank Rate and the Bank Rate.  With this then came the advent of
a new monetary policy.
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The new monetary policy followed by South Africa is very much like
the one used in Germany.  Prior to the period with the introduction of
the securities repurchase transactions system, the discount policy,
lombard policy and minimum reserve policy formed the key policy
instruments in Germany.  However, Germany found it increasingly
difficult to rely on these, and needed a more flexible alternative, as
these instruments proved to be cumbersome.  The lombard facility,
which was intended to be used for emergency funding, was used for
daily refinancing.  Furthermore, the country was suffering from more
frequent interest rate and exchange rate shocks from abroad. This
was the reason for the introduction of the securities repurchase
system, which provided a more flexible alternative. From this time, the
minimum reserves were held solely for regulatory purposes, and the
discount policy was no longer used as an instrument for managing
liquidity. With the extension of open market operations, in the form of
securities repurchase agreements, this has become the key
determinant of banks overall refinancing.  This change has increased
the Bundesbank’s ability to fine tune movements in the market for
interest rates, and recourse to the lombard facility has taken on its
original purpose.
With the globalisation, liberalisation, and co-operation of international
financial markets, the SARB found its previous monetary policy
instruments to be ineffective in the changing financial environment.
They were not flexible enough, and generated broad and lagged
effects.  As such, the SARB implemented the repurchase transactions
system, as was done in Germany. This was done so as to regulate
liquidity in the money market.   Under the new system, it is hoped that
interest rates will follow the Repo Rate more closely, more active use
will be made of the interbank loans market, and more market related
interest and exchange rates would be achieved. The new system was
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implemented on 9 March 1998. In the new system, the SARB will be
able to guide interest rates rather than control them. Furthermore, in
order to prevent turbulence in the domestic financial markets, the
signalling capacity of the SARB has become more important. The new
procedures make various forms of signalling possible, and are hoped
to lead to greater transparency of monetary policy than the previous
procedures.
Under the repurchase system, there is a positive relationship between
money market interest rates and the Repo Rate.  Money market
interest rates and the Repo Rate have changed in line with conditions
on the domestic and external fronts, and have reacted in a quick and
sharp manner. The Repo Rate is grounded in actual money market
conditions, and not determined by market expectations of the likely
actions of the SARB.  The time lag associated with the previous
system is not evident under the repurchase system, and the perverse
behaviour of interest rates has not been evident.  The Repo Rate and
money market interest rates appear to be much more flexible and
sensitive to market conditions, than the previous Bank Rate system.
The SARB has furthermore de-emphasised the significance of the M3
money supply growth rate.  Under the new procedures, the growth in
the M3 has stayed within the target guideline ranges for most of the
time, but this has not been attributable solely to the repurchase
system, but to improved global financial conditions.  However, the
growth in the M3 does appear to have been curbed tremendously
under the new system, and it has therefore been more successful
than the previous system in this regard.
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The Repo Rate seems to be far more responsive to liquidity
conditions, and the negative relationship between the Repo Rate and
level of accommodation is evident.  The SARB has also appeared to
be successful in terms of signalling to the market in its under/over-
providing actions.  Finally, the marginal lending facility has been
restored to a facility of last resort.  Much less use is now made of
second-tier accommodation under the marginal lending facility.  The
repurchase system appears to have been much more successful than
the Bank Rate system.  It is more sensitive, quick to respond, and
generally works more efficiently.
It appears that under the repurchase system of accommodation, there
has been more activity in the interbank market than previously.  The
Interbank Rate appears to be sensitive to the Repo Rate, and
therefore, to liquidity conditions.  The Interbank Rate has also
remained below the level of the Repo Rate, which is another factor
which helps explain why the Repo Rate has been more successful in
achieving the objective of developing the interbank market.  There
appears to be a close correlation between the Interbank Rate and
interbank lending, and the volume of interbank lending seems to be
much larger.  Finally, the Interbank Rate appears to be following the
same trend as the Repo Rate.
It would therefore appear that the repurchase system has achieved
the objectives for which it was intended.  It is evidently more efficient
and effective than the previous Bank Rate system.
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8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
With the introduction of the new repurchase system, the SARB moved
to a more eclectic approach where emphasis of its monetary policy
model shifted from movements in the money supply to using a
package of economic indicators as a guideline for making monetary
policy decisions in March 1998.  However, the SARB abandoned the
eclectic approach in 2000, and set a formal inflation target.
Undoubtedly, this new inflation-targeting model has raised numerous
questions for the conduct of monetary policy in South Africa.
Firstly, the advantages and concerns of implementing such a policy
need to be addressed.  Secondly, it is important to establish the
prerequisites for implementing such a model, and establish whether
South Africa has these in place.  Furthermore, such a model may be
in conflict with other policy objectives, and these need attention.
Another important question is how to measure inflation, that is, what
should be included in measuring the inflation target.  Finally, inflation
targets are about the future, therefore, in forecasting inflation, a
forward-looking model would have to be used, raising another
research question as to which model should be used for this purpose.
In researching this topic, it wold be useful to use another country such
as New Zealand or Canada, who have had such a policy in place for
some time.  This would be necessary in order to determine what
successes and failures they have had with this model, thereby giving
an idea of what South Africa could expect.  Furthermore, it could be
compared to the previous system of money supply targeting, to
establish how it is different and whether it has been more successful
in achieving the objectives of low inflation and price stability.
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Finally, in setting an inflation target, the central bank’s accountability
increases, and it is feared that the central bank may lose monetary
policy independence.  It also requires co-ordination between monetary
policy and fiscal policy.  These are further areas that can be
researched.
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APPENDIX I
DAILY TIMETABLE FOR REPURCHASE TRANSACTION
Deadline/Time Action by the Reserve Bank Action by Participant
+/- 09:30 Announce the final money market
shortage for the previous day as well
as the amount of liquidity provided to
banks under the marginal lending
facility.
09:45 Announce preliminary amount
available on tender – possible first
round of operations.
10:00 Deadline for bids
10:15 Announce results of round Confirm amount allotted
10:45 Split of securities
11:15 Delivery confirmation for
09:45
12:00 Announce amount available on tender
(if revised) – normal first round of
repo’s
12:15 Deadline for bids
12:30 Announce results of round Confirm amount allotted
13:00 Split of securities
13:30 Delivery confirmation for
12:00
15:00 Announce amount available on tender
(if revised) – normal second round of
repo’s
15:15 Deadline for bids
15:30 Announce results of round Confirm amount allotted
16:00 Split of securities
16:15 Delivery confirmation for
15:00
Source: SARB, 1998g: 8
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APPENDIX II
EXAMPLE OF SCREEN ANNOUNCEMENTS
+/- 09:30 The final money market shortage for the previous trading day
amounted to:
R………million.  An amount of R……..million as been provided in the marginal lending
facility.
09:45  Initial liquidity requirement forecast = R…….. million shortage
A round of fixed/variable rate repo operations is invited (if applicable).
The Bank’s Repo Rate id *% (in case of fixed rate tender).
Total amount on tender = R……..million
Maturity Date = ………
10:15  Result of repo operations  (if applicable).
Total amount allotted = R……..million at an average rate of …% (in case of variable rate
tender).
Noon First liquidity forecast revision = R……..million shortage.
A round of fixed/variable rate repo operations is invited.
The Bank’s Repo Rate is * % (in case of a fixed rate tender).
Total amount on tender = R……..million.
Maturity Date = ……..
12:30  Result of repo operations  (if applicable).
Total amount allotted = R……..million at an average rate of …% (in case of variable rate
tender).
15:00 Second liquidity forecast revision = R……..million shortage.
A round of fixed/variable rate repo operations is invited.
The Bank’s Repo Rate is * % (in case of a fixed rate tender).
Total amount on tender = R……..million.
Maturity Date = ……..
15:30  Result of repo operations  (if applicable).
Total amount allotted = R……..million at an average rate of …% (in case of variable rate
tender).
Source: SARB, 1998g: 10
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APPENDIX III
REPURCHASE TRANSACTION NOTICE
CONTACT NAME: DATE:
TIME OF ROUND:
REPO’S BETWEEN : AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE
BANK
We refer to the Reserve Bank’s telephone confirmation that, as a result of the
acceptance of bids under the round of repo operations specified above, we are to enter
today into the following repo transactions with the Reserve Bank.  This notice is given
under the Reserve Bank’s Operating Procedures relating to is repo transactions which
are subject to the Master Repurchase Agreement between us and the Reserve Bank.
SUMMARY OF BIDS:
BID
ALLOCATION
PURCHASE
PRICE
REPO
MATURITY
DATE
REPO RATE REPURCHASE
PRICE
FIRST BID
SECOND BID
THIRD BID
FOURTH BID
Totals < A + B
BONDS:
TYPE
(eg. R150)
Nominal Ytm ADJUSTED
MARKET VALUE
HAIRCUT
RATIO
MARKET
VALUE
TOTAL A
BILLS:
TYPE   Nominal Days to
Maturity
DISCOUNT
RATE
ADJUSTED
MARKET
VALUE
HAIRCUT
RATIO
MARKET
VALUE
TOTAL B
Source:  SARB, 1998g: 10
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APPENDIX IV (a)
MARGIN TRANSFER TO THE SARB
FROM:
N.B.  If insufficient room available on this form for number of securities
to.
be delivered, please fax additional forms.
PARTICULARS OF SECURITIES TO BE TRANSFERRED TO THE
RESERVE BANK.
BONDS
TYPE (e.g. R150) NOMINAL Ytm MARKET VALUE
TOTAL
BILLS
TYPE NOMINAL DAYS TO
MATURITY
DISCOUNT
RATE
MARKET VALUE
TOTAL
Source:  SARB, 1998g: 11
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APPENDIX IV (b)
MARGIN TRANSFER BY THE SARB
BONDS
TYPE
(eg. R150)
NOMINAL Ytm MARKET VALUE
TOTAL
BILLS
TYPE NOMINAL DAYS TO
MATURITY
DISCOUNT
RATE
MARKET
VALUE
TOTAL
Source: SARB, 1998g: 11
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